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The aim of this thesis is to suggest a way of employing Bayes's theorem and 
religious experience in the justification of theism that is alternative to Richard 
Swinburne's proposal. In Chapter 1,1 provide a general description of Swinburne's 
approach to the justification of theism in relation to the way he understands scientific 
inductive reasoning. Chapter 2 contains the main criticisms of that attempt, 
suggesting that if they harm Swinburne's proposal, this does not mean the whole 
Bayesian method should be rejected in this matter. Chapter 3 is devoted to criticising 
the simplicity principle, which is crucial to Swinbume's Bayesian approach. Chapter 
4 turns to the other pillar of Swinburne's programme to the justification of theism, 
that is, religious experience. In it, I describe Swinbume's account of this 
phenomenon, and hold that there are formal reasons for rejecting the role he devotes 
to it in his defence of theism. Chapter 5 continues with the criticisms of Swinburne's 
argument from religious experience, in view of the existing literature. In Chapter 6, 
Alston's approach to religious experience is analysed and interpreted in a minimalist 
way. The suggestion drawn from that reading is that this phenomenon could be used 
in a Bayesian discussion of the probability of theism to factor in the theist's initial 
probability of the hypothesis that there is a God. Chapter 7 analyses the 
intersubjective account of probability, in view of the defects displayed both by the 
logical and the subjective theories. In the final chapter I outline my application of the 
intersubjective theory of probability to the Bayesian analysis of the justification of 
theism, distinguish it from Swinburrie's proposal and suggest that my account has a 
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Notation 
In the formal expressions used in this thesis, the following notation will be 
employed. 
Signs 
Conjunction ('and') will be expressed by '. ' (as in 'e. k' for 'e and V), but in 
some quotations conjunction is also symbolised by 'A' and 
Negation ('not'): 
Multiplication: 'x', to be distinguished from Y, which designates a variable. 
Common mathematical signs such as ">", and 'Y' keep their usual 
meaning. 
Expressions 
'P(e)' is to be read as 'the probability of e'. 
'P(elh)' means 'the probability of e given h'. 
P(e h. k) 




When I left the sunny and dry Brasilia for the not-so-sunny and not-so-dry London in 
1998, my intention was to embark on a philosophical research on the traditional 
problem of the relationship between religious faith and argumentative reason. Given 
that in Brazil there was no possibility of obtaining doctoral training in the 
epistemology of religion, I applied for a grant to study in Britain, since the analytic 
approach seemed to me the most appropriate to the kind of discussion I was interested 
in carrying out. My idea was to analyse the relationship between the specificity of 
religious background and the universality of the claims of scientific and philosophical 
rationality in the way religious beliefs are said to be justified. 
The initial method chosen to delimit this huge subject proved unworkable. I 
intended to compare the approaches of two leading contemporary philosophers of 
religion, namely Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga. My suggestion was that 
while the former stressed the need to comply with general requirements and patterns 
of rationality to justify the respectability of religious belief, the latter argued that the 
religious believer was right in taking some basic tenets of his creed as basic, even if 
what counts as basic belief was not universally acceptable. The project was still too 
wide and hardly feasible, since Swinburne and Plantinga are two very complex and 
prolific authors. In addition, Plantinga was already developing some significant 
changes in his approach, which would make my task even harder. 
I decided then to limit my research to Swinburne's ideas. Apart from the 
enormous recognition his work has in today's analytic philosophy of religion, the 
rigour and clarity of his approach to the epistemology of religion seemed to me 
important qualities that I should display in my own proposals in the area. In addition, 
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the choice of Swinburne helped me to narrow down my subject further. Instead of the 
epistemology of religion, this thesis will deal with the particular belief that there is a 
God understood as the common object of worship in the great monotheistic religions 
of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In other words, my interest here is with the 
epistemology of the belief that there is a God who is an incorporeal person, 
omnipotent, omniscient, maximally good, eternal and worthy of worship. 
Another reason for concentrating my analysis on Swinbume and which helped 
me to clarify my project was the concept of justification. Swinburne considers the 
notion of justified belief from the point of view furnished by probability theory. In 
this account the strength with which I believe a proposition p is measured by a 
probability value. My degree of belief in p is justified if it is grounded in adequate 
and sufficient evidence. If I believe p strongly I must believe that p is more probable 
than not or, at least, that p is more probable than any other available alternative in 
view of the evidence I know. For the probabilistic approach, the degree of belief 
which theists have in the hypothesis that God exists is justified in the case that theism 
is more probable than not, given evidence and considering the existing rival accounts 
of this evidence. 
All this probabilistic approach to justification remits us to Bayes's formula, a 
theorem of the probability calculus that is crucial to Swinburne's discussion of the 
justification of theism. In fact, Swinburne is not the first philosopher to use 
probability reasoning to understand religious matters. Right at the beginning of the 
history of probability as a mathematical branch in the 18 
th century, a disciple of 
Thomas Bayes, Rev. Richard Pnce used his master's contributions in the area to 
refute David Hume's criticisms of the evidential value of miracles (see Earman 2000). 
Yet, even if Swinburne's use of probabilistic tools to discuss religious matters is not 
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innovative as such, his application of the fon-nal apparatus furnished by the 
probability calculus to the justification of theism is by far the most complete and 
accomplished to the date. 
However, despite the importance of his contribution to the problem, 
Swinburne's position has not encouraged attempts to develop the Bayesian approach 
in the epistemology of theism. Many criticisms were made of his view that for a 
belief to be justified it must be guided by correct inductive criteria, valid forinal 
inferential rules, and public and universally acceptable evidence, a position William 
Abraham calls 'hard rationalism' (see Abraham 1985). In my research, I was able to 
discover that Swinburne's hard rationalism is associated with a particular theory of 
probability - the logical theory - and that criticisms of his probabilistic approach to 
the justification of theism do not mean this same method cannot be employed 
fruitfully if based on a different theory of probability. 
Moreover, the way Swinburne deals with religious experience in his approach 
also seemed wanting to me. My main qualms were related with treating that 
phenomenon as a public piece of evidence, on a par with other data employed by him 
in his defence of the justification of the belief in God. My intuitions were that 
religious experiences are intrinsically related to a particular religious conceptual 
framework, and that to draw from them even an inductive argument addressed to all 
was a very difficult enterprise, if feasible at all. In this particular, William Alston's 
position seemed to me a more promising approach to religious experience, although 
Alston works within a different understanding of justification. 
In the course of this research on Richard Swinburne's suggestion for the 
justification of theism, my own proposal started to emerge. I wanted to preserve the 
Bayesian approach, although recognising its limits as an account of scientific 
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reasoning, but not to get involved in Swinbume's hard rationalism. It seemed to me 
that the demand for evaluating the probability of theism only according to impersonal 
and universal criteria was too strong, and in fact unnecessary for a programme in the 
area that aimed to discuss the question in terms accessible both to theists and atheists, 
and that postulated that this question could be resolved through argument. As a result, 
I took from Donald Gillies his intersubjective theory of probability (see Gillies 1991) 
and suggested a different way of using religious experience in the Bayesian approach 
to the justification of theism, based on a particular reading of Alston's contribution. 
In sum, the present thesis does not intend to argue either that belief in God is justified 
or unjustified. Its purpose rather is methodological. Based on Richard Swinbume's 
account, it aims to suggest an employment of the Bayesian epistemology and the 
phenomenon of religious experience in ways alternative to this philosopher. 
In order to achieve its goal, the present work is divided into eight chapters. In 
Chapter 1,1 provide a general description of Swinburne's proposal for the 
justification of theism in relation to the way he understands scientific inductive 
reasoning. Chapter 2 brings together the main criticisms of that attempt, suggesting 
that if they han-n Swinburne's proposal, this does not mean the whole Bayesian 
method should be rejected in this matter. In addition, I hold that any criticism of 
Swinburne's approach can only be successful if it analyses his principle of simplicity, 
which is the basis for the answers he gives to his critics. Consequently, Chapter 3 is 
devoted to a discussion of the simplicity principle, pointing to several problems 
related to its definition, application and justification. Chapter 4 turns to the other 
pillar of Swinburne's programme for the justification of theism, that is, religious 
experience. In it, I describe Swinburne's account of this phenomenon, and hold that 
there are forinal reasons for rejecting the role he devotes to It In his defence of theism. 
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Chapter 5 continues with the criticisms of Swinburne's argument from religious 
experience, arguing that any hopes for keeping it as an inductive compelling reason in 
favour of theism are now very dim. In Chapter 6, Alston's approach to religious 
experience is analysed and interpreted in a particular way. The suggestion drawn 
from that reading is that this phenomenon could be used in a Bayesian discussion of 
the probability of theism to factor in the initial probability the theist gives to the 
hypothesis that there is a God. Since this suggestion is incompatible with 
Swinburne's theory of probability, Chapter 7 proposes a different account of this 
subject, in view of the defects displayed both by the logical and the subjective 
theories of probability. In the final chapter I outline my application of the 
intersubjective theory of probability to the Bayesian analysis of the justification of 
theism, distinguish it from Swinbume's proposal and suggest my account may have a 
particular place among the different methods available in today's epistemology of 
theism. 
In the schematic proposal I put forward at the end, there is shown to be a way 
to deal with the relationship between the particularity of religious faith and the 
universalistic requirements of argumentative rationality, which was the initial reason 
that brought me to London. I hope it becomes a fruitful programme to be developed 
later on, as fruitful as it was for me to stay in Britain (despite the weather). 
Chapter I- Scientific Reasoning and the Hypothesis of 
Theism 
The suggestion I will formulate on how to employ religious experience and 
Bayes's theorem in the justification of the belief in God is based on a critical 
discussion of Richard Swinbume's epistemology of religion. In order to do so, I need 
to start by describing Swinburne's programme for the justification of theism, the 
claim that there is a personal God that is the sustainer and creator of the universe, who 
is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, eternal and worthy of worship. In this 
chapter I will firstly present the philosophical context of his proposal and its purpose. 
Then I move on to give an account of the main elements of Swinburne's epistemology 
and how they are applied to theism as an explanatory hypothesis. Based on this 
description, I will analyse critically the limits of Swinburne's attempt in subsequent 
chapters. 
1. Restoring the Intellectual Respectability of Theism 
If philosophical inquiries always attempt to solve a theoretical problem, 
perhaps we could forinulate the questions behind Swinburne's philosophy of religion 
as 'Would belief in God be incompatible with a highly educated backgroundT and 
'Could theism be rationally acceptable in an age where scientific theoretical activity 
stands as the paradigm of justified belieff. Richard Swinbume's programme for 
justification of theism aims to answer 4no' to the first question and 'yes' to the 
second. Having the work of Thomas Aquinas as a model for approaching the problem 
of the rationality of the belief in God, Swinburne intends to show that theism is an 
intellectually respectable belief. As Aquinas did in the thirteenth century, Swinbume 
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now sets himself the task of using the best intellectual tools of scientific thought in his 
time to show that belief in God is not the groundless last resort of ill-educated people, 
but a belief that can be justified according to the most rigorous forins of scientific 
reasoning and the recognised results of scientific inquiry (see Swinburne 1994: 8). 
However, two striking differences between Swinbume and Aquinas's context 
may help to explain better what constitutes the proposal of the former. On the one 
hand, in contrast with Aquinas's time when to be an educated person in Europe was 
almost synonymous with being part of the church, Swinbume acts in an environment 
predominantly unreceptive to religious belief. Not only has British culture and 
society become increasingly secularised since the end of Second War, but also the 
academic circles in which Swinbume moves seemed to continue the trend started in 
the nineteenth century of regarding with suspicion everything related to beliefs not 
gTounded either in empirical observations or fon-nal reasoning. 
Moreover, the quest for rational justification and dialogue with scientific 
thought had lost the important place it used to have traditionally in Christianity. The 
prevailing tendency in Christian theology in the post-war period had become mostly 
irrationalistic and fideistic, following the influence of Karl Barth and Soren 
Kierkegaard. This retreat into fideism, in Swinburne's view, is not only a 
demonstration of intellectual laziness but also a reinforcement of the idea that belief 
in God has no room in an academic world where natural science is the most credible 
theoretical enterprise. 
The main obstacle Swinburne had to face was that according to the 
epistemology and philosophy of language prevalent in the 1950's, theism could not 
pass the tests required by a scientific culture. As a result, the only way out for his 
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programme was to propose an alternative view as to the standards for an acceptable 
scientific theory. 
Swinburne noticed in his epistemological studies that, contrary to what 
verificationism postulated, a scientific hypothesis does not owe its meaning and 
justification to its empirical verification. Most propositions of theoretical physics, for 
example, given their highly abstract character, would not pass the verificationist 
criterion of justification, and most terms and expressions in current use in natural 
science, such as 'electron' and 'natural selection'. would be meaningless if 
verificationism were right. Swinburne then remarked that in scientific activity, 
'verified' did not mean 'conclusively verified', but 'confirmed or supported by 
evidence or argument', and that the meaning of a proposition was not given by its 
empirical content (see Swinburne 1994: 3f). 
If that really is the case, there is no reason for great metaphysical theories, 
including Christian theism, not being considered meaningful and justified. As a 
result, Swinburne claims, 'once I had seen this, my programme was in place: to use 
the criteria of modem natural science, analysed with the careful rigour of modem 
philosophy, to show the meaningfulness and justification of Christian theology' 
(Swinburne 1994: 5). In other words, the aim of one of the most important 
philosophical programmes to justify the belief in God in analytic philosophy of 
religion is to establish a parallel between theism and scientific hypotheses, postulating 
that the former could be considered rational according to the same criteria used to 
assess the latter. In order to carry out this objective, Swinburne needed to clarify 
what he meant by 'criteria of scientific reasoning'. 
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2. Bayesianism and Simplicity as Universal Patterns of Rational Belief 
As I mentioned above, for Swinbume, a typical scientific hypothesis is not 
verified directly through observation but may be confirmed by evidence. The 
difference is that instead of confinuation being a direct relationship between 
hypothesis and experience, what is involved in scientific theoretical activity to him is 
an assessment of a set of propositions - the theory - on the basis of another set of 
propositions accounting for the evidence available. In other words, the extent to 
which a scientific hypothesis should be rationally held given the phenomena it aims to 
explain is fundamentally a logical matter, that is, a matter of relationship between sets 
of propositions. 
2.1 Bayesianism and the logic of induction 
The characterisation of the evaluation of scientific hypotheses as a logical 
problem does not mean for Swinbume an account of scientific reasoning by means of 
deductive logic, as proposed by Popper, for example. Swinburne understands science 
as a typical inductive enterprise (see Swinburne 1991: 6), and postulates that the best 
logical account of this activity is provided by Bayesian confinnation theory. 
Bayesian confirmation theory sees the relationship between hypothesis and evidence 
as a matter of probability whose basic constraints are provided by the probability 
calculus, particularly one of its theorems: Bayes's formula. Bayes's formula, more 
commonly known as 'Bayes's theorem', is named after Rev. Thomas Bayes who in 
1763 submitted a paper to the Royal Society in which he defended the importance of 
considering prior probabilities in the calculation of the chance that a certain situation 
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might obtain'. In other words, in order to calculate the probability of a certain 
occurrence happening, we need to take account of its probability in view of previous 
happenings. This idea was later on formalised in mathematical terms, and among the 
many forms the theorem has, the following one will be particularly important for us: 
P(A / B) = 
P(B / A) 
x P(A) P(B) 
In this formula, the probability of event A happening in view of event B is 
given by the prior probability of A multiplied by the result of the division of the 
likelihood of A (the probability of B given A) by the prior probability of B. 
Mathematically speaking, Bayes's theorem is not controversial, since it is 
easily deducible from the third axiom of probability calculus - known as the law of 
multiplication - as follows: 
P(A. B) = P(A / B) x P(B) (axiom 3) 
P(B. A) = P(B / A) x P(A) (axiom 3) 
But P(A. B) = P(B. A) (by commutation) 
As a result, P(A / B) x P(B) = P(B / A) x P(A), from which we have Bayes's 
theorem as above. 
However, the application of this forinula of probability calculus to the 
relationship between evidence and hypothesis, as defended by Swinbume, is not 
accepted by some authors. Some of this controversy will be reported in Chapter 7, 
but I will follow in this thesis Swinbume's postulation that Bayes's theorem also 
covers that episternic relationship, a position generally known as Bayesian 
epistemology, or simply Bayesianism. According to Bayesian epistemologists, the 
' See Thomas Bayes (1958). 
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probability that a hypothesis h explains a certain set of phenomena e will be given by 
the product of the prior probability of h (P(h)) and the explanatory power of h over e 
(P(elh)IP(e)) in a way that corresponds to Bayes's theorem as expressed above if we 
substitute A for h and B for e: 
P(h / e) - 
P(e / h) 
x P(h) P(e) 
Probabilities are basically proportions. Bayesian epistemic probabilities take 
into account the proportion a certain hypothesis has of being true in relation to 
alternative explanations of the same set of phenomena. In this proportional evaluation 
two main elements must be considered both in relation to the hypothesis in question 
and in relation to its alternatives, namely the probability of each of the hypotheses in 
themselves (the prior probability of the respective explanation) and the probability of 
the phenomenon in relation to every single hypothesis under consideration (the 
likelihood of each hypothesis given evidence). This idea of Bayesian epistemic 
probability as a result of a comparative proportion looks clear in Laplace's expression 
of Bayes's theorem (see Howson & Urbach 1993: 28), which reads as follows: 
P(hk le) - 
P(e / hk) x P(hk ) 
I P(e / hi) x P(hi) 
In Laplace's fonnulation, the probability of a certain hypothesis hk as an 
explanation of evidence e is a result of the proportion between the product of the 
probability of e in view of hk and the prior probability of hkand the sum of the same 
factors (probability of e given alternative explanations hi and the prior probability of 
the different possible hypotheses hi) considered for the whole set of alternative 
explanatory hypotheses of e. The conditions for Laplace's version of Bayes's 
theorem are that the set of alterriative hypotheses be exhaustive (i. e. its sum be equal 
to 1), that each alternative be incompatible with the others (i. e. if one is true the others 
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are false) and that the prior probabilities of e and each alternative hypothesis 
considered be not zero. 
Let us take an example to clarify these conceptS2 . Think of a doctor 
attempting to evaluate the probability of a certain diagnosis (a typical explanatory 
hypothesis) of a given set of symptoms displayed by a patient. Let us consider for 
didactical reasons a set of symptoms that has proved to be associated with only two 
diseases, say bronchitis and pneumonia. Let us admit that the incidence of pneumonia 
is much rarer than bronchitis, say 100 times less frequent according to medical 
records available. In this case, the prior probability of the patient having bronchitis 
instead of pneumonia is considerably higher. In our example, bronchitis occurs 100 
times more frequently than pneumonia. Mathematically speaking, P(Br)= 100/101 
and P(Pn)= 1/100. The fact that pneumonia is a comparatively rare disease, however, 
does not mean that bronchitis is the best diagnosis for the patient in question. The 
initial disadvantage of pneumonia being the best diagnosis for the case may be 
inverted by a probability or degree of expectedness of the set of symptoms borne by 
the patient in view of pneumonia that is higher than the one on the assumption that he 
has bronchitis. Let us say the patient manifests a symptom that occurs in I out of 2 
patients with pneumonia but only in I out of 500 with bronchitis, respectively 
P(elPn)= 1/2 and P(elBr)= 11500. Applying these figures to the fonnula above, the 
probability of pneumonia being the correct explanation for what is happening with the 
patient is 5/7, which means that it is more than 70% probable that the case in question 
is pneumonia and not bronchitis. 
In fonnal ten-ns, we have: 
The following example is based on Bartholomew, 1984: 52ff. 
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P(Pneumonia /evidence) = 
P(Pn eum on ia) x P(eviden ce / Pn) 
P(Pn) x P(e / Pn) + P(Bron ch itis) x P(e / Br) 
P(Pn / e) = 
P(Pn / e) = 
1/100 x 1/2 
(1/100x 1/2) + (100/101 x 11500) 
5 
or 70% 7 
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Bayesianism is then a theory that states how to assess the rationality of belief 
in a hypothesis in relation to its alternatives in a context of uncertainty, that is when 
the explanation is neither absolutely true nor absolutely false. Bayesian epistemic 
probability is then the measure of the degree of belief in an uncertain proposition. 
This assessment is generally done in an inductive way so that recorded past results 
serve as bases for an estimation of the probability of the hypothesis in question in 
order to explain a certain set of phenomena. The doctor in our example would be 
much more rational in believing that the patient has pneumonia instead of bronchitis. 
Yet, this considerable higher probability does not mean certainty. In the end, the 
patient may be included in the small group of people who have symptoms that are 
more characteristic of pneumonia but that in fact have bronchitis. In this last case, 
can the doctor be blamed for misdiagnosis? Of course he made a mistake, for he 
asserted the patient had pneumonia and this one turned out to have bronchitis, but he 
cannot be blamed for having chosen the diagnosis irrationally. If he considered all the 
evidence available and opted for the most probable explanation in relation to them, 
the Bayesians say, he was plainly justified in his diagnosis. 
2.2 Prior probability and simplicity 
in a Bayesian assessment of a hypothesis, then, there are two major elements 
to be considered. The first one may be called explanatory power and is the degree to 
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which the hypothesis h we are considering explains a phenomenon e. According to 
the theorem, the explanatory power of a hypothesis h in explaining an occurrence e is 
higher the more h makes e probable or expected (i. e. the higher is the value of P(elh)) 
and the less e is probable in itself (i. e. the lower is the value of P(e)). In other words, 
the more a theory makes us expect a phenomenon whose occurrence would be 
otherwise unlikely the more this theory explains this phenomenon. The second 
element we take into account in a Bayesian evaluation of a hypothesis h is its prior 
probability P(h), which is prior to the consideration of how much the evidence adds to 
the probability of h. 
In a comparative assessment, prior probability is sometimes the crucial 
element in deciding which is the most probable explanation of a certain phenomenon 
when there are a great number of alternatives that equally explain the facts. This 
point touches upon what is generally known as the 'curve fitting problem' in 
epistemology (see Swinbume 1996: 26f), which can be fonnulated the following way: 
the same set of points in a graph expressing the details of a certain phenomenon, for 
example, can be connected in infinite different ways. It can be a straight line, a 
parabola or any other kind of curve. As long as they all describe the points, they are 
all equivalent from the point of view of explanatory power, and we have no means of 
selecting the best alternative in view of this criterion. The way to sort out this 
indeterminacy, according to Bayes's theorem, is by assessing the rival theories in 
tenns of their prior probability. 
According to Swinbume, there are three main objective criteria for attributing 
a prior probability to a hypothesis (Swinburne 1991: 52ff). Firstly, it depends on how 
much h fits well with empirical knowledge we have in other fields, i. e. with our 
background knowledge. In other words, the more the behaviour of the entities and 
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occurrences postulated by h is similar to the behaviour of objects and happenings of 
the same kind in other areas, the higher the prior probability of h. For example, if an 
anthropologist proposes a theory of social interaction to explain the political 
behaviour of a certain tribal group and if his hypothesis diverges too much from the 
knowledge accumulated about this group and political activity in general, his theory 
will have a low prior probability in light of background knowledge 3. 
Secondly, the prior probability of a hypothesis h depends on its scope, i. e. on 
the range of phenomena h is intended to cover. In Swinbume's view, the larger the 
scope, the lower is the prior probability of the theory, since it will be more exposed to 
instances of refutation. The more a hypothesis says about a set of objects and the 
ampler is this set the more risk we run of a mistake (see Swinburne 1991: 52). 
The third criterion defining the prior probability of a hypothesis is simplicity. 
According to Swinburne, 'a theory is simple in so far as it postulates few 
mathematically simple laws holding between entities of an intelligible kind. By a 
theory postulating "entities of an intelligible kind", I mean that it postulates entities of 
a kind whose nature and interactions seem natural to us' (1991: 52). For Swinbume, 
simplicity is the most important element of the three when it comes to evaluating 
large-scale theories like theism, which is intended to explain the existence of the 
universe itself Crucially, in this type of theory no empirical evidence is left in the 
background knowledge. The reason for this is that there are no neighbouring fields 
according to which we could assess the fit with background knowledge. As regards 
scope, the reasons Swinburne presents for not considering it relevant are not very 
clear. He seems to say that this criterion has usually not been as important in the 
Certainly, if his theory is capable of explaining data that existing knowledge has been incapable of 
accounting for or if there is new information about the group that the explanation is able to cover, the 
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history of science as simplicity (see Swinburne 1991: 54 and 282 and 1996: 106). We 
will return to this issue later on. For now, it is enough to say that for Swinbume, in 
the evaluation of theories with the same explanatory power, scope and fitness with 
empirical background knowledge are much less important than simplicity. 
Swinburne argues, then, that not only has simplicity a very important role in 
scientific reasoning directed at selecting which is the best theory to explain a certain 
set of phenomena, but also that simple theories are more probably true than complex 
ones. This idea leads him to use the principle of simplicity, which constitutes a 
crucial criterion for assessing the probability of a hypothesis in his epistemology, as 
an addition to Bayes's theoreM4 . The principle of simplicity in Swinbume's words 
could be stated as follows: 
[ 
... 
] other things being equal - the simplest hypothesis proposed as an explanation 
of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any other available 
hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than are those of any 
other available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate a priori epistemic principle 
that simplicity is evidence of truth (Swinburne 1997b: 1). 
It is crucial to stress the importance of the expression 'other things being 
equal' in this statement of the simplicity principle, which means 'considering 
hypotheses with the same explanatory power'. This is the most important feature of a 
theory, since from an epistemological point of view, a theory is evaluated by how 
much and how truly it explains the event it aims to elucidate. Swinburne claims that 
the 'how truly' can be evaluated positively, at least in principle, when a theory is 
simple, given that it explains the happenings as well as its rivals do. 
low prior probability of his hypothesis (due to incongruance with the prevalent 
background knowledge) 
will be largely compensated by its explanatory power and the evidence will then 
be able to confirm it. 
4 The character of the simplicity principle as an addition to Bayes's theorem will 
be discussed and 
criticised in Chapter 3 (pp. 90-1). 
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It is not a simple task to define precisely what simplicity means. As we will 
see in more detail in Chapter 3, many authors, such as Mario Bunge (1963) and Mary 
Hesse (1967), are sceptical as regards the possibility of reaching an exact concept of 
simplicity that comprises the wide range of meanings it bears in scientific reasoning. 
Swinburne is conscious of this diversity when he includes in his notion of simplicity a 
considerable variety of facets. In his words, simplicity should be considered as: 
[ 
... 
] (1) fewness of entities and properties, (2) fewness of kinds of entities and 
properties, (3) more terms which can be understood without reference to other 
terms (i. e. more terms describing things more readily observable), (4) fewer laws, 
(5) individual laws relating fewer variables, (6) mathematical simplicity - i. e. 
fewer terms in its equations; and more mathematical entities and relations which 
can be understood without reference to other entities (e. g. more primitive 
relations, such as multiplication rather than power; vectors rather than tensors). 
(Swinburne 2000: 1). 
A major characteristic of Swinbume's definition of simplicity is that this is 
predominantly quantitative and mathematical. This way the concept becomes more 
objective and universally invariant, since mathematics and quantities are far less 
subject to particular cultural aspects. As we will see in more detail in the next 
chapter, this is certainly an improvement on his previous definitions of the concept, 
which seemed much fuzzier (see, for example, Robert Prevost's observation in 
Prevost 1990: 46). As a result, according to Swinburne, if the principle is stated in this 
way, scientific reasoning can operate with a reasonable degree of objectivity by using 
the notion of simplicity for selecting the most probable theory out of a set of 
altematives. 
However, even if we grant to Swinbume that simplicity is a precise and 
manageable concept, it still remains to be shown that this concept constitutes a 
distinctive marker of a true theory. Why should the simplest proposal be the truest 
among the alternative explanatory hypothesis available? For reasons that will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, Swinburne discards both the analytical and 
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the a posteriori arguments for justifying the thesis that simplicity is an indication of 
the high probability of a hypothesis. In other words, that theories are probably true 
because of simplicity is neither a truth of logic nor something known from experience. 
Instead, he opts for an a priori validation of his principle, for according to him, 
The fact - however unwelcome to many - is that, if the principle of simplicity is 
true, it is a fundamental a priori truth. If data ever render one theory or one 
prediction more probable than another, that can only be because there are a priori 
criteria for extrapolating from the data in one direction rather than another. Yet 
there is no truth of logic with a consequence about which direction of 
extrapolation yields probable truth. So - if any proposition which is not analytic 
is synthetic - it is both synthetic and a priori that (other things being equal) a 
simpler theory is more probably true than a complex one (Swinburne 1997b: 50- 
1). 
In arguing that the simplicity criterion is a synthetic a priori truth, Swinbume 
points to a transcendental reason for the use of this principle in science. For him, it is 
a condition for theoretical scientific activity to be a rational enterprise that simplicity 
is taken as making hypotheses probably true (see Swinburne 1997b: 56). The denial of 
the principle of simplicity would imply that the way scientists judge theories and 
predictions probable is unwarranted and, consequently, irrational. Since very few are 
prepared to maintain that science is an irrational activity, since simplicity plays a 
major role in scientific method, and since science is a paradigm of activity aimed at 
truth, Swinburne argues, we are entitled to claim that simplicity, all things being 
equal, is evidence of a probably true hypothesis. 
All these claims about simplicity and its role in a Bayesian Picture of scientific 
reasoning involve a great deal of controversy, and will be analysed critically - 
particularly in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7. For the moment, however, I intend only to 
provide an overview of Swinbume's proposal. On this same tack, let us examine in 
the next section how he applies the theoretical devices of the simplicity principle and 
Bayes's theorem in his defence of the rationality of theism. 
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3. Assessing Theism as an Explanatory Hypothesis 
In order to assess the rationality of theistic belief in the same way that a 
scientific theory is evaluated, Swinbume has to consider theism as a sort of 
explanatory hypothesis. This task involves two major elements. Firstly, he needs to 
clarify how similar theistic explanation is to scientific explanation. Secondly, he 
needs to specify how Bayesianism and simplicity - the two main components of 
scientific reasoning according to his epistemology - can be applied to theism. 
3.1 What kind of explanation is theism? 
According to Swinburne, an explanation can be understood as an intellectual 
enterprise that has two main components (Swinburne 1991: 22-3). Firstly, 
explanations aim to describe what happens by presenting the factors (events, 
processes, states, objects and their properties at certain times) that have caused the 
phenomenon at issue. In other words, in order to explain what made E happen, we 
need to present a full description of the phenomenon in question and the attendant 
circumstances. Considered as having brought about a phenomenon, causal factors 
must be different from the event and must really have happened. This first mode of 
explaining a phenomenon requires a response in terms of causes. Swinburne calls the 
set of factors that were sufficient for the occurrence of the phenomenon E the full 
cause of E, which should be distinguished from other members of the set of factors 
involved in its happening that should be simply called 'causes of E' (see Swinbume 
1991: 24). 
The second component of an explanation refers to the reason(s) according to 
which the aforementioned cause and conditions could in fact bnng about the effect in 
question. This part of the explanation aims to answer the question 'Why did the 
Chapter I- Scientific Reasoning and the Hypothesis of Theism 27 
appointed cause produce the phenomenon in questionT. In other words, once we 
select the circumstances that are sufficient and particularly relevant to account for the 
occurrence of phenomenon E, we need to justify the claim that those factors are the 
causally significant ones by showing how they were able to generate E. A 
phenomenon has a full explanation in so far as we can specify a full cause for its 
occurrence and a reason for this cause's efficacy. In this case both the question 
'whaff and 'whyT are properly answered (see Swinburne 1991: 24). 
Given this general account of the nature of explanation, Swinburne 
distinguishes two types of explanatory accounts in view of the kind of causes and 
reasons adduced to explain a certain occurrence. In a scientific or inanimate 
explanation the reason for a phenomenon is given by the laws of nature that define the 
powers and liabilities of bodies that cause (in the sense of physically necessitate or 
make more probable than not) the effect one aims to explain (see Swinbume 1997b: 5 
and 1991: 30). The causation offered by an inanimate explanation may be either 
deten-ninistic or probabilistic, depending on how far the cause in question necessitates 
the corresponding effect. 
Personal explanations are also to be understood in terms of causes and reasons, 
and can also have either a universal or a probabilistic forin, but deal in the beliefs and 
desires of a person who perfonned a certain action intentionally. The cause of a 
phenomenon E in this case is an agent who acted intending to do so. A personal 
explanation is universal when the power of perforining an action intentionally 
conjoined with the liabilities of the person's desires and beliefs entail the effect. A 
probabilistic or partial personal explanation occurs when the same powers and 
liabilities of the individual make it more probable than not that the effect will be 
carried out (see Swinburne 1997b: 7). In other words, the beliefs, powers and desires 
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of a person constitute the 'what' of a personal explanation, whereas her intention to 
perfonn the concerned action is the 'why'. 
According to Swinburne, theism, in so far as it can be considered an 
explanatory hypothesis, is an instance of personal explanation. God is conceived as a 
person whose powers and liabilities are said to cause the existence of the universe and 
many distinctive features of it. God is postulated as a non-embodied person who is 
omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly free, perfectly good and a necessary being that 
created and sustains the universe in its being. In addition, the type of person God is, 
according to Swinburne, permits theism to explain not only what brought about the 
universe and its actual features but also why they happened to occur through citing 
God's intention of creating and sustaining them. So, by virtue of providing not only 
the causes but also the reason for the existence of the universe and many of its 
distinctive features, theism qualifies as a theory in the same broad sense as any 
explanation does. 
As a result, if theism can be taken as sharing the same basic structure of solid 
explanatory hypotheses, it meets one of the prerequisites of intellectually respectable 
theories. In the next subsection we will see how Swinburne demonstrates that theism 
also meets the other requirement of intellectually respectable inductive theories, 
namely the successful application of Bayes's theorem and simplicity principle 
3.2. The application of Bayes's theorem and simplicity principle to theism 
In his analysis, Swinburne opts for a presentation of the Bayesian formula 
slightly different from, but equivalent to the ones we introduced in the second section 
of the present chapter. An important point in his formalisation, 
however, is that he 
distinguishes between evidence e and background knowledge k, being considered in k 
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only non-empirical infort-nation (see Swinburne 1991: 15-6). In general, Swinburne 
shows the Bayesian fonnula in the following way: 
P(h / e. k) = 
P(e / h. k) 
x P(h I k) P(e / k) 
A first basic presupposition of this application is that the question of how well 
grounded one is in believing that there is a God is also a matter of uncertainty, that is, 
it is a matter of probability reasoning, not deductive proof as it had been in the 
tradition of natural theology as illustrated in the works of Aquinas and Leibniz (see 
Swinburne 1991: 14). The many traditional arguments Swinburne uses to ground his 
cumulative case for theism are laid out in the form of probabilistic inferences from the 
different phenomena. The arguments cite theism as the best explanation of these 
phenomena. So, the existence of the universe, the existence of order in the world, of 
conscious beings, the occurrence of miracles, evil and some singular facts in history 
are taken as pieces of evidence that increase or decrease the probability of the belief 
in God, rather than being premises of a deductive argument. In Bayesian terms, these 
occurrences are the pieces of evidence lei ... e7l to 
be considered in the fonnal 
analysis. 
The use of theism as an explanatory hypothesis is the second important 
assumption of Swinburne's application of Bayesianism to the epistemology of theistic 
belief Theism is a hypothesis in the sense of both being an uncertain and unknown 
belief, and of being an explanation of certain pieces of evidence. As I showed in the 
previous subsection, the existence of God is postulated as an instance of personal 
explanation for the different pieces of evidence ej, which it aims to explain. In 
Bayes's fon-nula, then, the belief in God is the hypothesis h, whose postenor 
probability in view of evidence tei ... e7j and 
background knowledge k, i. e. 
P(hlei ... e7k), we are searching 
for. 
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Now in a particularly important move, which I will analyse more deeply in 
Chapter 2, in order to comply with a requirement of Bayesian analysis seen above 
Swinburne also calculates the probability of theism in comparative tenns. Yet he 
compares the probability of theism with only one alternative explanation for the 
evidence considered. The alternative in question is the prior probability of each piece 
of evidence given only background knowledge k (P(ei ... e7lk)). In other words, the 
alternative with which theism is compared is the uncaused occurrence of each 
phenomenon lei ... e7j, 
i. e. of their happening anyway as ultimate brute facts (see 
Swinburne 1991: 86-7 and 108, for example). As we will see next chapter, 
Swinburne will attempt to justify this move using the principle of simplicity. 
A last feature of Swinburne's application of Bayesianism to his evaluation of 
the rationality of believing in God I would like to highlight is the way he ascribes a 
value to the prior probability of the theistic hypothesis. According to Swinbume, as 
we saw above, there are three main objective criteria according to which we attribute 
a prior probability to a theory. For Swinburne, simplicity is the most important 
element of the three when it comes to evaluate large-scale theories like theism, which 
are intended to explain the existence of the universe itself. The reason for this is that 
there are no neighbouring fields according to which we could assess the comparative 
fitness with background knowledge of the hypotheses under assessment. As regards 
scope, Swinburne suggests that we do not consider it, since the probability value 
conferred by high simplicity generally outweighs any possible decrease in view of a 
hypothesis having wide scope (see Swinbume 1991: 106). 
Based on the idea that the criterion of simplicity is the most important to be 
accounted in the assessment of large-scale theories like theism, 
Swinbume claims that 
the hypothesis that there is a God has a considerable prior probability. The simplicity 
Chapter I- Scientific Reasoning and the Hypothesis of Theism 31 
of the hypothesis of theism is demonstrated by three things: 1) the number of things 
postulated in the explanation Oust one), 2) the concept of God itself, and 3) the kind 
of explanation it provides. 
1) Theism postulates the existence of one single God capable of creating and 
sustaining the universe. Consequently, in relation to this facet of the simplicity 
principle, it is much simpler than alternatives that postulate multiple divinities, for 
example. 
2) For Swinburne, the fact that God has the attributes of power, knowledge, 
freedom, presence, and goodness in an unlimited 5 level also makes its concept one of 
a very simple kind, at least simpler than any explanation which resorts to a divine 
being with limited attributes (see Swinbume 1991: 287). The reason is that extreme 
values such as zero and infinite do not require the additional explanation regarding the 
specific amount or degree that any intermediary figure demands (see Swinbume 1991: 
94). Another reason for considering as simple the idea of a person with attributes in 
infinite degree is the intuitive character of the concept of infinite. In his words, 
Interestingly the concept of some quantity being infinitely large is often graspable 
by someone who has not grasped any concept of a very large number [ ... ] One 
does not need to know what a trillion is in order to understand what is the 
infinitely long or lasting or fast. It is because infinity is simple in this way that 
scientists postulate infinite degrees of quantities rather than very large degrees of 
quantities, when both are compatible with data (Swinburne 1997b: 27-8). 
' Swinbume carefully remarks that God's capacities have no limits but the ones imposed 
by logic, in 
order to prevent theism becoming conceptually incoherent. 
For a more comprehensive approach to this 
matter, see SwInburne 1993. 
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In addition to this psychological simplicity of the concept of infinite in relation 
to the idea of very large numbers, Swinbume claims that the divine attributes can be 
shown to fit neatly together, making them seem natural to us (see Swinbume 1991: 
93). God's attributes fit together because they cohere with one another and have an 
immediate affinity. For example, a being that is omnipotent should not be limited in 
his knowledge but by logic, as long as knowledge is a sort of power. As a result, an 
omnipotent being would also be omniscient. Moreover, in being omnipotent, this 
being should not be influenced or detennined by anything outside his control, being 
then perfectly free and so on. Moreover, since God is a person with unlimited 
capacities, beliefs and intentions, its concept can well be taken as an explanation that 
requires no further clarification. 'For', Swinburne claims, 'if some state of affairs E is 
explained as brought about by God in virtue of his powers and beliefs and intentions 
to bring about E, how can this action be further explainedT (Swinburne 1991: 95). 
The choice of an agent in the sense of the fulfilment of a decision is 'the most natural 
kind of stopping-place for explanation', Swinburne holds (1991: 103). As a result, if 
we consider naturalness as a facet of simplicity, this characteristic of theism also 
makes it a simple theory and, in turn, with high comparative prior probability. 
3) However, even if we discard naturalness as an aspect of simplicity in view 
of more recent developments in Swinbume's definition of simplicity (see section 2.2 
above), there is another reason for considering theism simple. According to him, once 
we take God's beliefs and intentions as the ultimate stopping-point for explanation of 
evidence that is either too odd or too big to be explained scientifically (see Swinburne 
1991: 71), we can reduce all explanations to only one type. In other words, theism is 
a simple hypothesis because it allows us to reduce physical explanations to personal 
ones in the last analysis (see Swinbume 1991: 105). 
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As a result, given the high prior probability of theism in view Of the principle 
of simplicity and an explanatory power higher than the one of ontological naturalism 
(that leaves all the considered pieces of evidence unexplained), and given the crucial 
evidence provided by religious experience, Swinburne concludes that theism has a 
posterior probability higher than 0.5, which means it is a justified belief (see 
Swinbume 1991: 291). 
4. Swinburne's Epistemological Positions in the Justification of Theism 
Let us take stock of the main points in Swinburne's programme for justifying 
the belief that there is a God. One element is the idea that theoretical activity in 
science is a particularly powerful current model for any intellectually respectable 
activity. So, if theism wants a place in a world culturally dominated by science it has 
to show that the content of its proposal can be conveyed in a way structurally similar 
to a scientific hypothesis. Science is taken by Swinbume as essentially an inductive 
enterprise (see Swinburne 1991: 6), whose patterns of correct inference are given by 
Bayesian confin-nation theory (see Swinburne 1973: vi). According to confirmation 
theory, in Swinburne's view, the ways scientists argue in their search for more 
probable hypotheses are well described by means of Bayes's theorem and the 
principle of simplicity (see Swinburne 1991: 54 and 64). Hence, in order to defend the 
rationality of the belief in God and the intellectual respectability of theism, Swinbume 
opts for applying the same inferential tools employed by science (see Swinbume 
1991: 56). If he succeeds in this application, Swinbume could consider himself to 
have in great measure met the challenge of showing that the belief in God is justified 
(see Swinburne 1999: 34), for one will be able then to regard theism as at least as 
justified as any well confirmed scientific theory. 
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Swinbume's position regarding the justification of scientific theories as a 
paradigm for the justification of theism stems from his general theory of what makes a 
belief rationally justified. In view of the criticisms made of his account in Faith and 
Reason (198 1), Swinburne abandoned the idea that to believe p is to believe that p is 
probable (see Swinburne 2001a: 36n). In his new conception, probability enters as a 
way to describe the strength of a subject's belief. For him, belief is a contrastive 
notion if we focus on its strengt . So the strength of my belief in p can be described 
as 'I believe that p is more probable than not', in those cases where the contrast is 
only between p and its negation, as is the rule. Through this amendment, Swinburne 
avoids the charge of incurring an infinite regress of beliefs and postulating a general 
account of believing that does not match the case of young children, who do not have 
any beliefs about the probability of the propositions they believe (see Alston 1994c: 
26ff). According to Swinburne, 
The claim in the text above avoids these problems. It claims only that beliefs 
about p's probability entail beliefs about p, but not vice versa. It constrains which 
beliefs about p's probability can be held by a believer that p, but is compatible 
with her not having any such beliefs (Swinburne 2001 a: 3 6n). 
In using probability to analyse the notion of strength of belief, Swinburne 
gives a prominent role to Bayesianism in his theory of justification, since Bayes's 
theorem becomes an important way of checking the correctness of my degree of belief 
in p in light of evidence. For him, the probability of a proposition being true is 
relative to another set of propositions that constitute a subject's evidence. According 
to Swinbume: 
The subject's evidence is then this set of propositions reporting what he is initially 
inclined to believe, together with the degree of prior probability which he ascribes 
to each, the degree of his initial confidence in them. A claim that a belief is 
probable is then a claim that it is made probable by this set. The greater the prior 
probability of basic propositions p, and the greater the conditional probability of a 
ftirther proposition q on the basic propositions p (i. e. the probability that if p then 
q), the greater the resultant probability of the further proposition. (Swinburne, 
1981b: 20-1). 
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In other words, the degree of belief in a proposition p depends on the degree p 
is backed by relevant evidence. A belief is rational if the strength with which it Is 
believed is proportional to the evidence we have in its favour, a position commonly 
called 'evidentialism' (see, for example, Stenmark 1995: 42). So, my particular belief 
about which team will win the FA Cup is based on empirical evidence, a set of 
propositions that seems at first sight true to me, namely, for example, that Manchester 
City has been so far the best one in the current championship. If my pieces of 
evidence are correct and I make the correct inferences, then the belief I base on them 
will be rationally justified, since for Swinbume, '[ ... ] not all beliefs are rational 
beliefs. A belief will fail to be rational if it is based on evidence the wrong way or if 
it is based on the wrong sort of evidence' (Swinburne 198 1 b: 3 3). 
Swinburne's view on belief postulates, then, that in someone's doxastic 
system there are some beliefs that do not depend on any other to be considered 
justified by the subject (the basic beliefs). Further, there are beliefs which are 
grounded on the basic ones, called non-basic beliefs, a position nonnally called 
'foundationalism' (see Stenmark 1995: 44). A point on which Swinburne lays 
considerable stress is that the foundational beliefs of a subject's doxastic system are 
not known infallibly or incorrigibly (see Swinburne, 1981b: 20). In his conception, 
there are beliefs that serve as bases for other ones without being founded in other 
beliefs themselves, but this does not mean the basic beliefs are unchangeable or 
incorrigible. A subject can ascribe different degrees of confidence to his beliefs and 
correct the less firm on the basis of the more reliable for him through, for example, 
inference. 
In Faith and Reason Swinburne produces a theory of rationality in which the 
justification of a belief p depends on the evidence to which p is associated and the 
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inferential standards that relate p to that evidence. In addition to those elements, his 
classification of rationality also considers the extent to which a belief in p resulted 
from adequate investigation. As a result, he proposes five kinds of rationality that are 
presented in an order of increasing objectivity and stringency. In the first kind, a 
belief p is rational if it is coherent with the basic beliefs and inductive standards 
accepted by a subject (see Swinburne 1981b: 45). So my belief inp is rational in this 
sense if it agrees with my basic beliefs and the way I draw inferences from them, even 
if my basic beliefs are false and my inferential patterns are incorrect. The second kind 
of rationality puts an additional constraint to consider the belief in p as rational. 
According to Swinbume, 
A subject S who believes that p has what I shall call a rational2belief if and only 
if p is in fact rendered probable by his evidence, and his evidence consists of basic 
propositions which he is in fact justified in holding with the degree of confidence 
with which he does hold them (Swinburne 198 1 b: 46). 
To be considered rational in this higher level of rationality, it is not enough 
that my belief in p conforms to my evidence and inferential patterns. It must to be 
acceptable in view of objective standards, which do not depend on my recognition. 
The three other kinds of rationality refer to the extent to which my belief that p 
results from investigation that has been adequate for the goal of securing true beliefs. 
In other words, the next three concepts of rationality refer to the justification of a 
belief in p not only in view of evidence and inferential standards available in a certain 
time, but given adequate investigation over time. As a result, the third kind of 
rationality refers to the extent to which p and the standards on which p is judged were 
adequately investigated according to a subject's particular standards of adequacy (see 
Swinbume 198 lb: 49). A failure in investigating whether a subject's belief that p is 
true or his standards of Judgement correct given the subject's own patterns is what 
makes his belief in p irrational in this sense of rationality. In the fourth kind of 
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rationality, the subject assesses his investigation of evidence and criticism of 
inductive standards on which he drew his belief p in view of the pattern revealed by 
his own past investigations and criticisms (see Swinbume 1981b: 53). Lastly, the 
higher and most rigorous kind of rationality in view of investigation over time takes a 
belief p to be rational given objective standards of adequacy, which are independent 
of what the subject thinks of them (see Swinburne 1981b: 54). 
Although he does not mention this same classification of five kinds of 
rationality in the much more recent Epistemic Justification (2001), Swinburne 
maintains the same basic ideas. He distinguishes synchronic and diachronic theories 
of episternic justification. The former ones consider what it is for a belief to be 
justified in a given time and the latter discuss justification in view of investigation 
over time (see Swinburne 2001 a: 9). In addition, Swinburne still maintains a 
gradation as regards the objectivity of inductive criteria used to evaluate one's belief. 
As we will see in more detail in Chapter 7, he classifies the theories of probability 
relation into three types. In the subjective theory of probability, probability is 
assessed according to criteria considered correct by a certain subject (see Swinbume 
2001 a: 70). In the epistemic view, the probability of a belief p is assessed in view of 
correct criteria but only given the limited knowledge and abilities a subject is 
expected to have in this type of assessment (see Swinburne 2001 a: 69). The logical 
theory of probability consider beliefs probable in view of objective inductive 
standards accessible to a logically omniscient being, that is, a being who knows all 
logical possibilities and has correct inductive criteria (see Swinburne 2001 a: 64). 
However, Epistemic Justification brings an important addition to Swinburne's 
theory of rational belief, namely the clarification of his position regarding the 
interrialist/exterrialist debate. Given the recent developments of 
Alvin Plantinga's 
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externalist programme in the justification of theism (see Plantlnga 2000), that point 
becomes even more relevant. Still, given the extension and complexity of that debate 
and the aims of this thesis, I will simply state Swinbume's position here in order to 
briefly distinguish it from the alternative I will suggest in the final chapter on how to 
use Bayes's theorem and religious experience in the justification of theism. Basically, 
an externalist theory of justification holds that what makes for the justification of a 
belief is external to a believer, that is, justification is determined by the causal 
antecedents of our beliefs. On the other hand, intemalists assess the degree of 
justification of a belief only in view of what is internal to the believer, that is, to what 
he can have access through introspection. Swinburne clearly opts for internalism, 
since, in his words, 'we value the scientist for having a belief that is not merely true, 
but results from consciously responding to all the evidence of which he is currently 
aware in the right way' (Swinbume 2001 a: 163). Moreover, he states that there is 'no 
intrinsic merit in having a belief justified by extemalist criteria of a reliabilist kind' 
(see Swinbume 2001 a: 163). 
Now, it follows from Swinbume's evidentialism, foundationalism and 
intemalism that a rational belief is predominantly the result of a relationship between 
basic beliefs and inferential criteria of which the subject is aware (see Swinbume 
1981b: 36). Yet, why not consider the belief in God as properly basic as Plantinga 
has once suggested? 6 Swinburne does not discard this idea as an alternative for 
justifying theism, 'but', he warns, 
many of us who believe that there is a God are not in that position. Either our 
belief is not a basic proposition at all, or - if it is - it would be defeated by 
counter-evidence in the absence of further support. In that case its justification 
will depend on how much probability it gains from other basic propositions; and 
how weak is the counter-evidence (Swinbume 1999: 34). 
6 This is basically the idea defended by Plantinga in his famous article 'Reason and 
belief In God' (see 
Plantinga 1983). 
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In other words, for Swinburne, if theism is rational, this is predominantly a 
matter of inference, not immediate acquaintance. He does not dismiss the possibility 
of the belief in God being basic - as the result of a mystical experience, for example - 
but he only admits this possibility within the framework of an inductive inference. 
His treatment of religious experience as evidence for theistic belief will be a 
consequence of this stance, as we will see in Chapters 4,5 and 6 of the present thesis. 
Given the importance universally accepted criteria and fon-nal inductive 
standards have in Swinburne's method to justify theism, his approach was labelled by 
William Abraham as 'strong rationalism' (see Abraham 1985: 114ff). In the last 
chapter of this thesis I will spell out Abraham's classification in order to better situate 
Swinburne's enterprise and to clarify my own alternative position. 
What follows next, however, is a critical analysis of Swinbume's use of 
Bayes's theorem, the principle of simplicity and religious experience in his 
programme for restoring the intellectual integrity of belief in God. The next chapter 
will therefore be devoted to discussing some difficulties with the idea that the 
Bayesian fon-nal inductive inference can be used to justify theism. 
Chapter 2- Some Problems with the Application of 
Bayesianism and Simplicity to Theism 
In one of the most important defences of theism in twentieth century philosophy, 
Richard Swinburne both preserves and renovates the tradition of arguing in favour of 
the existence of God. Arguments like the cosmological and the teleological, and the 
argument from miracles, for example, which were very well known to authors like 
Aquinas and Leibniz, are retrieved in The Existence of God. However, Swinbume 
does not state these arguments in a deductive form but, more modestly, as parts of an 
inductive and probabilistic case for theismi. The traditional arguments are taken not 
as proofs but as instances that increase or diminish the probability of the hypothesis 
that God exists. Assuming that the more probable a hypothesis is the more justified is 
the corresponding belief (see Swinburne 1999: 3 1), Swinbume postulates that the 
various relevant arguments may be added up in a cumulative forin. Proceeding this 
way, the final result (the power of the summed arguments pro deducted from the 
arguments against) will point to the degree to which the belief in God is rational. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse critically the application by Swinburne of 
the Bayesian inferential model and the concept of simplicity in his arguments in 
favour of the existence of God. In this analysis I will not assess whether these 
assumptions regarding scientific theories are correct - i. e. whether science can really 
be well accounted for in terms of Bayesianism and the principle of simplicity - but 
rather examine the extent to which these concepts are applied satisfactorily to theism 
1 It could be said that classifying Aquinas's type of argument as deductive would 
be anachronistic. 
However, this point does not preclude - in fact, it even reinforces - the observation about the 
originality of Swinburne's approach in the epistemology of religion to 
be made in what follows. 
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as an explanatory hypothesis. This aim will be carried out mainly by means of a 
review of the principal criticisms of Swinburne's method. 
Swinburne's approach to estimating the probability of the existence of God 
relies on two notions of inductive argument. Firstly, he investigates whether the 
different pieces of evidence he considers add to the prior probability of the hypothesis 
of theism, that is, whether we can construe a good C-inductive argument from each 
piece of evidence (see Swinburne 1991: 7). In fonnal tenns, where e stands for a 
piece of evidence, h for the hypothesis that God exists, and k for background 
knowledge, we have that an argument from e to h is a good C-inductive argument if 
and only if P(hle. k)>P(hlk). A good C-inductive argument is then an inference in 
which the initial probability of the hypothesis is increased by the consideration of a 
certain piece of evidence e, that is, when e confirms h. So from Bayes's theorem we 
have that the higher P(elh. k), the higher tends to be P(hle. k), and the smaller P(elk) 
the more probable P(hle. k) is expected to be. By the same token, evidence e will 
confirm h if and only if the probability of e given h (or the likelihood of h) is higher 
than the probability of e in view of the negation of h, that is, given that theism is false. 
In fon-nal tenns, P(hle. k)>P(hlk) if and only if P(elh. k)>P(elk) and if and only if 
P(e1h. k)>P(e1-h. k) (see Swinburne 1991: 108). An important remark regarding C- 
inductive arguments is that, in order for evidence e to increase the probability of h, i. e. 
in order to make P(hle. k)>P(hlk), the prior probability of h [P(hlk)] cannot be zero, 
for then P(hle. k) will also be zero. 
The second kind of inductive inference used by Swinbume is called a P- 
inductive argument, which deals in whether a hypothesis is more probable than not, 
i. e. whether P(hle. k)>V2 (see Swinburne 1991: 17). As with C-Inductive ones, a good 
P-inductive argument will depend in a considerable extent on the prior probability of 
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h. It is only after considering the prior probability of h that we can reach to a 
conclusion on whether h is more probable than not, for even if P(h1k) is not zero and 
evidence e raises its probability by means of C-inductive arguments, the prior 
probability of h may be so low that its posterior probability may end up below ! /2. 
It is 
because of this important problem of the prior probability of the hypothesis of theism 
that Swinburne relies so much on the principle of simplicity, as we saw in Chapter 1. 
In what follows I will examine some problems related to this application of 
Bayes's theorem and the principle of simplicity to the hypothesis of theism. These 
problems will be considered under three main headings: 1) general obstacles to the 
, application of Bayesianism to the belief that God exists; 2) difficulties involved in 
ascribing a prior probability to theism, and 3) the question of to what extent the 
theistic hypothesis is simple. 
1. Can we use Bayes's theorem for assessing theism? 
As we saw above, the assessment of a hypothesis using Bayes's theorem 
involves two basic elements: a likelihood inference and the ascription of a prior 
probability to the hypothesis in question. In a likelihood inference we calculate the 
extent to which the probability of evidence e given the hypothesis h under evaluation 
is greater than the prior probability of e, that is, whether P(elh)>P(e). The higher 
P(elh) in relation to P(e), the larger will be the ratio P(elh)IP(e) in the theorem, which 
expresses how much the hypothesis explains the phenomenon and how much it can 
update (confinning or disconfinning) the initial probability of h. In the present 
section I will discuss some criticisms of Swinburrie's proposal regarding the 
likelihood inference involved in the evaluation of theism and the general adequacy of 
employing Bayes's theorem to assess the rationality of religious 
beliefs. The question 
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regarding the ascription of a prior probability to the hypothesis that God exists will be 
approached in the two subsequent sections. 
1.1 A general inadequacy in the use of Bayesianism in religion 
John Mackie was a colleague and friend of Swinburne. For more than twenty 
years they debated the philosophical problem of the existence of God (see Swinburne 
1983: 385). In this long and fruitful debate, however, they reached divergent 
conclusions about the balance of probabilities regarding the hypothesis of theism (see 
Swinburne 1991: 291 and Mackie 1982: 253). Robert Prevost, one of the most 
important critics of Swinburne's approach in the epistemology of religion, takes this 
crucial divergence as a starting point for a general objection against the use of Bayes's 
theorem in the assessment of theistic belief. Prevost argues that despite the fact that 
both Swinburne and Mackie agree that theism should be discussed using the tools 
provided by the probability calculus, the results they amve to are completely 
different. In Prevost's words, 
The agreement between the two, however, ends with their similar Bayesian 
methodologies. It is a consequence of Bayes's theorem that, if two alternative 
hypotheses have similar explanatory power, the evidence confirms to a larger 
extent the hypothesis with the greater prior probability. Both Mackie and 
Swinburne give the impression that an assessment of the evidence of theism or 
atheism is a simple matter of determining the relevant prior probabilities. But 
though, taken as hypotheses about the nature of the universe, theism and atheism 
have similar explanatory powers, the assessment of the prior probabilities of the 
alternative hypotheses varies tremendously depending on the philosopher. 
According to Swinburne, theism has high prior probability because of its 
simplicity, but, according to Mackie, theism is unacceptable because its lack of fit 
with background knowledge shows that it has very low prior probability. The 
result of these differences over evaluative criteria is that Bayes's theorem records 
a vastly different probability for theism on given evidence (Prevost 1990: 39). 
From these considerations, Prevost concludes that '[ ... ] the use of 
Bayes's theorem is 
not a completely satisfactory method for assessing the evidential support 
for theism' 
(Prevost 1990: 55). 
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One important point to be noted is that Swinburne and Mackie agree not only 
about the adequacy of using Bayes's theorem for assessing the probability of theism, 
but also that this inferential tool should be interpreted as a means to measure, in 
Mackie's words, the 'objective chance' of a hypothesis about a certain occurrence 
(see Mackie 1973: 223-4). In Swinburne, this idea of objectively measured belief is 
better interpreted under the logical theory of probability (see Swinburne 1973: 24). 
According to the logical theory, the probability measured by Bayes's theorem, also 
called episternic probability or probability of a hypothesis given evidence, is a degree 
of rational belief. By 'rational belief the logical theory means the one that is a result 
of universal criteria regarding initial probability distribution, that is, the ascription of a 
prior probability to the hypothesis under assessment must be based on totally 
impersonal and universal patterns. The choice of the logical theory of probability by 
Swinburne and the consequences for his programme of justification of religious belief 
will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7. For now, it is enough to say that we 
can use Bayes's theorem to assess the rationality of a certain belief based on theories 
of probability different from the one championed by Swinburne. So, remarks about 
the failure of the logical theory of probability in achieving this universal and objective 
criterion for defining the initial probability of a hypothesis do not mean that Bayes's 
theorem is incapable of describing the main elements of a discussion of the rationality 
of theism. In other words, Prevost may be right in his criticism of the pretension of a 
universally rational approach of probabilistic arguments 
directed to the justification of 
theism, but this does not necessarily preclude the use of the Bayesian method of 
inference as such. 
Chapter 2- Some Problems with the Application of Bayesianism and Simplicity to Theism 45 
1.2 Bayes's theorem and the problem of evil 
Prevost strengthens his case against the use of Bayeslanism in the 
epistemology of religion when he argues that Bayes's formula does not account for 
important steps in the specific justification of theistic belief He observes that 
Swinburne does not employ the theorem either in his defence of the evidential value 
of religious experience or in the discussion of the arguments involved in the problem 
of evil (see Prevost 1990: 20f). Surprisingly, however, he does not discuss in detail 
the treatment given by Swinburne to religious experience, even considering the 
crucial character this point has in Swinburne's argument. Prevost, instead, 
concentrates his attention on the way the problem of evil is dealt with in Bayesian 
terms. For Prevost, 'an appropriate response to the problem of evil requires 
explaining why God allows evil, and it is the evaluation of the power of theistic 
explanation in this sense which makes difficult the assessment of evil using Bayes's 
theorem' (Prevost 1990: 21). Later on he asserts: 
An instance of evil disconfirms the existence of God whenever we have no 
apparently plausible reason for God allowing it. The degree of disconfirmation is 
inversely proportional to how well the postulated reason accounts for evil and, at 
the same time, preserves the goodness of God: the more reprehensible the evil and 
the less plausible the reason, the more disconfirmed is theism. This pattern of 
disconfirmation does not fit the Bayesian model (Prevost 1990: 26). 
By applying Bayes's formula to the problem here in question we can say that the 
existence of evil e disconfirms the hypothesis of theism h in so far as evil is very 
likely in a world where God does not exist and considerably unlikely given h, that is, 
P(el-h)>P(elh). This means the explanatory power of theism in relation to evil is 
low. It is not zero because of the elements involved in the theistic hypothesis 
regarding the divine attribute of goodness, that is, God could be good and allow some 
evil for certain reasons, which make the occurrence of evil probable even given the 
existence of God. Prevost is right when he remarks that the details of theistic 
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defences against the problem of evil do not fit Bayes's theorem easily. That is, 
Bayes's theorem will not tell us whether the Free Will Defence is coherent, or 
whether second order goods outweigh first order evils. 
Nevertheless it seems Prevost misjudges the role of fon-nal reasoning when he 
says that Bayes's theorem is not appropriate for assessing theism because it fails to 
grasp the idiosyncrasies of the problem of evil. When a physicist uses the formulae of 
classical mechanics to explain the movement of a horse he also misses much of what 
is involved in this animal action. His formal explanation does not account, for 
example, for the particular pattern of stepping of this species of animal or the 
anatomic interaction between muscles and bones involved in this motion. What his 
fon-nal account is capable of doing is to highlight the fundamental mathematical 
structure of the event from a physical point of view. The employment of Bayes's 
theorem may be said to have an analogous effect in Swinbume's account. It shows 
the basic logical relations between the evidence of evil and the hypothesis of theism. 
Bayes's theorem shows us that we must compare the probability of evil assuming that 
there is no God, with the probability of evil assuming that there is a God. One way 
theism explains evil is by providing reasons, which (despite God's goodness) make 
the occurrence of evil likely in a God-created universe. Bayes's theorem itself will 
not yield a theodicy, but the assessment of the explanatory power of theism over evil 
can be entirely Bayesian, enabling Swinburne to say that God could have created a 
world where evil was a likely outcome without this counting against the existence of 
God (see Swinbume 1991: 220). If these considerations are right, there do not seem 
to be any insurmountable obstacles to fitting the analysis about the impact of the 
evidence of evil on the likelihood of theistic hypothesis in a Bayesian way, despite 
Prevost's assertions. 
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As Mackie correctly observes, since probabilistic evaluations are made in 
almost all fields of human life, there is no point in associating the Bayesian approach 
with a scientistic world-view, as we can apply Bayes's theorem just as well to 
ordinary beliefs (see Mackie 1982: 5). So, if the analysis contained in the two 
subsections above is correct, the general criticisms provided by Prevost against the 
use of Bayes's theorem in the evaluation of the rationality of theistic belief do not 
pose any great difficulties for Swinburne. Yet, Prevost's observations about the 
conflict between Swinburne's and Mackie's criteria for assigning a prior probability 
to theism contain an important insight that will be taken up in Chapter 7, in a critique 
of the theory of probability chosen by Swinbume. I will also examine the different 
arguments put forward by Mackie and Swinbume in defence of their particular criteria 
for initial probability distribution, which will come in section 2 of this chapter. 
1.3 Swinburne's likelihood inferences 
In his discussion of how far we can go in using the resources of probability 
calculus to assess questions like the existence of God, the reliability of extra sensory 
perception reports and others, the statistician David Bartholomew has pointed to a 
considerable obstacle to the detennination of the probability of evidence taken into 
account by Swinburne's argument. According to Bartholomew, Bayes's theorem 
ordinarily detennines the posterior probability of a hypothesis h only in case all 
relevant alternative hypotheses to h are considered (see 1988: 152). In the example I 
explored in Chapter I of the doctor searching for the correct diagnosis for a set of 
symptoms, I postulated only two exclusive options for didactical reasons. 
However, a 
hypothesis can face many more than two ways of explaining a certain phenomenon 
and this must be taken into account in a fon-nal discussion of the issue. 
One way of 
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doing this is representing Bayes's rule using Laplace's forin, also shown in Chapter I 
(p. 18), which expresses more clearly the idea of comparison between alternative 
hypotheses to explain a same set of phenomena. 
According to Bartholomew, we can only clinch a Bayesian argument from 
evidence e to a hypothesis h when we can give an exhaustive list of the alternative 
explanatory proposals to h (see Bartholomew 1984: 59). Nevertheless, in most of his 
discussions, Swinburne compares theism only with the hypothesis that there is no 
further explanation for the evidence in question, i. e. the 'null hypothesis' in the 
specific sense of the expression 2 (see Swinburne 1991: 104-5). More precisely, 
Swinbume narrows down the alternatives just to the personal explanation provided by 
theism and the causal explanation given by natural science. Since science cannot 
account for these pieces of evidence - since they are too odd or too big for natural 
science to explain them (see Swinburne 1991: 71) - the only alternative to theism 
would be then to leave those phenomena unexplained. 
However it is plausible to argue that the events recounted in Swinburne's 
argumentation - as the existence of the universe, of order in the world, of conscious 
beings, and others - can come under more than two hypotheses. The theistic 
hypothesis can take more than one form, as a finite deity with powers limited only to 
do what would be needed to create the universe, like the Platonic derniurge, for 
example, or even more than one limited finite deity, each of them responsible by a 
particular feature of the universe. We could also mention non-personal, deistic or 
even pantheistic alternatives like the action by logos and pneuma proposed by the 
Stoics, or the Spinozian Single Infinite Substance or the Absolute Spirit of Gennan 
2 The expression 'null hypothesis' is of current use in statistics and 
in its specific sense expresses the 
thesis that there is nothing to be accounted for about the evidence under enquiry, i. e. Its 
features are due 
to chance alone, not to a systematic cause 
(see, for example, Priest 1981: 425). 
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Idealism to explain the existence of the universe. In fact, alternative cosmological 
hypotheses to traditional theism are potentially infinite in number. Following 
Bartholomew's point, then, we could say that in not accounting for at least a larger set 
of alternatives rival to theism in his probabilistic comparison, Swinbume may be 
accused of a serious mistake in his application of Bayes's theorem to the assessment 
of the theistic hypothesis. 
It is not only in cosmology that we potentially have an infinite set of 
alternative explanations. For all phenomena to be explained in science and ordinary 
life innumerable rival accounts are logically possible. Swinbume is very aware of this 
issue, known as the 'curve fitting problem' (see Swinburne 1996: 26ff). According to 
Swinburne, and consistent with the position postulated by the logical theory of 
probability, we need objective criteria in order to select from this potentially infinite 
set of alternatives only the most important ones so that we can compare their 
probabilities in a posterior moment of the probabilistic reasoning. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the criterion Swinbume takes to be the most important is simplicity, and 
his reply to Bartholomew's objection would be based on the corresponding principle 
as is clear from the following quotation: 
I suggest that theism is very, very much more probable than any rival personal 
explanation of the existence, orderliness, and other characteristics of the universe. 
A personal creator of the universe must be a person of immense power and to 
suppose that he has very great but finite power would be, as we saw earlier, to 
propose a much less simple hypothesis than the hypothesis that he has infinite 
power. It would raise the enormous problem of why he had just the amount of 
power which he had and what, if anything, limited his power in this way. Some 
other force would, as it were, stand against God lirriiting him. Similar points 
apply to hypotheses that the personal creator of the world has limited knowledge 
or freedom. The other alternative hypotheses postulating a limited creator of the 
universe are very, very much less probable than the hypothesis that God made it. 
The only plausible alternative to theism is the supposition that the world with all 
the characteristics which I have described just is, has no explanation. That 
however is not a very probable alternative. We expect all things to have 
explanations (Swinbume 1991: 287). 
S. - jo, c 
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In other words, using the criterion of simplicity, Swinburne rules out all other possible 
explanations as implausible, concentrating his attention exclusively on the hypothesis 
that the pieces of evidence he considers in the arguments are ultimate brute facts i. e. 
are probable in themselves. Thus, he is able to claim, the list of alternative 
hypotheses chosen for meeting the requirements of a Bayesian assessment of theism is 
not exhaustive, but is sufficient, since it focuses on the only one that could have any 
considerable prior probability, according to the simplicity principle. 
One might object that he has not applied his principle to all non-personal 
cosmo ogica ypotheses as he has to the ones mentioned above. His calculation will 
be defective as a result of not considering metaphysical hypotheses with an 
impersonal absolute. I have found no answer to this objection in Swinbume's works. 
Nevertheless, this omission is not necessarily a surprise or even a defect if we 
consider that the main target of his justification effort is not the metaphysician, but the 
natural scientist who champions the naturalistic position in cosmology. If this is 
really so, however, technically speaking, his conclusion, if favourable to theism, could 
not be that this hypothesis is generally more probable than not, as he intends it to be, 
but that at most it is more probable than naturalism at least. In other words, his 
evaluation only permits a limited comparative conclusion. 
In addition, Swinbume's delimitation of the set of relevant hypotheses in this 
discussion is not made according to the parameters provided by the logical theory of 
probability. As I argued above, there are many alternative explanations for the 
evidence Swinburne discusses that are not discarded by means of the principle of 
simplicity. If we eliminate them by arguing that these hypotheses are not relevant in 
the context of the justification of theism in modem academic and scientific circles 
then we are bringing into the argument elements that are not permitted by the logical 
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theory of probability. Chapters 7 and 8 will discuss more deeply how the problem of 
delimiting the set of relevant theories can be sorted out using a different theory of 
probability. In Chapter 31 will argue that the whole idea that we need to consider an 
infinite set of alternative hypotheses, which is Swinburne's main rationale for the 
principle of simplicity, is also very controversial. For the moment, however, it is 
sufficient to claim that Bartholomew's objection to Swinbume's approach to a 
Bayesian justification of theism is a very serious one, but not to any and every 
Bayesian approach. 
In any case, what is important to highlight here is that Swinburne's answer to 
this problem is based on the principle of simplicity. However, Bartholomew also 
points to another, potentially more serious difficulty in the use of Bayes's theorem by 
Swinburne. The difficulty in question is the assignment of a prior probability to 
theism, an issue that will be analysed in the next section. 
2. Can we attribute a prior probability to theism? 
The likelihood calculation in Bayes's theorem is the way of updating our 
initial belief in a hypothesis h. The result of a Bayesian computation is called 
posterior probabilLty, which is the prior probability of h (P(h)) modified by the 
consideration of relevant evidence. In his application of Bayes's theorem to theism, 
Swinburne must ascribe a prior probability to theism to make the calculation possible. 
In doing so, he has to observe two constraints. Firstly, he needs to use objective and 
universal criteria of probability distribution, as the logical theory demands. In 
addition, he needs to attribute this initial probability without considering any 
empirical information, i. e. in a totally a priori way, since theism 
is intended to explain 
all contingent facts, including the existence of the universe itself. 
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In view of these requirements, Bartholomew expresses great scepticism about 
the possibility of meeting the challenge. In his words, 
The crux of the matter is whether one can assign a prior probability to any 
hypothesis prior to having any knowledge whatsoever. If one does claim to be 
able to do this it must surely be based on one's general knowledge of the way 
things are and this is posterior to the originating event and not prior. We are 
trying to do the impossible by asking what degree of belief would be justified in 
the hypothesis that God exists prior to anything existing at all including the 
human mind which is being asked to make the assessment. This seems quite 
impossible if not absurd (Bartholomew 1996: 167-8). 
Bartholomew's criticism concentrates on the second constraint I mentioned above, 
that is, the restriction about which kind of inforination should be considered in the 
assignment here in question. As we saw in Chapter 1, Swinburne postulates that the 
prior probability of theism should be evaluated according to principles of rational 
belief, which are a priori in the sense of both imposing order on the way we elaborate 
the content of our thoughts and of being independent of empirical information. 
Among the criteria he lists (adequate fit with background knowledge, scope and 
simplicity), Swinburne opts for simplicity as the most important, and the basis on 
which he could attribute a prior probability to theism. Yet he does not say that one 
should assign that initial probability 'prior to having any knowledge whatsoever' if 
6prior' is ascribed a temporal meaning, that is, of having psychologically acquired 
information, which seems to be the sense employed in Bartholomew's analysis. The 
priority of the criteria required for assessing the initial probability of the belief that 
God exists is not temporal but logical; they are thought of as patterns for ordering 
thinking itself, independently of experience. As a result, the question about whether it 
is reasonable to think of anything prior even to the existence of the human mind is 
irrelevant, since the matter is not psychological or empirical but logical and 
transcendental in the Kantian sense. 
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In fact, Bartholomew is joined by other authors in his scepticism about the 
possibility of ascribing a prior probability to theism prescinded from any information 
about the world. In his The Miracle of Theism, one of the first critical analyses of 
Swinbume's probabilistic version of natural theology, Mackie had made a similar 
observation, when he said: 
Still, all that is being said is that the existence of a complex physical universe 
raises the likelihood of a god, makes it more probable that it would have been 
otherwise, that is, if there had been no such universe. But it is hard to see how 
this helps us. How can we even think about the antecedent probability that there 
should be a god, given that there was no such universe? Presumably we must 
think of an initial probability of there being a god, relative only to tautological 
information, and if we have rejected the ontological argument this will be pretty 
low (Mackie 1982: 98-9). 
The assumption taken by Mackie in this quotation is that the main criterion for 
establishing the prior or antecedent probability of a hypothesis is the fit of the 
hypothesis with background knowledge, that is, the set of infortnation we have about 
the world prior to considering a specific piece of evidence. Now, since the first piece 
of evidence to be accounted for is the existence of the universe itself, no empirical 
information remains to adjudicate on the prior probability of theism, which for 
Mackie is a serious obstacle to an inductive argument in favour of theism. In 
addition, under the criterion of background knowledge, theism should receive a very 
low prior probability, since it postulates direct intentional action of a disembodied 
personal being as the cause of the existence of the universe. This postulation is 
improbable given our background knowledge because, in Mackie's words: 
All our knowledge of intention-fulfilment is of embodied intentions being fulfilled 
indirectl by way of bodily changes and movements which are causally related to y 
the intended result, and where the ability thus to fulfil intentions itself has a 
causal history, either of evolutionary developments or of learning or of both 
(Mackie 1982: 100). 
An important point to be made regarding this remark by Mackie is that, if Swinburne 
were to judge the Prior probabIlIty of thelsm according 
to background knowledge 
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from his logical theory approach, he really would need to conform his assignment to 
the current knowledge about the features of personal action in general. This is the 
case because he wants to base the God-hypothesis on completely impersonal and 
universal grounds, which he primarily takes to be those acknowledged by 
contemporary science. In other words, since Swinburne intends to base his degree of 
belief on patterns acceptable by both theists and non-theists, he needs to show that the 
concept of a disembodied personal being acting intentionally and directly in his 
causation of the universe is coherent with what both parties accept about personal 
action. Even if he could show there is no incoherence in principle here, he would 
need to admit that God is a type of person that diverges very much from what we 
nonnally know about persons. 
Nevertheless, Swinburne's reply to Mackie is of a very different sort: he 
rejects background knowledge as the main criterion and postulates that the 
comparative prior probability of theism and naturalism should be judged according to 
the principle of simplicity. For him, if a person can be understood as 'a being with 
power (to do intentional actions), knowledge, and freedom (to choose, uncaused, 
which action to do)' (Swinbume 1983: 385), then human beings are persons with a 
limited degree of these properties and God is a person with an infinite level of power, 
knowledge and freedom. Considering that 'it is always simpler to postulate infinite or 
zero degrees of some property than a certain precise value of it' (Swinburne 1983: 
385), God can be said to be the simplest kind of person conceivable. 
In addition to postulating that God possesses those properties in an infinite 
degree, the hypothesis of theism is also simple because it proposes a simple mode of 
causality, that is, the direct, unmediated accomplishment of intentional actions (see 
Swinburne 1983: 386). So, the kind of person theism postulates for God is not only 
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comprehensible but also very simple, and if simplicity increases the probability of a 
hypothesis, then theism has a significant prior probability as well. Mackie's objection 
does not apply because the prior probability of the belief in God is to be judged 
exclusively by a priori considerations, such as the principle of simplicity. 'The 
simplicity of a hypothesis', Swinburne claims, 'is not a matter of its familiarity, 
whether or not it is exemplified in the world of experience' (Swinbume 1983: 387). 
No factual background knowledge should be assumed to evaluate the hypothesis, but 
merely analytical truths and a priori principles. So it does not matter if in fact the 
examples we know of intentional action do not instantiate the simplicity of the 
relation between intention and its realisation in a being like God. 
So, in Swinbume's reply the criterion of simplicity should be preferred to the 
fit with background knowledge in judging how probable theism is initially. Recall 
that the reason he presents for this precedence is the fact that the theories in 
contention here have no neighbouring, related fields. His position regarding the 
relationship between the criteria of simplicity and background knowledge, then, is 
crucial for the success of his application of Bayes's theorem to the justification of 
theism. This point is so important that I will come back to it in Chapter 3, when the 
difficulties of simplicity as an epistemological principle will be analysed at greater 
length. Let us, however, first discuss, in the following final section of the present 
chapter, some troubles with the characterisation of theism as a simple hypothesis. 
3. Is theism really a simple hypothesis? 
Even if we grant to Swinburne that the justification of the belief in God can be 
achieved by means of the Bayesian inferential apparatus and that 
it is possible to 
assign to theism a prior probability taking into consideration mainly 
the principle of 
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simplicity, we should still check the extent to which the belief that there is a God is a 
simple explanatory hypothesis at all. It was Mackie again who first raised this issue, 
when he said: 
Contrary to what Swinburne says, the postulate of a divine mind, if given enough 
content to raise the probability of there being pervasive regularities, In particular 
if we assign to this mind the power to create a universe from nothing and to put 
into it and maintain in it pervasive regularities by unmediated fulfilments of 
intention, is far from simple. As I said when discussing personal explanation in 
Chapter 7, the introduction of this category of immediate intention- fulfilment is at 
variance with what we really know about our own intentional actions, and 
conforms only to an illusory, over-simplified, naYve understanding of them 
(Mackie 1982: 149). 
Mackie's argument for the complexity of the theistic hypothesis, however, as we can 
see in the quotation above, lacked a discussion of the concept of simplicity, which is 
fundamental in view of Swinburne's approach. Instead, Mackie appealed again to the 
poor fit of the concept of a disembodied personal being with our background 
knowledge, a move barred by Swinburne's reply as we have already seen. 
Yet, the issue of how simple the theistic hypothesis is has received a deeper 
analysis than that provided by Mackie in an article by Don Fawkes and Tom Smythe 
(1996). According to them, the fact that the kind of person Swinbume is proposing 
has the capacities of power, knowledge and goodness in an infinite degree turns 
theism into a very complex hypothesis and God into a very complex being. Why 
postulate a creator with many more capacities than he would ever need to create the 
universe? Why assume that this being is immortal if it would be simpler to propose a 
god with only the capacity to create the universe and so would die after having 
completed his task? 
3 Simpler still would have been to explain this evidence without 
appeal to any god, the authors argue. A hypothesis that assumes more than the 
bare 
necessities to explain its corresponding phenomena can hardly 
be accounted as simple 
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(see Fawkes & Smythe 1996: 263). Moreover, if we consider that for Swinbume 
simplicity is mostly a quantitative matter as we saw in Chapter 1.2.2 (p. 24), the 
knowledge of an infinite number of propositions, as God is supposed to possess, 
makes of Him the most complex being conceivable cognitively speaking. If 
simplicity is a matter of economy, of parsimony, then it seems at least bizarre that an 
entity that owns an infinite number of qualities may be classified as simple. 
The controversial character of the concept of 'infinity' is the main idea behind 
Quentin Smith's critical reaction against Swinburne's postulation that theism is more 
probable than naturalism given the criterion of simplicity. Smith has argued that 
Swinburne's comparison between the sole cause for everything in the universe 
postulated by theism and the infinite number of causes claimed by naturalism is not 
correct, and it is only because of this misconception that theism is said to be simpler 
than its rival. However, Smith argues, 'the person, God, is not the cause of everything 
in the universe. Rather it is God's creative acts, the divine volitions, that are the 
causes' (Smith 1998: 92). Since these creative acts correspond in number to each part 
of the universe that was created or being created, the purported simplicity of theistic 
explanation is shown to be illusory, for it involves not only an immense number of 
causal events in its explanation but also postulates them in addition to the material 
power and liabilities proposed by its rival. In fact, Smith claims, it is naturalism that 
is simpler than theism, not the opposite (see Smith 1998: 92). 
Smith's argument has force assuming that God causes all things by 
innumerable creative acts. One might retort, however, that this move sounds very 
artificial, for, since Smith does not deny that God is the sole cause of these creative 
' The notion of a mortal deity with finite powers was suggested, for example, 
by Hume in his 
Dialogues Concei-ning Natw-al Religion (1935), part V. 
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acts, God ends up being the single, unique cause of the universe. Moreover, 
naturalism cannot postulate 'nature' as the cause of all material powers and liabilities 
at work for the occurrence of the events, since 'nature' is just the name given to this 
whole set. As a result, naturalism leaves unexplained whence these powers and 
liabilities come. What we have, then, this reply could claim, is really God on one side 
and on the other the large quantity of material forces postulated by naturalism as the 
ultimate cause of all events in the universe. None the less, without considering God's 
creative acts in the reckoning of explanatory elements, the mere addition of God to 
natural causes makes theism less simple than its rival, given that it postulates more 
entities to explain the same phenomena. Indeed, it is important to notice that Aquinas 
had already admitted this point in his famous Five Ways. He did not argue for the 
relative simplicity of theism but contended that we in fact need God to explain 
thoroughly the occurrences of the universe. In other words, for Aquinas, the relative 
lack of simplicity of theism would be largely compensated by its higher explanatory 
power (see Aquinas Summa Theologica Q. 2 Art. 3). 
In addition, Smith offers another reason for disagreeing with Swinbume's 
evaluation of the comparative prior probability of theism and naturalism regarding 
simplicity. Recall that the main reason why theism is a simple hypothesis is that God 
has all His attributes to an infinite degree, and that, according to Swinburne, it is 
simpler to postulate a being with unlimited qualities than with limited ones, since any 
limit cries out for explanation. Smith argues, however, that the concept of infinity 
used by Swinburne is equivocal, with at least four different senses. 'Infinite' refers to 
1) a number (the Cantor's transfinite number aleph-zero), 2) the instantaneous or 
infinitely fast speed of light, 3) the maximum degree of a property (which is the sense 
in which is said that God's properties are infinite), and 4) the set of all numbers, 
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including the various transfinite ones (the different 'types of infinite mathematical 
numbers'), which God is said to know. Swinburne uses all these different meanings 
in a mostly indistinguishable way (see Smith 1998: 92-3). Yet, the equivocation here 
involved does not seem to be so problematic as Smith attempts to demonstrate, since 
Swinburne's point is not that the concept is univocal, but that the notion of infinite as 
a quantity or degree is simpler than any particular figure we may attribute to an 
object, and consequently, if God is a personal being with attributes in an infinite 
degree, He is the simplest person we can conceive. 
It would be problematic, however, if we could not compare the notion of 
infinity used in mathematics or physics and in theology, as Smith asserts (see Smith 
1998: 93). The reason he presents for this, however, is rather weak. Smith states that 
'God's infinite goodness' is not equivalent to 'God is capable of perforining an aleph- 
zero number of good acts', since this one is consistent with 'performing an aleph-zero 
number of evil acts'. which would not be acceptable to theism. The problem with this 
objection is that one might retort by saying that the infinite goodness attributed to God 
is not in the number of good acts He performs, but in the degree of righteousness in 
each singular act, which, being infinite in goodness, is not compatible with any degree 
Of eVil4. If so, Swinbume could still postulate the use of a mathematical concept of 
infinity to God, even in view of Smith's observations. 
However, while this last remark by Smith may not be seen as so hanuful to 
Swinburne's analysis as at first sight, another philosopher, not directly concerned with 
the probabilistic justification of theism, has made it possible to raise some important 
imple because of the concept of infinity. In a problems with the idea that theism is si II 
This is, in fact, one of the elements of the problem of evIl, which would not 
be posed If God's good 
acts were trivially compatible with evil acts. 
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paper comparing infinity in mathematics and in theology, Jill Le Blanc argues that the 
concept in the two fields cannot be easily assimilated. According to her, 'the 
conception of the theological infinite is not a conception of an infinite collection, but 
rather of the unbounded or unlimited' (Le Blanc 1993: 52). In mathematics, the 
infinite can be either an extension of the finite, as a result of the application of a 
certain rule or process (the potential infinite) or an actually existing collection of an 
infinite number of parts (the actual infinite). In theology, Le Blanc claims, the infinite 
is thought of as a necessary attribute of God and cannot be understood save by the 
idea of the unlimited. This idea of limitlessness is the one behind the idea that God's 
attributes are infinite. In Le Blanc's words, 'to say that in God being, goodness, 
power and so forth are infinitely present is to say no more than that the quality is not 
limited by the nature of God, as it is limited by the nature of any creature in which it 
is found' (LeBlanc 1993: 56). 
In fact, the unreconcilable difference between God and His creatures is a 
recurrent theme in theology and takes us to another facet of the theological concept of 
infinity: that God is infinitely mysterious, that we can talk about Him only in an 
analogical sense. God's infinite nature is beyond our common knowledge, 
inaccessible to our full comprehension. The idea of mystery involved in the notion of 
infinite in theology is another point at which the theological and the mathematical 
infinity become incomparable. According to Le Blanc, '[ ... ] mathematics shows that, 
while we may not be able to encompass the infinite - we cannot actually pass through 
all the numbers in an infinite series - we can still grasp the infinite, and 
by finite 
, J, means' (Le Blanc 1993: 59). In being graspable, mathematical infinity 
does not share 
with the theological notion the power of provoking the typical reactions of the 
religious person in her contact with the sacred, as anxiety, 
delight, fear and trembling. 
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Modem mathematics deals with infinity as it deals with any concept of set theory, 
with no especial wonder or fascination. As a result, concludes Le Blanc, 
It may be that the proposition 'God is infinite' can be taken literally only when 
infinity in general is shrouded in mystery. When infinity is 'secularized' and 
mathematical infinity is given an increasingly clear and unmysterious meaning, 
'infinite' can be understood of God only figuratively [ ... ] We cannot somehow 
extend the mathematical concept of the infinite in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the nature of God. Instead, comparison of the mathematical 
with the theological concept brings into light the experience of God as the 
mysterious unspeakable (Le Blanc 1993: 62). 
If Le Blanc's arguments for the incomparability of the mathematical and theological 
meanings of infinity are correct, then Swinburne's claim that theism is simple because 
of God's infinite attributes faces considerable difficulties. The idea that we can 
conceive of infinity in a much simpler way than any particular number is clearly taken 
from mathematics. From a theological point of view, however, infinity is not an 
accessible thing to consider at all, but the most mysterious, paradoxical and 
fascinating thought the human being is capable of attempting. So, if we grant to 
Swinburne the use of the mathematical concept of infinity for talking about God, we 
run a serious risk of not recognising this god as the God of theism. On the other hand, 
if we apply to infinity its more proper theological meaning, then we cannot say that 
God is the simplest being we could conceive. 
A possible reply to this objection would be that the mathematical concept of 
infinity Swinburne uses in his theory is not necessarily incompatible with the 
theological concept Le Blanc emphasises; they would only be two different 
perspectives on the same logical object. From a mathematical point of view, God's 
infinite nature is simple, because it does not require any additional information to be 
understood; it can be easily grasped. Any limit to the number of His attributes would 
demand explanation that is not needed in the case of traditional theism. This does not 
mean, so this reply goes, that this quality in God does not inspire 
fear and trembling in 
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the religious believer because of His transcendence. Now, God's infinite nature 
pennits us to regard theism as a simple hypothesis because, from a mathematical point 
of view, it is psychologically accessible and because it is economical in its 
explanation. The problem, however, is that, from a theological point of view, that 
same quality of God is highly mysterious and extremely complex. Given that these 
psychological states (accessibility and mystery) and epistemological qualities 
(parsimony and complexity) are incompatible, the perspectives on God's infinite 
nature cannot both be assumed because they lead to irreconcilable assessments. In 
other words, if we opt for the mathematical perspective, we abandon the theological 
standpoint, which is much more important from a religious point of view. 
In this chapter, I attempted to show that, although there is nothing in principle 
against using the Bayesian inferential apparatus to discuss the justification of theism, 
we could not say the same about the principle of simplicity. Indeed, as we saw above, 
the concept of simplicity is central to Swinbume's programme, since most of the 
serious criticisms of his application of Bayesianism to the justification of theism 
presented here are answered by an appeal to the principle of simplicity. However, the 
difficulties associated with simplicity in Swinburne's proposal are not restricted to its 
application to God's nature 5. The formulation and operation of simplicity as an a 
priori epistemological concept faces its own problems. These pose even more serious 
challenges to Swinburne's proposal, which will be the focus of the next chapter. 
5 For another interesting criticism of Swinbume's application of simplicity in the 
justification of theism 
see Wynn 1993. 
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As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Swinburne's main reason for proposing the principle of 
simplicity is the curve-fitting problem. In his view, we need objective, universal 
criteria for selecting the relevant alternative theories in view of the infinite number of 
possible options to explain the same state of affairs (see Swinbume 1991: 55). In 
other words, given that the points in a graph, expressing the data we have about a 
certain phenomenon, can be covered by a infinite number of curves, we need 
objective, universal criteria to narrow down the choice to the relevant ones, which 
will then be assessed by science. The principle of simplicity is one of these criteria, 
and if we deny the acceptance of principles like it, Swinburne argues, we are faced 
with the undesirable alternative of considering science a non-rational enterprise, since 
the selection of theories from the potentially infinite set of options would not be 
guided by any objective reason. In other words, either we assume the principle of 
simplicity or we end up considering science an irrational activity. 
Let us recall the way the principle of simplicity is stated. With it, Swinburne 
aims to show that, 
[ ... 
] other things being equal - the simplest hypothesis proposed as an explanation 
of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any other available 
hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than those of any other 
available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate a priori epistermc principle that 
simplicity is evidence of truth (Swinburne 1997b: 1). 
Since I have already expounded and discussed Swinbume's applications of this 
principle in the two previous chapters, my present analysis will concentrate on general 
epistemological issues. In doing so, I will be questioning the very basis of one of his 
fundamental argumentative tools. To accomplish this, I will start with some standard 
objections to simplicity as a way of evaluating how true a proposition 
is. Then, we 
Chapter 3- SýmPl'city as Evidence of Truth 64 
will see how Swinbume's more recent statements on the matter - issued in Simplicity 
as Evidence of Truth (1997) and in Epistemic Justification (2001) - answer those 
criticisms. In the last two sections, I will present some critical responses to 
Swinbume's proposal. 
Some Classic Objections against Simplicity as an Epistemological 
Principle 
What Swinburne basically claims regarding simplicity is that this concept may 
be used to select theories in a principled way, and for epistemological reasons. In 
other words, simplicity is a way of evaluating rival theories in an objective and 
universally acceptable fashion. In addition, the reason simplicity is important relates 
to truth, that is, the simpler a hypothesis is the truer it is. 
The epistemological value of simplicity has been the subject of considerable 
discussion in the recent history of philosophy. In this section, I will expound some of 
the most relevant criticisms against simplicity advanced by epistemologists such as 
Mario Bunge, Rom Harre and Mary Hesse in order to better clarify and evaluate 
Swinburne's position later on. 
In a text that serves as the inspiration for many contemporary discussions of 
simplicity, Mario Bunge analyses the various elements involved in 'semiotic 
simplicity', i. e. the one relative to the signs that describe the things in the world'. In 
general, Bunge's analysis focuses on the problem of whether we should prefer 
simplicity in scientific theories, discussing the difficulties related to the logical, 
semantic, epistemological and pragmatic dimensions of the concept. 
1 Bunge deliberately does not discuss the notion in an ontological context, i. e. the idea of natural 
simplicity. According to him, the discussion of serniotic si III 
application (see Bunge 1963: 32). 
implicity precedes that of its ontological 
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From a logical point of view, talking about simplicity means discussing this 
concept in relation to terrns, propositions and theories. Now, according to Bunge, 
scientific analysis generally does not involve simple terms. On the contrary, the more 
in depth research progresses the more complex tend to be the terins used. Requiring 
simplicity at this stage may block scientific analysis (see Bunge 1963: 55). Moreover, 
the simplicity of a term like a predicate is contextual and may vary depending on the 
outcome of its elaboration according to transformation rules. Thus, apart from not 
being prima facie desirable, the criterion of simplicity applied to tenus may lead to 
indefinite results. 
The simplicity of propositions faces a similar problem. Despite attempts like 
Jeffrey's (1948) for example, Bunge suggests that we have no clear and 
uncontroversial measure for the complexity of a proposition yet (see Bunge 1963: 63). 
The problem is not only the number of variables in an equation that should be taken 
into account, but also the degree of complexity a single symbol may have in an 
equation, which can distort completely the result of any formula meant to measure 
propositional simplicity universally. In other words, a proposition with fewer 
variables may have a much higher degree of complexity than another composed of 
more symbols. Apart from the difficulties related to propositions, Bunge continues, 
the attempt to measure the simplicity of theories faces the challenge that one and the 
same theory may be formulated in various alternative and equivalent ways that can 
vary in complexity. In addition, a simple theory may be based on complex 
assumptions and vice versa, which again makes challenging any measurement and 
comparison of theories with respect to simplicity (see Bunge 1963: 64). 
If logical simplicity seems to swing between lack of definition and lack of 
parameters for the comparison of alternatives, the prospects for this concept regarding 
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its semantic dimension do not seem more hopeful either, Bunge says. Intuitively, the 
notion of the semantic simplicity of a scientific theory refers to economy of 
presuppositions, i. e. the fewer concepts and propositions a theory presupposes the 
simpler it is. Yet counting presuppositions in a natural language demands that we 
consider the cultural and historical background of the theory in question as well as the 
relative familiarity of its concepts. However, these elements make the issue not only 
difficult to define, but also introduce a changing and relative parameter for assessing 
scientific hypotheses. 'Consequently', Bunge asserts, 'S-simplicity [semantic 
simplicity] could be measured in formalized languages alone - i. e., where it is hardly 
an interesting problem' (Bunge 1963: 69). Semantically, then, according to Bunge, 
simplicity is either indefinable or uninteresting, providing two further reasons for not 
esteeming that characteristic so highly in scientific theories. 
Bunge calls epistemological simplicity the parsimony in the use of 
'transcendent terms', i. e. terms distant from sense-experience expressions. According 
to this criterion, the more abstract the words used by a theory, in the sense of not 
directly related to observational expressions, the more complex it is (see Bunge 
1963: 71). The problem with this kind of parsimony is that it neither corresponds to 
the actual trend that has been followed by modem science nor is it advisable in itself 
Modem science since Galileo has employed more and more theoretical and non- 
observational terms. On the other hand, according to Bunge, empirically bound 
phrases like 'this is metal' (also called 'phenomenalist phrases'), '[ ... ] achieve 
epistemological simplicity, or triviality, at the cost of both syntactical complexity and 
epistemological shallowness: it takes longer to say less in phenomenalist languages. 
The latter are not economical, but just poor' (Bunge 1963: 72). 
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Lastly, Bunge discusses the notion of simplicity from a pragmatic point of 
view, understood as 'economy of work'. This last expression, however, may have 
more than one meaning. It can be a measure of the effort in constructing workable 
experiments or the use of more economic and suggestive symbols (notational 
simplicity) or even the search for an easy understanding or familiarity with a matter 
(Bunge 1963: 77-78). The common link between these different aspects of pragmatic 
simplicity is that none of them is desirable in itself. If the aim of science is objective 
truth, it may be that the easiest ways of looking for it will not work. This is so 
because, as was said before, the deeper we research a subject the more difficult it 
tends to become and the less easy to express, operate and understand. Regarding 
psychological simplicity, Bunge is even more sceptical. For him, this is a culturally 
and educationally related feature, and consequently very difficult to state as an 
objective parameter for scientific activity in general. The striving for clarity and easy 
understanding is clearly secondary in comparison with depth and accuracy if our aim 
is not merely to teach established information but fundamentally to elaborate new 
knowledge (see Bunge 1963: 76). 
In conclusion, Mario Bunge does not see much hope in the project to find a 
unified and measurable concept of simplicity in general. According to Bunge, the 
occasional preference for simplicity is due more to other qualities related to scientific 
work like systernicity, cohesiveness, easy checking of consistency and of empirical 
testability. Moreover, he does not accept the idea that simplicity is the decisive 
criterion when it comes to choosing among alternative theories, 
for, in his words, 
'[ ] other criteria, such as accuracy and depth - which are manifestly 
incompatible 
with simplicity - are far weightier. Even formal criteria, such as symmetry and 
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extensibility', may predominate over simplicity' (Bunge 1963: 81). We cannot deny 
the intuition that simplicity is a worthwhile characteristic of a scientific theory, but 
this is only valid as long as it is put at the service of the general purpose of attaining 
truth. Even so, there still remains an intrinsic ambiguity in the notion. 'In short', 
Bunge argues, "'simplicity" is a multivocal term; not all kinds of simplicity are 
desirable or even compatible with one another; and the theory of simplicity, though 
still in a very rudimentary stage, threatens to become highly complex' (1963: 83). 
Rom Harre joins Bunge in the criticism of simplicity. According to Harre, the 
idea that the simpler a statement the more likely it is to be true is part of what he calls 
the attempt to anticipate nature, that is, the attempt to describe how the world is prior 
to any effort to inspect the phenomena empirically (see Harre 1965: 9). This attempt 
to anticipate nature through the concept of simplicity should be distinguished from 
pragmatic considerations of simplicity, which take it to be just a heuristic device with 
no truth value claim. In other words,, a position like Swinburne's, which takes 
simplicity to be an a priori indication of the truth of a theory, should be distinguished 
from the use of this concept in purely pragmatic terins, that is, the selection of simple 
theories because they are easier to compare with others or to test empirically, for 
example. Harre does not rule out that simplicity might have a heuristic importance at 
some point in scientific research, but, he argues, it '[ ... ] can 
hardly be said to supply a 
universal and necessary a priori principle of likelihood, even less of truth' (Harr6 
1965: 105). 
Harre grounds his position in an argument similar to the one employed by 
Bunge. The first characteristic to be noted in simplicity, Harr& claims, is that it is 
2 Extensibility is jthe] possibility of growth to cover new domains' (Bunge 1963: 103). According to 
Bunge, this characteristic is generally incompatible with simplicity because the more economical a 
theory is the less extensible it tends to be in this sense. 
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essentially a comparative concept. When we say p is simple, we are in general saying 
that p is simpler than q regarding some aspect. Simplicity is generally a function of 
relative fewness of units or parts of a thing. Consequently, this assessment of relative 
fewness of parts depends on a method of analysis of the object concerned. A smaller 
number of relations in a theory h does not mean that h is simpler than g, for it may be 
the case that, although g has more relations among its component propositions, those 
relations are simpler than in h, which leaves the comparison indefinite. There is no a 
priori reason for choosing the fewness of relations instead of a less complicated web 
of relationships. 
Algebraic simplicity in mathematical expressions of phenomena, however, 
seems to be a good general indication of what theory to choose. In these cases, the 
simplest curve possible to cover the points representing the behaviour of a certain 
phenomenon will probably be the best theory to take. Yet, Harre points out that we 
seldom find concrete cases of lines to fit in plotted results, where these results are the 
only evidence for finding the form of the curve. 'In most scientific contexts', Harre 
claims, 'there is some guide from the larger body of knowledge as to what the curve 
is, and this may frequently be so paramount as to be used to adjust the error band so 
that the expected shape of curve is obtained' (Harre 1965: 100). In other words, in 
concrete cases of the so-called 'curve fitting problem', simplicity is not the decisive 
criterion which enables us to tell rival theories apart, rather it is the background 
knowledge commonly recognised by the scientific community. 
Despite partaking in Bunge and Harre's scepticism concerning the simplicity 
principle in an earlier article (see Hesse 1967), Mary Hesse later defended a more 
positive approach to this epistemological concept. However, before advancing her 
IIIII fil c position regarding the place of that principle in her probabilistic theory of sc ent 
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inference, Hesse delineates carefully the many possible facets of the notion. First of 
all, it is necessary to distinguish between subjective and objective simplicity. Only 
the second one - theory choice regarding relative truth-value - is philosophically 
interesting for her purposes. Subjective simplicity if taken to refer to pragmatic or 
psychological preferences for certain kinds of theories because they are more 
workable or convenient, is not only irrelevant to that aim in philosophy of science but 
also difficult to make precise (see Hesse 1974: 222). 
Another facet she dismisses is notational simplicity. Two expressions might 
be notationally different, but logically equivalent, which makes them equivalent as 
regards their truth claims and so irrelevant with respect to the theory choice problem. 
So, the relevant concept of simplicity for the theory of scientific inference is the one 
relative to the logical and conceptual structure of theories that have distinctive factual 
consequences (see Hesse 1974: 225). 
Yet within the objective simplicity domain, and considering only hypotheses 
with different factual content, we should also distinguish between simplicity of 
content and simplicity of economy. Simplicity of content is a matter of fewer 
concepts and fewer premises in a theory that, because it makes fewer claims about the 
worK, is taken to be more likely to be true than its rivals. Simplicity of content has to 
do with the generality of scientific theories. In claiming that the less general the more 
likely a theory is, and that we should look for likely theories, this application of the 
simplicity principle contradicts the widely accepted idea that science should aim for 
increasingly general theories. This is why Popper objects to the association between 
simplicity and high probability, suggesting that the simpler a theory the easier to test 
it is, and, consequently, the less probable it is in a priori tenns. 
However, in Hesse's 
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view, Popper's position only makes sense as regards simplicity of content (see Hesse 
1974: 227). 
Simplicity as economy, on the other hand, refers not to the expected generality 
of scientific theories, but to their specificity, that is, to being a brief way to explain as 
much detail as possible about the facts at issue. In other words, simplicity as 
economy is related to the property of scientific theories according to which they yield 
more probable predictions about the facts. They are simple in the sense of being good 
summaries of what happens in the world. 'Thus', Hesse claims, 'the directive of a 
probabilistic account of theory choice is not "Choose the most probable theory", but 
"Of two conflicting theories of equal relevant content, generally choose that which 
yields more probable predictions... (Hesse 1974: 228). In this way, the search for the 
most probable is not contrary to what we expect from a scientific theory, rather it 
conforms to the aim of more detailed and correct predictions in science. 
According to Hesse, economy should not be taken as a universal criterion for 
theory choice. This is so because the cases where theories are selected merely on the 
basis of simplicity are rare in the history of science. In addition, the application of 
this criterion is local in the probabilistic account, for there is no single concept of 
simplicity which scientists can resort to in their research. In other words, each case is 
particular and the general trend will be not to search for simpler theories but to seek 
for more data and more comprehensive theories. Moreover, she argues, in a remark 
that will prove crucial for my purposes, that there is no transcendental argument in 
favour of the option for simple theories. The only reason the probabilistic approach 
can suggest is that the preference for simplicity, if it is not purely a pragmatic 
issue, 
can be justified on the presupposition of the homogeneity of the events 
in the 
universe, for which Inductivism cannot provide any a priori Justificatlon. 
So, 
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scientists opt for simple theories because of certain ontological commitments they de 
facto presuppose, and not because the principle of simplicity is an independent and 
necessary truth (see Hesse 1974: 256). 
2. Swinburne's Position Regarding Simplicity in view of its Critics 
How does Swinburne's account fare in the light of the above objections? As 
we saw in the section above, one of the main points of Bunge's cnticism of simplicity 
was that it has too many different meanings. In view of that polysemy, Bunge opted 
for analysing the value of simplicity as a guide to science in what he called the 
logical, semantic, epistemological and pragmatic domains. Now, in Swinbume's 
recent statements (1997 and 2001), simplicity is defined according to the following 
facets: 
(1) fewness of entities and properties, (2) fewness of kinds of entities and 
properties, (3) more terms which can be understood without reference to other 
terms (i. e. more terms describing things more readily observable), (4) fewer laws, 
(5) individual laws relating fewer variables, (6) mathematical simplicity - i. e. 
fewer terms in its equations; and more mathematical entities and relations which 
can be understood without reference to other entities (e. g. more primitive 
relations, such as multiplication rather than power; vectors rather than tensors). 
(Swinburne 2000: 1). 
Thus, in Bunge's classification, Swinburne's concept of simplicity is restricted to the 
logical (facets 6,3,4 and 5) and semantic domains (facet 2- if we take 'kinds' as 
concepts - and 6). Facet I cannot be included in Bunge's categorisation, since 
it does 
not refer to signs, but to things in the world. The first facet in Swinburne's concept of 
simplicity, then, is not a merely conceptual or linguistic issue, but an ontological 
matter. On the other hand, Swinburne does not mention the pragmatic aspect of 
simplicity - given that he is concemed with its evidential value - and 
does not accept 
the epistemological aspect of simple theories in Bunge's sense. For Bunge, 
epistemological simplicity has to do with economy in the use of non-empirical 
Chapter 3- Simplicity as Evidence of Truth 73 
expressions in scientific theories. Swinburne would probably agree with Bunge's 
rejection of epistemological simplicity in this sense, since he argues elsewhere against 
phenomenalism (see Swinburne 1994: 4-5 and 1993: 22-23). 
In addition to this stress on principally logical and semantic aspects, 
Swinbume's concept of simplicity is predominantly quantitative. As I noticed in 
Chapter 1.2.2 (p. 24), this would be a way of avoiding the ambiguities contained in 
more qualitative accounts given before, where simplicity was also defined in terms of 
'coherence', 'naturalness' and 'neatness' (see, respectively, Swinbume 1973: 6,1991: 
94 and 93), for example. Furthermore, this narrower and more precise definition of 
simplicity would be a way of making this concept more applicable to the task of 
selecting the most probable theory from a set of rivals. Quantities tend to be more 
objectively comparable than qualities and for a 'hard rationalism programme' 
objectivity is crucial. 
If the limitation of simplicity to quantitative aspects is a way to respond to the 
criticisms of this concept regarding definition, this also provides an answer to the 
problem of operation. According to the principle of simplicity, all other things being 
equal, the simplest theory will be the most probably true, that is, faced with 
hypotheses of the same explanatory power, the scientist has only to pick up the 
simplest if he is aiming at truth. As a result, if the definition of simplicity is 
mathematically oriented, its application will be straightforward and objective, 
dispensing with personal judgements, a point that will be crucial for its justification as 
an epistemological principle. 
Even while admitting that science progresses towards an increasing theoretical 
complexification, Swinbume still believes his principle applies. The trend towards 
complexification we observe in the history of science does not contradict the principle 
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of simplicity because that tendency is due to the search for theories that yield the data, 
but always in the simplest way. In other words, the principle still stands, because its 
condition is that we should opt for the simplest hypothesis given a set of proposals 
that explain the data equally well. So, the principle of simplicity should always be 
taken in conjunction with the criterion of explanatory power: the simplest among the 
hypotheses capable of explaining the evidence available is the most likely to be true 
(see Swinbume 1997b: 19). 
It is from this idea that Swinburne produces the following reply to Colin 
Howson, according to whom simple economic forecasting hypotheses are generally 
rejected by economists on the grounds that they are unlikely: 
But the reason why such hypotheses are very unlikely is that very simple 
hypotheses have worked poorly in the past in social and economic theory, while 
the simplest among hypotheses of a certain kind and degree of complexity have 
done better; and so a new hypothesis, to fit well with such hypotheses, will have 
to postulate the same kinds of complex interactions - in other words, a new 
relatively complex hypothesis will make for a simpler overall theory than does a 
new very simple hypothesis (Swinburne 1997b: 63, note 20). 
In other words, the economists do not reject theories because they are simple, but 
because they do not account for the data properly. It is not simplicity that indicates 
their implausibility, but their poor predictive power. According to Swinburne, the 
economists') practice does not contradict the principle of simplicity because a complex 
hypothesis is only accepted if it is the simplest theory available to explain the facts. 
The criterion of looking for the simplest alternative among those with the same 
explanatory power is still being applied in this kind of situation. 
Assuming that Swinburne's theory of simplicity can answer to the problems of 
definition and application in the way above, we come then to the question of 
justifying why simplicity is an indication of true theories, and why scientists should 
obey the principle in their selection of hypotheses. 
Now, in his defence of the 
Chapter 3- Simplicity as Evidence of Truth 75 
confirmatory value of simplicity, Swinburne admits he does not have a theory that 
permits us to say that simplicity is in all contexts more important than the other 
criteria for choosing hypotheses (see Swinbume 1997b: 14-5). He restricts his 
defence of simplicity to the case of large-scale theories only, and proceeds by 
comparing the role of that criterion with three others: explanatory power, fitness with 
background knowledge and scope or content. According to Swinburne, while 
explanatory power and background knowledge are a posteriori criteria, which require 
contingent empirical information to operate, scope and simplicity would be a priori 
parameters governing a rational choice amongst rival theories (Swinbume 1997b: 12- 
3). For Swinburne, large-scale theories, that is, theories at the boundaries of scientific 
enquiry have to be evaluated in a priori terms only. This was the case with Newton's 
laws of gravitation, for example, when there was no background knowledge available. 
They had to be assessed mainly in relation to simplicity (see Swinburne 1997b: 35). 
This is so in all cases where the alternative hypotheses have the same explanatory 
power and the same scope. 
With regard to the relationship between simplicity and scope, Swinbume's 
position is comparable to Hesse's, as seen in the previous section. As we saw, Hesse 
distinguishes her position from Popper's in stating that her concept is simplicity as 
economy or fewness of properties, and that simplicity should be understood in the 
context of theories of equal content, that is, which have the same degree of generality. 
In Popper's sense, the simplicity of a theory refers to its openness to falsification (see 
Popper 1972: 142). Taken in this sense - contrary to Swinburne - the simpler a 
theory the less probable it will be, since, in Popper's view, the simpler the theory the 
larger its scope. Swinburne's view is not that a theory is simpler if it has more 
content, and is thus easier to falsify, but rather that the less content it 
has the simpler it 
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is (see Swinbume 1997b: 20). In addition, he notices that '[ ... ] geater ability to yield 
the data or greater simplicity may come in as compensating factors to make a 
difference to which is the more probable [ ... ]' (Swinbume 1997b: 14). In other 
words, for Swinbume, simplicity should not be confused with scope as in Popper, and 
the simplicity and explanatory power of a hypothesis frequently counterbalance the 
improbability due to its large scope. 
Now, if we do not dispute Swinburne's position regarding the relationship 
between scope and simplicity, using only the four criteria considered by him and the 
conditions of analysis he states (large-scale theories and same explanatory power), 
then the favourable conclusion regarding simplicity sounds trivial, since simplicity is 
the only criterion that remains. Moreover, we could argue with Hesse and Harr6 that 
this kind of theory selection situation has been extremely rare in science and that the 
scenario Swinburne sets up is in fact too artificial. 
However, Swinburne has an additional argument in favour of simplicity that, if 
successful, strengthens his case considerably. He affirms that even when we consider 
situations where there is relevant background knowledge, simplicity is still the main 
criterion to be considered, because we need the concept of simplicity in order to 
evaluate how well a theory fits with background knowledge. In Swinburne's words: 
But the second and all important point is that where there is background 
knowledge, where there are theories of neighbouring fields, it is the criterion of 
simplicity which determines which proposed theory "fits best" with those 
neighbouring theories. 'Fitting better' is 'fitting more simply', and thus making 
for a simpler overall view of the world (Swinburne 1997b: 40). 
Asserting that the criterion of fitness with background knowledge depends upon 
simplicity is a very substantial claim which, if successful, would 
be a strong argument 
in favour of the relevance of simplicity in theory choice contexts. 
It is worth then 
following Swinburrie's arguments here in more depth. 
Chapter 3- Simplicity as Evidence of Truth 77 
Swinbume's main reason for rating simplicity more highly than background 
knowledge in general is that the employment of the latter presupposes the former. 
When we state that some hypothesis h is plausible because it is more adequate to what 
we know nowadays, this is not sufficient for concluding that h should be preferred. In 
fact, we could say h fits with background knowledge in very weird and complicated 
ways, by supposing, for example, that the phenomenon e the hypothesis aims to 
explain is completely different from what has been observed so far. Now, scientists 
do not reason this way generally, Swinbume claims, because this sort of supposition 
regarding e is absurd, and it is absurd because it implies a too complex picture of the 
world. It is then in view of simplicity that we dismiss theories that do not harmonise 
with our accumulated infon-nation. For Swinbume, 
It is the criterion of simplicity which tells us to have theories which 'mesh' with 
theories of neighbouring and wider fields, and it does so by insisting that overall 
theories be as simple as possible. The criterion of background knowledge [ ... 
] 
boils down to the criteria of yielding the data and of simplicity (see Swinbume 
1997b: 41). 
It is important to analyse the role played by the ontological claim that the world is 
simple in the justification of simplicity as an epistemic criterion for theory choice. In 
Swinbume's view, scientists prefer to explain a phenomenon e on the assumption that 
natural events will behave generally the same way they have been observed to 
happen. 'In holding simpler theories to be more probable than complex theories', 
Swinburne claims, 'the inquirer is holding it to be more probable that the world as a 
whole is simple than that it is complex' (Swinbume 1997b: 42). So, when a 
hYPothes's is discarded because it does not fit with the background knowledge, this Is 
justified by the idea that natural events happen according to an ordered pattern that 
can be predicted. In other words, we are initially reluctant to accept weird theories 
because they contradict the simplicity we assume in the world. Indeed, even the 
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search for the simplest theory possible only makes sense in view of the notion that the 
new range of phenomena we are investigating will reveal the same overall type of 
complexity as revealed in the other fields of natural research (see Swinbume 1997b: 
40). Underneath all this reasoning is the idea that the world is fundamentally simple. 
Simplicity is then the paramount criterion among those most commonly used to select 
the most probable theory, not only because it is important on its own, but also because 
it is implicitly assumed in the application of the background knowledge criterion. 
All these ideas about how scientists have used the success of certain types of 
theories in the past to justify the centrality of simplicity in comparison with other 
criteria may give the impression that Swinburne justifies his principle on an inductive 
basis. Yet, for him, we can neither ground the simplicity principle on the basis of its 
use in the history of science nor claim that it is logically deducible from an analytic 
truth (see Swinburne 1997b: 44). Swinburne presents two reasons for dismissing the 
justification of simplicity based on the history of science. Firstly, it is doubtful that 
the simplest hypothesis has proved to be the best predictor. In fact, there are many 
examples of the contrary. Secondly, the inductive justification of simplicity commits 
the fallacy of circularity, for in holding that we rely on simplicity given past results 
the argument presupposes that we extrapolate from past data to the simplest theory in 
M (see Swinbume 1997b: 46-7). In other words, the a posteriori the simplest ýv 
defence of simplicity supposes that scientists in general choose the shortest and least 
complicated way of reaching their conclusions in a inductive manner, that is, they 
circularly require simplicity to understand why people use this criterion 
in their 
probabilistic reasoning. That is why Swinburne opts for saying that the simplicity 
principle is a synthetic a priori truth, that is, a necessary requirement 
for thinking of 
the scientific enterprise as a rational activity (see SwInburne 1997b: 
51). In other 
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words, the principle of simplicity is not justified as a logical necessity or as an 
empirical truth. It should be accepted because it is a condition for rationality in 
science, that is, without a criterion like this, the crucial scientific activity of theory 
selection becomes arbitrary and irrational, which contradicts the non-nal view of 
science we have. 
In contrast to Swinburne, Mary Hesse's intention was not to justify simplicity, 
but to describe how scientists usually employ this concept. She even provides a 
lengthy example of the assumptions in the choice of Einstein's principle of relativity 
instead of Lorenz's modification of classical electrodynamics on the basis of 
simplicity (see Hesse 1974: 239-255). Hesse has no need to suppose there are strong 
compelling reasons to ground the use of simplicity for assigning a prior probability to 
a hypothesis. Far from the hard rationalism programme of Swinburne based on a 
logical theory of probability, she adopts a personalistic account of Bayesianism (see 
Hesse 1974: 6, see also Chapter 7 below). Simplicity for her is not a universal 
criterion, but merely a local constraint, given the particular context of the scientific 
debate at issue, whence the concrete contours of simplicity will emerge. 
3. New Objections against Swinburne's Principle of Simplicity 
In this section I intend to offer some additional objections against Swinburne's 
principle of simplicity that take into account the way this principle stands in view of 
the criticisms Presented in section 1. My critical analysis of the principle of 
simplicity will follow the same sequence of section 2, that is, I will discuss in turn the 
limits of this principle as regards its definition, application and justification. 
As to its definition, Swinburne's updated conception of the principle of 
simplicity may be accused of two defects. First, the restrictions 
imposed on the 
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concept by Swinburne make its application to the hypothesis of theism difficult. 
Arguments based on the concept of simplicity as naturalness, such as that the divine 
attributes fit neatly together (see Swinburne 1991: 93) and that the choice of an 
omnipotent agent that fulfils his decision directly is 'the most natural kind of 
stopping-place for explanation' (see Swinburne 1991: 103) cannot be used any more, 
since this facet of simplicity does not figure in Swinburne's new definition. In 
addition, if Jill Le Blanc's arguments against the reduction of the theological concept 
of infinity to the mathematical one are correct (see Chapter 2.3, pp. 60ff), then the 
main argument in favour of the simplicity of theism that is allowed in the more 
delimited conception of simplicity has a serious defect. As we saw, if theism is a 
simple hypothesis because God's infinitude is reduced to the mathematical sense of 
infinity, then we risk not being able to recognise this hypothesis as the object of faith 
of religious believers. The problem is that the theological concept of infinitude is 
incompatible with arguing that, because God is infinite, theism is a simple theory in 
the sense of being more comprehensible, of not needing any additional information in 
order to be understood. If this incompatibility really holds, then Swinbume's concept 
of God will be at odds with the theology of the great monotheistic religions. In sum, 
Swinburne's updated definition of simplicity can be criticised both for continuing to 
have too many facets and for being even more difficult to apply to the justification of 
theism. Second, even the restriction of the concept to quantitative and objective 
aspects does not free it from having many different meanings or facets. It is true that 
they are related to each other by the idea of economy in the sense of 'having few 
elements', but this connection is certainly very weak, since the elements that are said 
to be few are very different from each other. In other words, in Swinburne's more 
recent publications mentioned above we may have a more unified theory of the nature 
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of simplicity, but this is still multifaceted, which creates problems for an impersonal 
and straightforward application of the principle, as I will explain below. 
One of the problems the simplicity principle faces regarding its application 
stems from its multifaceted nature. The difficulty is that, even considenng the 
artificial scenario of a theory choice situation in which the rival hypotheses explain 
the data equally well, bear the same scope and have no neighbouring area in order to 
assess their fitness with background knowledge, the criterion of simplicity is still not 
objectively and directly applicable as Swinburne postulates it to be. Still, if the 
concept has many facets, it is possible that they clash with each other at some point, 
i. e. each of the rival theories can be assessed as the simplest hypothesis according to 
different facets. In this kind of situation, the criterion of simplicity cannot be applied 
directly, since it can lead to contradictory results. 
Swinburne notices this problem as well, but maintains that 'it is, I suggest, 
normally objectively clear which is the simplest formulation of a theory and which 
theory is the simplest, when simplest formulations differ only in respect of one facet 
of simplicity' (Swinburne 1997b: 30). This objectivity in sorting the simplest theory 
when there is a conflict of facets is a consequence of the consensus we non-nally 
observe in the scientific community, he claims (see Swinburne 1997b: 30). Yet what 
does this consensus consist in? Is it not merely the sharing of the same background 
knowledge? In other words, Swinburne claims the clashes of contradictory 
judgements regarding the simplicity of rival theories will be solved by recourse to a 
set of positions all scientists agree on, which makes clear in each context which is the 
most important facet of simplicity to consider. Yet why not call this set of undisputed 
'entific community? In fact, propositions the background knowledge shared by the sci 
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this very question makes us turn to Swinburrie's conception of background knowledge 
itself 
In his description of the four main criteria for theory choice, Swinburne asserts 
that 'Simplicity is the only criterion of choice among hypotheses of equal scope with 
equal ability to yield the data, when there is no background evidence - that is, 
evidence of how things behave in neighbourin fields of enquir ' (Swinbume 2001 a: 
93, emphasis mine). In a similar context, but in a much earlier book, he affin-ns: 'the 
criterion of fitting in with background knowledge is clearly of less and less 
importance in so far as the theory postulated is of wider and wider application (i. e. 
claims to tell us what there is in all fields), for then there are less and less other fields 
with whose theories it has to fit' (Swinburne 1991: 53). In other words, Swinbume's 
concept of background knowledge includes only empirical theories both of the 
research area concerned and of neighbouring fields. When we are dealing with large 
scale theories in the borders of scientific investigation we cannot resort to the criterion 
of background knowledge any longer. Yet, surely we can consider mathematics, 
deductive logic laws, heuristic values and inductive principles as part of the 
background knowledge shared by the scientific community. They are neither 
tautologies nor empirical data, but can clearly be thought of as part of the body of 
information that defines a certain area or a whole theoretical activity as scientific. In 
other words, they constitute much of the knowledge someone is supposed to hold in 
order to be considered part of the scientific community. 
If my observations above are correct then we can say that the concept of 
background knowledge Swinbume uses (when not discussing the theistic hypothesis) 
ing only empirical However, to is too restrictive in admitti IIIIIn 
knowledge such as mathematical ideas and include in that concept non-empin II 
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inductive principles, for example, then even the principle of simplicity can be 
considered part of the background knowledge according to which the scientific 
community will assess rival accounts of the same set of data. In this case, then, the 
relationship between simplicity and background knowledge can be seen to be the 
inverse of Swinburne's account of it, that is, instead of the background knowledge 
criterion needing the concept of simplicity in order to be applied, it is the principle of 
simplicity that needs background knowledge to be applicable in conflicting situations. 
The above appears to be the early position assumed by Swinbume. He stated 
that even considering theories much less influenced by historical and cultural changes, 




] although there are these transcultural rules for comparing in respect of 
simplicity incompatible universal nomological propositions they do not seem able 
to deal with the vast majority of cases ... In the vast majority of the cases the 
greater simplicity of a theory consists in the greater farruliarity of its concepts. In 
such cases we cannot really talk about one theory being simpler absolutely than 
another theory, but only simpler for this or that cultural group. (Swinbume 
1973: 117-8) 
In other words, Swinburne once recognised that, at least in most cases, there are no 
objective rules to guide the choice of a hypothesis in terms of simplicity when all 
alternatives fit the other requisites of a good explanation equally well. Simplicity 
becomes a question of familiarity with concepts, expressions and formulae employed, 
which is quite clearly relative to a particular epistemic community. 
There is an additional reason for not considering the principle of simplicity to 
be directly and impersonally applicable. Not only is the use of the simplicity 
principle dependent on background knowledge, but also it is highly controversial to 
say that a hypothesis is always a priori more probable than another because of its 
simplicity. Indeed, too simple a theory is frequently considered implausible even 
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before we take into account the phenomena It aims to explain. We give to such a 
hypothesis a low plausibility on the charge of it being simplistic. Indeed, instead of 
Swinbume's linear gradation for evaluating a hypothesis in view of simplicity so that 
the simplest is the most probable in principle, it seems more correct to take simplicity 
as medium optimum above which we have complex theories and below which we 
have simplistic ones. In this case, simplicity would enhance the probability of a 
theory when it has the right degree of this quality, that is, neither too little nor too 
much. 
As a result, the correct statement of the principle of simplicity should not be 
'other things being equal the simplest hypothesis is the most likely to be true' but 
instead that 'the one which has the correct amount of simplicity, that is, which is 
neither deficient in this property (the complex ones) nor excessive in it (the simplistic 
ones), should be a priori the most probable'. If so, however, the application of the 
criterion for estimating prior probabilities is far from straightforward. It requires 
familiarity with the prevailing conception about what is the optimum of simplicity in 
the research area we are referring to in order to sustain a trained judgement. In fact, 
we can even agree with Swinburne that simplicity is not a sheer methodological or 
pragmatic criterion, but that it has something to do with truth. However, the 
definition of what simplicity amounts to and the application of this parameter for 
assessing the plausibility of a hypothesis depend on the background knowledge shared 
by a given community of researchers. 
As in a chain reaction, the problems I claim to exist in Swinbume's definition 
of the simplicity principle generate difficulties for the kind of application he suggests 
for it, which, in turn create obstacles for the justification of it as an epistemological 
postulate. As we saw in the previous section, one of the Justifications for the idea that 
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simplicity is an indication of truth is that this quality is presupposed in the application 
of the background knowledge criterion. Yet, as I argued above, there is reason to 
think that in order to apply the criterion of simplicity we frequently resort to the 
background knowledge shared by the scientific community, although conceived in a 
way different from Swinburne's. In fact we could counter Swinburne's claim 
regarding the relationship between simplicity and background knowledge by saying 
that the former is supposed in the latter only marginally. Recall that for Swinburne, 
when we say a theory is plausible because it fits in well with what we know, we mean 
that it does it in the simplest way (see Swinburne 1997b: 41). 
However, even if simplicity helps in spelling out the operation of the criterion 
of background knowledge, this is not the only concept involved, and not even the 
most central one. Simplicity may express the ýyýa a hypothesis h relates to a body of 
established infonnation so that we evaluate h as plausible, but it does not say anything 
about the nature of the criterion of fitness with background knowledge. In other au 
words, the criterion of fitness cannot be reduced to the one of simplicity because its 
definition does not include simplicity as a prime factor. Fitness consists in a theory 
being logically consistent with an accepted body of infort-nation. Certainly, there are 
both complex and simple ways for a set of propositions p to be compatible with 
another set q, but this is only a qualification of a relationship defined by the attribute 
of consistency. 
The main argument I would like to suggest to counter Swinburne's 
justification of the epistemological value of the simplicity principle 
is that even if we 
accept that theory selection in science should follow a priori criteria, these 
do not 
need to be universal and given from a neutral, a-historical, logical point of view. 
An 
important contemporary epistemologist who agrees with the epistemological 
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importance of simplicity but disagrees with Swinburne regarding its universality and 
impersonality is Elliot Sober. 
Sober prefers to describe his position in more ontological terms, arguing that 
'The principle of parsimony counsels that we should hypothesise that an entity does 
not exist if its postulation is to no explanatory point' (Sober 1981: 145). In other 
words, simplicity is an important criterion in deciding which of the hypotheses faced 
by the scientist is the best explanation for the observations he aims to explain. It is a 
tool to be used in what we can call abduction or inference to the best explanation (see 
Sober 1988: 50). According to Sober, simplicity has been thought of since Hume as a 
principle that takes us from observations to explanatory theories. 'Given a set of 
competing hypotheses', Sober claims, 'simplicity and consistency with the evidence 
detenuine which of these hypotheses is to count as "best... (Sober 1988: 59). So far, it 
seems, there is no difference between Sober and Swinburne's positions 3. Their 
disagreement, however, becomes apparent when Sober affirms that 
My claim is that whenever simplicity performs this function, it embodies 
empirical background assumptions about the way the world is. Explicit mention 
of empirical background assumptions is often suppressed when an argument 
appeals to simplicity or parsimony, but substantive background assumptions there 
must be nonetheless (Sober 1988: 59-60) 
In other words, Sober postulates that, if simplicity is an indication of truth and if truth 
is understood as correspondence between proposition and reality, then the principle of 
simplicity should not be thought of as purely methodological, but as having an 
ontological content instead. Putting it another way, simplicity can only be evidence 
3 Another curious convergence between Swinburne and Sober's theory of simplicity is In the way the 
former justifies the simplicity of infinitude. As we saw in Chapter 2, infinite quantities are simple 
because they require less extra information in order to be understood. Now, the idea that the 
less extra 
information required by a concept or theory the simpler 
it is corresponds exactly to the notion of 
simplicity as informativeness 
developed by Sober in (1975), but which is surprisingly criticised by 
Swinburne (see Swinbume 1997: 22, and 2001 a: 86n). 
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of truth in a correspondence sense of truth if we consider the world to be 
fundamentally simple. 
In fact, Swinburne also holds that scientists presuppose the thesis that nature is 
simple in order to engage in the task of explaining evidence, as we saw above. In 
contrast with Swinburne, however, Sober thinks this principle of unifonnity of nature 
is too vague and, in fact too mistaken to be taken seriously if stated in general terms. 
According to Sober, we do not accept that nature is uniform in all aspects, since we 
believe that there is multiplicity and variation in the way the world is (see Sober 1988: 
55). He suggests, then, that the ontological simplicity presupposed in scientific 
research should not be thought of in general terins, but as confined to the investigative 
situation and the subject matter under scrutiny. In other words, simplicity is a local 
criterion, not a general one, as in Hesse's proposal above. 
Sober's suggestion arises from the study of the elements involved in the 
choice of a theory to explain phylogenetic relationships in biology, i. e. how to classify 
different species into more comprehensive groups. One of the hypotheses defended in 
the current debate is cladism, which states that phylogenetic relationships should be 
inferred not from overall similarities (as pheneticism posits) but from a certain type of 
resemblance, namely genealogical likeness, and nothing else (see Sober 1988: 7). 
According to Sober, cladism appeals to a principle of simplicity in postulating that 
'[ I the best supported phylogenetic hypothesis is the one that requires the fewest 
evolutionary changes' (Sober 1988: 31). Simplicity is then understood here as 
ontological parsimony, that is, paucity in the assumptions about what the world is like 
in its evolutionary changes. 
In contrast with the status of cladistic parsimony, which is defined in terms 
that are expressed precisely in the specific discussion for the scientists involved, no 
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global concept of simplicity that is completely plausible as a constraint on all 
scientific inferential contexts could be fon-nulated yet, Sober claims (see Sober 1988: 
39). In other words, inferences to the best explanation may have the same common 
structure, but they do not presuppose the same general empirical assumption, and, 
consequently the same concept of simplicity. 'Appeals to simplicity', argues Sober, 
cmust count as highly abstract and abbreviated summaries of background assumptions 
about the empirical subject and inference problem one faces. Such appeals should not 
be viewed as unmediated applications of some perfectly general and a priori principle 
of scientific reason' (Sober 1988: 69)4. In sum, if Sober is correct in his reasoning, 
then we can conceive of simplicity as having epistemological value, but without 
constituting a universal and impersonal principle of rationality. 
Another important argument advanced by Swinburne in defence of the 
criterion of simplicity is that this principle is a transcendental condition for theory 
selection in science to be considered rational. However, would a scientist be 
irrational if he opted for a more complex theory? This question presupposes that we 
can tell very clearly and universally when a hypothesis is simple relative to another 
one. However, all I said in the few previous paragraphs echoing Sober's position is 
that this judgement is not possible in the absence of background knowledge of the 
specific discussion. Thus, a certain theory may be chosen as simple according to one 
facet but could be classified as complex according to another one, and the conflict can 
only be settled by consulting the relevant background knowledge. As a result, we had 
4 Day & Kincaid share the same view as Sober in their comparison between simplicity and inference to 
the best explanation (IBE), when they assert: 'Like IBE, simplicity is supposed to be a perfectly 
general principle for inferring the best hypothesis given the data. Like IBE, simplicity is often invoked 
to support philosophical and metaphysical theses. And, like IBE, simplicity is often invoked without 
much explication, for it, too, has resisted any general analysis. We think there is good reason that 
simplicity has these characteristics: it, too, is not a general inference principle 
but rather an inference 
based on background information, often contextually specific information' (Day & Kincaid 1994: 283). 
Chapter 3- Simplicity as Evidence of Truth 89 
better view simplicity as a concept whose content and application depend on the 
specific context of scientific debate. 
Yet this view of simplicity does not help Swinburne very much. Recall that 
his hard rationalism program needs a criterion for assigning the prior probability of 
theism that could be applied universally and impersonally. If simplicity is contextual 
and dependent on the judgement of the scientific community for its application, as 
Sober has in fact claimed, then it does not do for Swinbume's purposes. In other 
words, we can meet the need of objectivity in the selection of theories in science using 
a priori criteria such as simplicity, fruitfulness, and others not mentioned by 
Swinburne without postulating that they are universal and totally impersonal. It can 
be argued then that Swinburne's principle of simplicity is not justified by the need for 
objective principles in theory choice, since we can be assured that this activity is 
directed by criteria, albeit that they are contextual and related to the judgement of a 
given research community. 
In sum, in this section I intended to argue that even after the improvements 
made to Swinbume's principle of simplicity, there are still considerable difficulties 
with the definition and application of this criterion for theory choice. Not only are 
there reasons to contest some justifications Swinburne suggests in favour of the 
epistemological value of simplicity, but also we could take up his idea of simplicity as 
an indication of truth without endorsing his hard rationalism program in 
epistemology. These could be reasons enough to abandon his approach to Bayesian 
epistemology, but I will present further reasons in the next section, devoted precisely 
to the relationship between Swinburne's simplicity principle and Bayesian 
epistemology. 
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4. Simplicity and Bayes's Theorem 
In addition to the observations about the simplicity principle made above, it is 
important to discuss the relationship between this principle and Bayes's theorem 
before concluding this chapter. In this way we bring together the two main strands of 
Swinburne's epistemology, particularly in its application to the belief that there is a 
God. On this matter, Swinburne seems at first to state the position commonly held in 
Bayesian circles, according to which simplicity factors in the ascription of a prior 
probability to the hypothesis under assessment 5. Fon-nally speaking we have 
simplicity intervening in P(h1k), the prior probability, where h is the hypothesis and k 
is the background knowledge. However, Swinburne defends a quite original position 
in this matter when he asserts: 
If k contains empirical background knowledge, then P(h/k) will depend in part on 
how well h fits k, which - as we have seen - is a matter of how simple is the 
conjunction (h&k). But if we put all the empirical data into e [the evidence we 
are considering to assess h], then k becomes some bare tautology. In that case 
P(h/k) is what we may call the intrinsic probability of h; it will depend solely on 
factors intrinsic to h. That there is this crucial a priori element affecting the 
probability of h is the claim of this paper, which affirms that it is a function of 
simplicity and (inversely) of content (Swinburne 1997b: 55). 
In the case where there is empirical information in k, then simplicity intervenes in 
judging how the data fit with background knowledge. Yet, where we put in the 
background knowledge only analytical truths, then k becomes irrelevant (see 
Swinburne 1991: 16 and 2001 a: 104), and the prior probability of h will be a question 
of 'intrinsic probability', as Swinburne calls it. In other words, the intrinsic 
probability of h (P(h)) will depend only on factors that affect the hypothetical 
proposition on its own, such as simplicity and scope. 
5 Swinburne's position that takes simplicity as a major constraint to attribute prior probability values in 
a imperson way seems to be far from widespread among Bayesian philosophers of science. 
Nevertheless, a Bayesian approach to simplicity that basically agrees with that of Swinburne can be 
found, for example, in Bandyopadhyay & Boik 1999: S398. 
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Since k in the justification of theism is assumed to consist of only tautologies, 
we are left with the idea of 'intrinsic probability' as expounded above. The reason 
simplicity enters into the intrinsic probability of h in this case as P(h) is that 
simplicity cannot be part of k in Swinbume's point of view, because k contains only 
analytic truths and irrelevant information whereas simplicity is synthetic a priori and 
very relevant. In other words, the principle of simplicity cannot be a pqrt pf & because 
it is not a tautology (since its denial does not entail any contradiction); and 2) 
Swinburne states that k in the case of theism consists of tautologies and irrelevant 
information. He does not want synthetic, ampliative truths in k, yet simplicity cannot 
be an empirical matter, as we saw last section. 
However, the idea that simplicity is an a priori constraint on the intrinsic 
probability of hypothesis h entails that the principle can have no fonnal direct 
representation in Bayes's theorem. In other words, 'P(h)' does not express the 
probability of h given the principle of simplicity in any clear way. Formally speaking, 
this would be something like P(h1synthetic a priori principles of rationality), which is 
not part of the theorem. Thus, since the criterion of simplicity is not part of the 
background knowledge in Swinbume's view, it cannot be explicitly represented in 
Bayes's theorem, at least given the way Swinburne established the principle. If so, 
then this would be a very undesirable result for his hard rationalism program, which 
emphasises the importance of formal reasoning as a way to confer objectivity to the 
justification of theism. 
However, according to the Finnish epistemologist Ikka Niiniluoto, there are 
two ways of integrating simplicity in Bayes's formula. One of them is to treat the 
simplicity of a hypothesis as an additional factor that is 
independent of other 
desiderata of theory formation, and deserves to be calculated in a particular way. An 
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example of this treatment is in E. Kaila's formula that gives the relative simplicity RS 
of a hypothesis h given evidence e as defined by: RS(h, e) = syst(h, e)X(h), where 
csyst(h, e)' is the systematic power of h given e and K(h), the complexity of h (see 
Niiniluoto 1994: 158). The 'systematic power' of h given e is equivalent to 
Swinburne's 'explanatory power' of h over e, that is, the extent to which evidence e 
becomes explained by the hypothesis h. After calculating the simplicity of h in a 
fon-nula like Kalia's, we only need consider the result in the comparative assessment 
of the prior probability of h and its rivals. This way, simplicity is explicitly 
forinalised in the probabilistic calculation. 
The second form of dealing with simplicity in Bayes's theorem suggested by 
Niiniluoto treats simplicity as already built into rational probabilities, not needing any 
separate or formal treatment apart from being implicit in the Bayesian calculation (see 
Niiniluoto 1994: 160). Simplicity is then not formally and explicitly calculated, but is 
indirectly taken in Bayes's forinula as a plausibility consideration. Even so, the 
clearest way to represent simplicity in the theorem according to this second approach 
is by considering it as part of k in P(h1k), as in Salmon (1998), a suggestion that will 
be develop better in Chapter 7.4 (pp-247-8). 
Swinburne's approach to simplicity in Bayes's theorem fits in with the second 
of the positions above, that is, he does not calculate simplicity separately, but takes it 
as built into the prior probability of h, although he expresses it in a very unclear way. 
However, granting that there is a univocal notion of simplicity involved and only one 
forin of applying it -a very doubtful postulate as we 
have been arguing along this 
chapter - simplicity will only be 
decisive to the posterior probability of a hypothesis 
in two cases. The first one is when the rival hypotheses both entail the evidence 
concerned, that is, given h and h', P(hle)>P(hIe) because 
h is simple than h' only 
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when h =: > e (i. e. h entails e) and h'=> e, granted higher simplicity means higher prior 
probability. However, Swinburne does not generally work with the idea of entailment 
in Bayes's theorem. In his approach, the hypothesis does not make evidence certain, 
but merely probable i. e. instead of h =* e we have O<P(elh) < 1. This sends us to the 
second case where simplicity is decisive for the posterior probability of a hypothesis 
in Bayes's theorem, that is, when the likelihoods of h and Vare equivalent i. e. P(elh) 
= P(elh ). In other words, it is when the alternative hypotheses explain the data 
equally well that we need to resort to simplicity to choose a priori which is the most 
probable 
6. 
As I observed at the beginning of this chapter, Swinbume adduces the problem 
of choosing among different equall possible alternatives to explain the same set of 
data in order to justify his simplicity principle. 'Without the criterion of simplicity', 
he claims, 'we never have any way of choosing between an infinite number of 
theories compatible with data' (Swinbume 1996: 3 0)7 . Given that there is an infinite 
number of possible satisfactory explanations in a posteriori terms, we need an a priori 
criterion such as simplicity to sort them out. However, forinulated this way, the main 
argument for the importance of simplicity in science may make it impossible to 
calculate the posterior probability of any of the alternatives using Bayes's theorem. 
The reason for this is that, according to the first axiom of the probability calculus, the 
sum of the probabilities of the whole set of alternative hypotheses must not exceed 1. 
Yet, since they are infinite in number, however minimal the value ascribed to each 
non-contradictory rival hypotheses, the total sum will go beyond the limit established 
6 Nimiluoto curiously does not consider this alternative in his analysis and jumps from the rejection of 
the entailment condition to the statement (correct, I believe, but for different reasons) that '[ ... 
I simple 
theories need not be assumed to be probable a priori since they turn out to be probable a posteriori' 
(Nimiluoto 1994: 162). 
7 For an equivalent formulation of this problem, see Swinbume 1997b: 15,1991: 55, and 2001a: 85. 
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by the calculus. As a result, in a uniform distribution, the only value one can ascribe 
to each prior probability of an infinite set of alternative hypotheses is zero. However, 
from a prior probability whose value is zero, the posterior probability will always be 
zero, no matter how much the evidence is explained by the hypothesis, a result that 
makes Bayesian calculations pointless. 
A way out of this setback for Swinbume is for him to claim that the simplicity 
principle justifies a non-unifonn prior distribution of probability (see Swinbume 
2001 a: 243). In other words, the principle of simplicity would permit attributing 
higher priors to simple hypotheses and lower ones to complex theories. However, this 
solution only works if we assign a prior probability of zero to complex hypotheses, 
since otherwise the problem of a total sum higher than I will persist. Yet there is no 
reason for such an attribution, since simplicity and complexity are a matter of degree, 
that is, a highly complicated hypothesis h may deserve a very low prior but not zero, 
given that another even more complicated than h can be logically formulated, and no 
prior probability can be lower than zero. As a result, even using simplicity as a way 
of assigning differentiated prior probabilities, any forinulation of the curve-fitting 
problem that includes the scenario of an infinite set of alternative explanations runs 
the risk of being inconsistent with the probability calculus. 
Swinbume gives a reply to this apparently fatal objection, that curiously 
appears as just an additional note, since, in his words, 'nothing further in [his] book 
turns on it' (Swinburne 2001 a: 103n). According to Swinburne, the contradiction 
above disappears if we adopt a mathematics of infinitesimal numbers, in which an 
infinite amount of such numbers can be conceived that are greater than zero 
but less 
than any finite number. 'This', he claims, 'allows us to attribute the same infinitesimal 
value to each of an infinite number of prIor probabIlitles, which sum conJointly to 
V 
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(Swinbume 2001 a: 244). In fact, holds Swinbume, the use of non-standard analysis, 
as this type of mathematics is called, delivers us from the implausible view that each 
disjunct in an infinite set of rival explanations has the same value as a false or self- 
contradictory proposition. After all, says he, 'there is some chance of winning in a 
fair lottery with an infinite number of tickets! ' (Swinburne 2001 a: 244). 
However, if it is difficult to see how the principle of simplicity alone would be 
nlý aule to sort out the hypotheses in dispute in a standard analysis, what can we say 
ýtl about a degree of distinction involving infinitesimal figures? Even if we grant to 
Swinbume the epistemological value he is postulating to simplicity, his pi-inciple is 
very far from having the sort of precision needed to distinguish the prior probabilities 
of competing hypotheses in such a highly subtle context. 
Still5 the main problem with Swinburne's reply to the question we are 
analysing here is its implausibility. Even if we can mathematically conceive of an 
infinite set of rival explanations without contradicting the probability calculus, this is 
too artificial to be able to clarify what happens in scientific reasoning. The attribution 
of prior probability zero to each disjunct of an infinite set of exclusive hypotheses is 
due not to the fact that each of them equals a self-contradictory proposition, but to the 
implausibility of the scenario suggested. It is not that there is no chance of winning in 
a lottery with an infinite number of tickets, the problem is that the suggestion of such 
a kind of lottery simply does not make any sense. 
Indeed it is regarding the artificiality of Swinburne's idea of an infinite set of 
alternative hypotheses that Colin Howson fonnulates the following cnticism: 
How does one find an at most countable set which contains all the possible laws 
governing the data which science will ever deem worth testing, and which "will 
exclude no possible law a priori"? ... 
[The] answer is that the possible laws 
science will ever deem worth testing are those which it actually will test, not those 
which populate some independently-given logical space, the vast majority of 
which will never even be thought of (Howson 1988: 74). 
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In other words, Swinbume's main justification for simplicity is based on too artificial 
a scenario. In postulating a universal and objective constraint for the assignment of 
prior probabilities, the advocates of simplicity forget that theory choice in science 
does not start from any set of logically possible explanations, but from the limited 
universe of hypotheses already being considered as relevant by the scientific 
community concerned. Consequently, Swinburne's argument for considering 
simplicity in a Bayesian interpretation of scientific reasoning can be accused of 
having little relation with actual theory choice in science. In searching for a priori 
criteria to assess alternative prior probabilities, Swinburne is following through the 
ideal of neutral, unprejudiced consideration of hypotheses, which is typical of the 
defenders of the logical theory of probability (see Howson 1988: 77). However, the 
attempt to pose the problems involved in theory choice under a neutral logical space 
of alterriatives reveals itself to be very implausible. 
According to Howson, we do not gain anything in imposing a priori 
constraints on the attribution of prior probabilities apart ftom those required by the 
axioms of the probability calculus. If we consider Bayes's theorem as a formula for 
valid inductive inference from pre-test to post-test distributions of partial belief, and if 
we take prior probabilities as premises of this argument, then the demand of objective 
assignment of priors is simply pointless. It would be the same as requiring deductive 
logic to lay down criteria for assessing the truth-value of the premises in a syllogism, 
for example. So, there is no problem in principle if we start from whatever prior 
value we like, just as there is no problem if we start from any premise we may want to 
assume, as long as we comply to the axioms of probability calculus and the 
consequences of deductive logic, respectively (see Howson 1988: 82). The 
application of a Bayesian inference enables the production of posterior probabilities 
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that are person-independent, as long as the subjective prior probabilities are 
coherently updated through consideration of data in the likelihood calculations. In 
other words, we do not need to care very much about the starting points of our 
Bayesian inferences once we agree to change our prior probabilities in the light of 
evidence. 
This alternative approach to the problem of prior probability will be treated in 
more depth in Chapter 7.2. For the moment I need only emphasise that in order to 
adopt a Bayesian approach we do not need to postulate the principle of simplicity or 
any universal and impersonal criterion for the evaluation of explanatory hypotheses as 
in Swinburne's hard rationalism programme. In not doing so, we avoid all the 
problems aired regarding Swinbume's favourite epistemological principle, and can 
still benefit from the rigour and clarity the Bayesian inferential pattern can provide. 
With this chapter I conclude my analysis of Swinburne's use of Bayes's 
theorem and the simplicity principle in the epistemology of theism. In Chapter 11 
presented his project as a version of hard rationalism intended to apply to religious 
beliefs the same tools employed in the justification of scientific theories. In Chapter 2 
investigated the main criticisms of Swinburne's application of those tools, and 
pointed to the crucial role his principle of simplicity played in his Bayesian approach. 
Chapter 3 analysed the foundations of his principle and argued that it not only faces 
substantial difficulties, but also may turn out to be useless in a Bayesian analysis of a 
hypothesis, a topic that will be further developed in Chapter 7. All Swinburne's 
concern with simplicity as a way of attributing universally and impersonally justified 
prior probability could well be disregarded without damaging to a 
fruitful application 
of Bayes' s theorem to the epistemology of theism. I will explore this alternative 
Bayesian approach later in this thesis. Before doing so, however, let us examine 
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another crucial element of Swinburne's justification of theistic belief, namely 
religious experience. In the next chapter I will discuss Swinbume's treatment of this 
fundamental factor in his justification of theism and the relationship between religious 
experience and his whole project in religious epistemology. 
Chapter 4- Religious Experience and Bayesian 
Confirmation 
In a comprehensive article surveying contemporary analytic religious epistemology, William 
Hasker describes Swinburne as part of the 'experientialist movement', a trend in the 
philosophy of religion that became very significant in the 1980s and 1990s (see Hasker 
1996: 144). By 'experientialism' is understood the attempt to provide an epistemic basis for 
religious belief through religious experience, an effort that, according to Hasker, also 
includes authors like William Alston and Alvin Plantinga', and, more recently, we could add 
Jerome Gellman and Caroline Franks Davis 2. Religious experience plays a major role in The 
Existence of God but, despite its importance for Swinburne, he gives little further attention to 
it'. 
In this chapter, I will present and comment on the way Swinbume defends the 
evidential value of religious experience and the manner his argumentation fits into his 
inductive case for the rationality of the belief in God. In conclusion, I will evaluate the 
resulting interaction between religious experience and the other arguments discussed in 
Swinburne's final balance of the probability of theism. The present discussion of religious 
experience will basically follow Swinburne's approach. Criticism of it will be left to the next 
chapter. 
I The inclusion of Plantinga in this movement is at least controversial in view of more recent literature. See, for 
example, Plantinga (2000: 182). 
2 See particularly Gellman (1997) and Franks Davis (1989). 
3 On Bayesian theory of confirmation we have by him An Introduction to Confirmation Theory (1973), 
Episteinic Justification (2001) and at least four articles (see Swinburne's select bibliography in Padgett 
1994: 354ff. ). At least two articles were issued on the evidential role of simplicity in scientific theories apart 
from the booklet Simplicio, as Evidence of Truth (1997), which was largely reproduced in (2001). There are 
additional discussions about those topics in The Existence of God (1979 - revised edition: 
1991), Faith and 
Reason (1981b), and Is There a God? (1996). As to religious experience, in addition to what we find in The 
Existence of God (the main source for his ideas on this subject), there are mentions in 
Faith and Reason and Is 
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Religious Experience and its Evidential Value 
1. The character of religious experience 
In order to understand what Swinburne calls 'religious experience', let us quote four 
of his examples. Firstly, the episode in which Saint Paul is hit with a blinding light and 
talked to Jesus, which changed his life forever (Acts 9.3 -9). Secondly, the case of the 
Portuguese children who claimed to have seen and talked to the Virgin Mary in Fatima. 
Thirdly, the story of Joseph receiving a message from an Angel in a dream about the Virginal 
Conception (Matt. 1.18-25). The fourth interesting example of religious experience 
Swinbume offers is that of someone who watches the beauty of a sunset and sees it as God's 
handiwork. All these reports are taken by Swinbume as good examples for his argument 
from religious experience. 
Swinburne calls these events 'experience' because they all refer to a mental 
occurrence (see Swinburne 1991: 244). It is a conscious mental going-on in that the subject is 
aware of what he is enduring and is capable of giving some description of it. In all these 
cases there is a subject who claims to have felt something that is assumed to have religious 
relevance. Given the difficulty of defining 'religion', Swinburne restricts religious 
experience to that which is related to God or other supernatural beings, consciously excluding 
many experiences of the sort that do not refer to external entities (cf. Buddhism) (Swinburne 
1991: 246). 
Given that he is interested in religious experience in order to develop an argument 
from it addressed to those who do not share religious belief, Swinbume opts for an internal 
description of it, one that does not immediately entail the existence of the object of the 
there a God?, and only one article ('The evidential value of religious experience', SNvinbume: 198 1 a), which is 
largely a short version of the corresponding chapter in The Existence of God. 
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experience (see Swinburne 1991: 245). Internal descriptions of experiences talk in tenus of 
what the subject appears to be perceiving. This is so because to use an external description of 
the person's report about seeing God's handiwork in a beautiful sunset would be too 
straightforward to claim God's existence. External descriptions of religious experiences in an 
argumentative context would be like begging the question. 
However, if there are reasons to present the reports in an internal way, it will also be 
assumed that those experiences are bases for the subject to believe in the existence of the 
corresponding realities. Saint Paul took that occurrence on the road to Damascus as a crucial 
landmark in his whole life, when he not only stopped persecuting Christians, but also became 
a leading apostle of the nascent faith. This all happened because what seemed to him to be 
Jesus' figure was enough to create in him the belief that this one was indeed alive, as the 
Christians had been claiming since soon after his death. Following Roderick Chisholm, 
Swinburne uses 'epistemic' to describe the use of words such as 'seem', 'look' and 'appear' 
when they imply that the subject is inclined to form beliefs on the basis of his/her 
experiences. So, when I say in the epistemic sense that 'it looks as if there is a computer in 
front of me' I mean that I have this mental occurrence and that this experience is enough to 
create in me the belief that there is a computer in front of me. As a result, the reports of 
nlk religious experience stated aDOVe should be taken as internal descriptions of apparent 
experiential contacts with God or with some other supernatural being (see Swinburne 1991: 
246). Consequently, 'what makes an experience religious', Swinburne asserts, 'is the way it 
seems to the subject' (1991: 247). 
Thus, religious experience should be taken as a sort of perception, although it does not 
restrict itself to the five common senses. Experiences such as the one led by Joseph in his 
dream or those had by mystics like Saint Theresa are not necessarily mediated 
by the senses. 
Yet, they can still be called perceptions because they are, like sense perceptions, an apparent 
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awareness of something apart from ourselves. According to Swinbume, 'S perceives x 
(believing that he is so doing) if and only if an experience of its seeming (epistemically) to S 
that x is present was caused by x's being present' (Swinburne 1991: 247). In this view of 
perception, the causal theory, our perception of an object is caused by something apart from 
our mental apparatus in a way that we can only say that we are perceiving an object if this 
object is the cause of our awareness of it. So, I cannot be said to perceive a computer unless 
my awareness of the computer is caused by this object's being present. By the same token, 
Swinburne claims, 'S has an experience of God if and only if its seeming to him that God is 
present is in fact caused by God being present' (1991: 247-8). 
However, Swinburne admits that religious experiences are normally private whereas 
most sense perceptions are public (see Swinbume 1991: 249). Once people with working 
sense apparatus are rightly positioned, pay the same degree of attention and use the same 
relevant concepts, they will all perceive the same physical objects. Still, a perception of God 
is generally not a public occurrence. It can happen to a subject S but not to T who is by his 
side, as in Saint Paul's vision quoted above, which could not be shared by his journey 
companions. This discrepancy, Swinburne affirms, can be coherently fitted in the religious 
stance. On the one hand, God only manifests Himself to those He wants to. A religious 
experience is a sort of grace, not reachable by our own merits but according to God's will 
(see Swinburne 1991: 249). On the other hand, if God appeared to everyone at all moments, 
our free will would be severely damaged, given the moral power of that kind of experience. 
We would have no alternative but to follow God's commandments, which, according to the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, would be contrary to God's wish that we co-operate with his work 
freely, not constrained by any external cause (see Swinburne 1991: 244). 
Eveii in the case of sense perception, one and the same visual sensation may cause 
I ist different perceptions in two different people, just as when looking at an X-ray, the radiologi 
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sees a lung infection while the layman only notices some dark stains. The radiologist is not 
having two different perceptions, but perceiving the dark stains as a lung infection. An 
analogous situation occurs when the religious man sees God's handiwork in a beautiful 
sunset while the secular believer cannot have the same perception. We may interpret that 
situation as the latter simply lacking the same conceptual apparatus needed to have the 
corresponding religious experience, just as the layman fails to see the infection because of a 
lack of the relevant conceptual skills. 
An important feature of Swinbume's argument from religious experience is that in 
order to establish theism as the best explanation of this phenomenon, he introduces two 
epistemic principles, the principle of credulity and the principle of testimony, which will be 
described in what follows. 
1.2 The principle of credulity 
The principle of credulity asserts that, '[ ... ] (in the absence of special considerations) 
if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present, then probably x is present; what one 
seems to perceive is probably so' (Swinbume 1991: 254). Clearly, without accepting in 
principle the infonnation provided by our sensory organs, we would have no basis to hold the 
knowledge we think we have about the world, for they are the main source of data about the 
entities and occurrences in the universe. Swinburne justifies the principle of credulity by 
asserting it as an a priori (in the Kantian sense) condition of rationality, since otherwise we 
would be in a 'sceptical bog' (see Swinbume 1991: 254, footnote). Without reliance on the 
principle we would not be able to make any judgement (positive or negative) about any 
happening outside ourselves. 
In being both a condition of rationality and an inductive principle, the principle of 
credulity parallels the simplicity principle. Both indicate ways in which propositions are 
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made probable by other propositions and the justification for accepting both of them is that 
otherwise we fall into irrationality. The types of irrationality involved, however, are 
different. In the case of the simplicity principle, denial entails that science becomes arbitrary 
and not guided by any principle. As to the principle of credulity, the irrationality involved is 
scepticism. If we do not believe what our senses bring to us, we renounce the most important 
source of information we can possibly have about the world. Both consequences are 
undesirable, that is, we neither accept that science is totally arbitrary nor really assume a 
sceptical attitude regarding perception in our lives. Consistent with his hard rationalism, 
Swinburne wants to bar both forms of irrationality in principle. 
The credulity principle ties in with the causal theory of perception. According to 
Swinburne, we should describe a subject's perception in an internal way, not entailing the 
existence of the content of its apparent object. Yet, the principle of credulity grounds the step 
from the intemal mental act to the belief in the extemal object of that act , if it is a genuine 
perceptive act. So, according to the causal theory of perception, S perceives x only when his 
belief about x has its source in sensory contact with an object or event x that seems to S to 
exist outside his mind. For Swinbume, then, in principle, appearances are not misleading. 
However, the move using the causal theory of perception and the credulity principle to 
give evidential value to experiences described internally may be annulled by the very 
objection that the case at issue was not one of a genuine perception, but simply a 
hallucination or an illusion,, for example. In fact, it is in order to prevent this type of 
objection that the principle of credulity is construed in a defeasible way. The phrase 'in 
nlý I' is absolutely crucial to its statement. Without this clause, ausence of special considerations 
the principle would be open to obvious criticisms, since there are many kinds of situation in 
which the fact that it seems to S that x is present does not constitute a good reason for S to 
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believe that x is present. Swinbume offers four cases in which the perception S seems to have 
of x does not bear evidential value for his belief about x. 
Two typical cases for restricting the application of the principle of credulity invoke 
circumstances in which perceptual claims have proved unreliable in the past. In the first 
situation,, the subject who had the experience or the conditions under which the perception 
was made were shown to be unreliable (Swinburne 1991: 260). If I am visually impaired at 
night or if according to my own records I am inclined to have hallucinations and illusions 
while I am having a certain medicine, I had better not believe prima facie what my senses 
indicate to me in these cases. Through induction I come to know that my visual senses are 
not reliable in these circumstances. Consequently, the rational way to face the information 
conveyed by them is to consider them guilty until proved innocent, which is the opposite of 
what the credulity principle prescribes. 
While the first constraint for the credulity principle refers to inductive limits to the 
subject's conditions, the second one is related to the object claimed to have been perceived. 
Even if I do not have any special sensory impainnent and there is nothing special in the 
circumstances under which I am perceiving x, but if I usually have trouble in recognising x 
perceptually, then the most prudent stance to take is to disbelieve what I have apparently 
seen. So, if I have proven to be unreliable in recognising wines in the past, I should be 
cautious about my belief that what I am now tasting is a Chianti, not a Merlot. 
The two other restrictions to the principle of credulity refer to the causal relationship a 
perception is supposed to contain. As we saw, for Swinbume, a perception occurs when Ss 
seeming to have perceived x was caused by x being present. The third restriction casts doubt 
that the object allegedly perceived was really present. In other words, if my background 
knowledge makes very improbable that x was present then the pnnclple of credulity has a 
limited application. The typical case is the claim of having seen something that does not 
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exist anymore, like dinosaurs or people who have already died. However, although the 
principle of credulity does not guarantee an initial belief in this kind of content, their initial 
improbability can be overcome by additional evidence. The apparent perception of an 
external object when no such object is present is called hallucination, which is different from 
illusion, that is perceptually mistaking an object to be x, when we are really perceiving y. 
Hallucination is the case at issue in the third limit to the credulity principle, while the fourth 
refers to illusion. 
The fourth limit to the application of the principle of credulity occurs when there is 
good reason to show that the object allegedly perceived was not the cause of the experience 
of its seeming to me that x was there. So if x appears in a guise utterly different from its 
normal character, then I am right in doubting that it was x that caused my perception. 
Another related situation is when I am shown the real cause of my mistaken perception. If, 
for example, I appeared to have seen the head of my department at UnB, who has proved to 
be a very reserved serious man, and who usually dresses very circumspectly, enter a samba 
ball in a scandalous costume, I would have reason to believe it was not him whom I had 
perceived. My background knowledge enables me to take that appearance as misleading in 
principle and deserving of further proof before the corresponding belief is accepted (and 
disseminated). If after my inquiry I find out that my head has a twin brother who has 
opposite habits to his, I will then be justified in considering my purported perception as only 
an illusion. 
May the credulity principle be applied to religious experiences? Is someone who 
thinks that he has perceived God or some other supernatural being entitled to believe what he 
appears to have seen is really present? Can he say that his perception of God was caused by 
God being present? These are crucial questions for the task of giving evIdent'al value to 
religious expenence. Since Swinbume attempts to perform this task using both the principle 
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of credulity and the principle of testimony, let us discuss the latter before we see how he 
specifically applies them both to alleged perceptions of God. 
1.3 The principle of testimony 
The principle of testimony is also suggested by Swinburne as a condition for 
acquiring beliefs rationally. According to him, 
One inductive principle which all men accept is what I may call the testimony principle, 
that, other things being equal, if someone tells you that p, then probably p. What other 
people tell us is the main source of our knowledge about the world beyond our immediate 
experience (Swinburne, 1981b: 40). 
The reason for postulating this rule is the idea that testimony is actually the main source for 
what we take to be our true beliefs. Most of our knowledge of history, geography, and 
natural sciences or about our own childhood, for example, is in fact based on other people's 
word. This wide and universal use of others' reports as a means of obtaining knowledge 
constitute the first element in Swinburne's claim that there is a presumption in favour of 
testimony, given certain qualifications regarding its sources. 
According to Swinburne, 'we could not even understand what people say to us (which 
we need to do in order to test whether they are telling the truth) unless we had already made 
an assumption that they non-nally tell the truth' (Swinburne 1981b: 41). Testimony for him, 
then, is not only a contingent source of most of our actual true beliefs but also a necessary 
recourse in our acquisition of knowledge. In order to justify belief in what other people say, 
however, the principle of testimony must be qualified by some restrictions. This is what 
Swinburne means with the expression 'other things being equal'. 'But other things may not 
be equal', he observes: 'You may have other evidence which promotes the contrary belief - 
you may have seen for yourself or some third person may have told you that not-p. In that 
case, despite being told that p, you may still come to hold the belief that not-p, or may ascribe 
equal probabilities to p and to not-p' (Swinburne 1981b: 40). Moreover, the informer may 
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have been untrustworthy on other occasions, or he may be in a circumstance that makes his 
report dubious or even not be considered expert enough to testify on the subject in question 
(see Swinbume 1981b: 40) 4. 
In fact, Swinburne admits testimonial reports are weaker evidence than direct 
expenence, when he states that 
[ ... ] if S reports that it seems (episternically) to S that x is present, then that is reason for 
others also to believe that x is present, although not as good reason as it is for S if in fact he 
is having the experience which he reports. However, clearly it is quite a good reason 
(Swinburne 1991: 274). 
In other words, although testimony may on its own be sufficient reason for believing a 
proposition, it is not as strong as having direct access to the event through perception. This 
proviso might be taken as introducing a certain ambiguity in Swinbume's position regarding 
testimony. Yet, for my present purposes, it is sufficient to understand his position as 
postulating that testimonial reports deserve initial credence, unless there are positive reasons 
to deny them. 
Having described the two principles needed for ascribing evidential value to religious 
expenence, let us see how Swinbume applies them to accomplish that aim. 
1.4 Justifying religious experience with the credulity and testimony principles 
Granted we can use both the principle of credulity and the principle of testimony to 
_ 
provide evidential value to religious experience, Swinburne's argument here at issue becomes 
very straightforward. Given there are many reports of people who claim to have perceived 
God, the principle of credulity justifies the perceiver's belief that that experience was caused 
by God being present and the principle of testimony entitles us to believe those people's 
4 For further discussion about the nature of testimony as a source of information see Coady 1992, Stevenson 
1993, and, certainly, Hume's Enquiiles 
Concerning Hionan Understandj*ng, section X (1882). 
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word. At the end, we have a very strong piece of evidence In favour of thelsm- However , in 
order to be able to advance this argument, Swinburne needs first to address two different sorts 
of challenge. Firstly, he needs to justify the claim that we can use these principles to ground 
belief in religious experience reports. Secondly, he needs to show that the limits concerning 
each principle do not apply in general to statements of alleged perceptions of God. Let us 
follow his arguments on these matters in turn, of which a deeper critical assessment will be 
made in Chapter 5. 
In general terins, Swinbume believes it is not up to the theist to show that the 
principle of credulity can be applied to religious experience. Warning against the sceptical 
cul-de-sac that threatens those who deny the credulity principle, he adds: 'And if it is all right 
to use it for other experiences, they need a good argument to show that it is not all nght to use 
it for religious experiences' (Swinburne 1991: 254 footnote). In other words, unless one 
demonstrates that the analogy between sense perception and religious experience is not strong 
enough to warrant the application of the credulity principle to the latter, he feels justified in 
doing so. The burden is upon the critics of religious experience to show that the analogy with 
sense perception is weak. 
Swinburne endeavours to dismantle two arguments produced to rule out the 
application of the principle of credulity to religious experience. The first objection claims 
that that principle requires inductive justification that is not available in the religious case. 
So, for example, my reliance on my visual perception of parrots is justified by the fact that in 
the past my seeming to have seen a parrot proved to be right. For Swinbume, however, this 
argument has at least two flaws. Firstly, it is not true that we need to recall our past 
experiences to justify the truthfulness of a current experience. Not only do we not act that 
way, but even were we to do so, we would be trapped in a potentially infinite regress in 
justification, for what would be the grounds for such a recollection? Secondly, a person who 
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has never seen a parrot before is perfectly able to recognise one on the basis of a description 
of that particular kind of bird. Once the description is given in ten-ns of properties that are 
familiar to us, there is no reason to consider unjustified a perceptual belief of something we 
do not have past experiences of. In that case, Swinburne argues, there is no reason to rule out 
the perception of God, since '[God] is defined as a "person" without a "body" who is 
unlimited in his "power", "knowledge", and "freedom", and in terms of other similar 
properties, of all of which we have had mundane experience' (Swinbume 1991: 256-7). 
The second general argument used to rule out the application of the credulity principle 
to religious perception asserts that the principle holds only in cases that involve sensible 
characteristics or relations such as colour, temperature, similitude, and spatial location, for 
example. These would be basic perceptions, whereas those alluded to in religious experience 
would be mere interpretations or inferences from basic beliefs, which require further 
justification (see Swinburne 1991: 258). Only basic perceptions would be worthy of direct 
application of the credulity principle, since they would be the only ones we could take to be 
caused by the presence of the corresponding object instead of our own ideas. The problem 
with this argument, Swinburne claims, is that any distinction between sensible characteristics 
and interpretative concepts will turn out to be arbitrary. Moreover, we are generally justified 
in believing in objects not grasped through sensible charactenstics. Indeed, the fact that we 
cannot describe an object x in more 'primitive' terrns does not mean we cannot recognise it. 
So, if we cannot reduce a perception of God to sensible qualities that does not mean we 
cannot legitimately recognise God through perception. 'From all this', Swinbume holds, 'it 
follows that if it seems to me that I have a glimpse of Heaven, or a vision of God, that is 
grounds for me and others to suppose that I do. And, more generally, the occurrence of 
religious experience is prima facie reason for all to believe in that of which the reported 
experience was purportedly an experience' (Swinbume 1991: 260). 
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Granting to Swinburne his case against these two arguments, and bearing in mind that 
some other objections against the evidential value of religious experience will be analysed in 
the next chapter, let us see now how this phenomenon can be assessed in view of the 
principles of credulity and testimony. 
The first limit regarding the credulity principle does not affect most religious 
experiences, Swinburne says, since they '[ ... ] are had by men who normally make reliable 
perceptual claims, and have not recently taken drugs' (1991: 265). Let us grant that, provided 
there is no general charge against the reliability of the perceptual apparatus of people who 
have had religious experiences or any indiscriminate objection against the circumstances 
according to which those experiences were had, this first limit does not apply. So, since there 
is no wholesale rejection of the perceptual ability of people who have had religious 
experiences, and unless there is a case by case analysis available showing otherwise, we may 
consider this first objection as inapplicable. 
In his discussion of the second challenge, Swinburne adopts the same general idea as 
in the first one: the burden of proof is on the sceptic about religious experience. In other 
words, the only general way to show that perceptions of God are unreliable is by proving that 
God does not exist (see Swinburne 1991: 265). Yet, there are also two alternative ways of 
presenting the second challenge. The first of them is the assertion that, given religious 
pluralism, alleged religious perceivers in different traditions claim to have experienced 
supematural beings whose co-existence is not possible. Consequently, these multiple 
experiences of God in irreconcilable traditions would cancel each other out, which would 
already be a general reason for not accepting their evidential value. Swinbume replies to the 
problem posed by religious pluralism by distinguishing between the different descriptions of 
God and the common reference these multiple accounts may be said to have. If so, the 
III ferently conflict would be merely superficial, since it would be only that God is perceived dif 
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in different cultures, according to the vocabulary familiar to each of them. As a result, this 
does not mean that religious perceptions are contradictory, since they can still have the same 
referent. In such cases where the claim of a given experience is specifically incompatible 
with the creed of other religions (like having perceived God through having seen the 
resurrected Christ, for example), it is enough, in order to preserve the evidential value of 
religious experience, that we rephrase the original claim in a less committed way. The 
potential conflicts posed by religious pluralism, Swinburne holds, are '[ ... ]a source of 
challenge to a particular detailed claim, not a source of scepticism about all the claims of 
religious experience' (Swinbume 1991: 266). 
The second way of imposing the second limit to the application of the credulity 
principle to religious experience questions the very possibility of recognising God. In sense 
perception, we nonnally recognise objects that we have previously observed, frequently with 
the help of someone who taught us how to recognise that object through pointing it out. So, a 
child in the Amazon can learn how to identify a parrot by being visually presented to this bird 
by his parents, for example. Since God is incorporeal, religious experiences are non-nally 
private, and their occurrence is out of our control, we have no way to acquire the means of 
recognising God properly. Consequently, all claims of having identified God in a perception 
should be rejected. 
According to Swinburne, however, this argument does not have compelling force, 
because we can come to recognise an object that we have never seen before just through a 
description of it, without involving any particular previous sensory contact (see Swinbume 
1991: 268). So, a British child who had never been to a rainforest may be able to recognise a 
parrot in her first visit to the zoo just by having been given a verbal description of what this 
bird is like. As to people, we may be able to identify them at the first visual contact just 
because they match a behaviour description we have had of them. If so, there is no problem 
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in principle in recognising God as what one has perceived by religious experience. 
Nevertheless, Swinburne concludes, '[ ... ] some mild suspicion is cast on a subject's claim to 
have recognized an agent with these qualities [such as great power, knowledge or freedom] 
by the qualitative remoteness of his previous experiences from what he claims to have 
detected - but for the reasons which I have given, only some mild suspicion' (Swinbume 
1991: 269). 
One challenges religious experience by means of the third limit of the credulity 
principle by doubting that God was present as the cause of perception. This charge would 
only do, Swinburne argues, if there were a proof that God does not exist, since if He does, He 
is everywhere and can be perceived by those to whom He decides to reveal Himself (see 
Swinburne 1991: 269). Given that no such demonstrations have been provided yet, religious 
experience can also be said to have passed this test. 
The fourth limit to the principle of credulity implies that the alleged perceptions of 
God were caused by something other than God. So, if a more plausible cause of one's 
perception of God is advanced than that God was really present to me, then this is good 
reason not to believe that it was a case of perception of God. According to Swinburne, this 
objection does not do because if there is a God He is omnipresent and the sustainer of all 
causal processes. 'Hence', concludes Swinburne, 'any causal processes at all which bring 
about my experience will have God among their causes; and any experience of him will be of 
him as present at a place where he is. And so if there is a God, any experience which seems 
to be of God, will be genuine - will be of God' (Swinbume 1991: 270). Again, the only way 
to make this challenge to work against religious experience would be to have a proof that 
God does not exist. 
All these arguments will be analysed in greater depth in the next chapter in ,,,, hich I 
will attempt to show that they forrn a stronger cumulative case against religious perception as 
Chapter 4 -Religious Experience and Bayesian Confirrnation 114 
a source of objective evidence than Swinburne admits. For the moment, however, let us grant 
him the thesis that we can justify our belief in God from religious experiences using the 
principle of credulity. 
Regarding the principle of testimony, as seen above, the main constraints in believing 
what other people say relate to the reliability of the witness. According to Swinbume, 
however, it is not nonnally true that people who report religious experiences are habitual 
liars, or have a tendency to exaggerate or to misremember what they perceived (see 
Swinbume 1991: 272). In fact, there is a way to test the witness's reliability here, for it is 
sensible to expect a change in life-style from someone who endured a religious experience. If 
you really have had a perception of God, then your faith will become much stronger and the 
time and importance you dedicate to religion will increase considerably. Since there is no 
reason in principle to suspect the trustworthiness of people who claim to have perceived God, 
and since in the most famous cases above the mentioned change in behaviour was observed, 
Swinburne claims we can also take religious experience to have passed the test of its 
applicability regarding the principle of testimony. 
So, granting Swinburne for the moment that religious experience not only can be 
justified by the principles of testimony and credulity but also that it actually passes all the 
tests they impose for the acceptance of a perceptual claim, let us see now how this analysis 
fits in the Bayesian framework generally adopted in his justification of theism. 
2. Religious Experience as an Argument for the Best Explanation 
A preliminary Point that is worth exploring before we discuss how Swinbume fits 
religious experience into a Bayesian argument for the theistic hypothesis is the way he 
uuiderstands the interaction between the reports of alleged perceptions of God and the other 
pieces of evidence exposed in The Existence of God. The final balance of probability does 
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not amve at a conclusive result before the evidence of religious experience js considered 
separately, for, in his words: 
[ ... ] (I have ignored this evidence so far, because I had a somewhat different approach to it from the approach to all other evidence, which involved the use of Bayes's theorem) 
(Swinburne 1991: 291). 
However, despite being qualitatively and formally different from the other arguments, the 
evidence provided by religious experience is not functionally different from the other C- 
inductive arguments he developed in The Existence of God. As with the other pieces of 
evidence, religious experience is said to confirin theism because this hypothesis is the best 
explanation for that phenomenon. 
Given that this point generates some difficulties with interpretation, it may be worth 
having a closer examination of the reasons why the argument from religious experience does 
not follow the inferential pattern provided by Bayes's theorem, in contrast to the other 
arguments produced by Swinbume. In principle, there is no impediment to using Bayes's 
theorem to evaluate the extent to which the evidence provided by religious experience 
confirms the hypothesis that there is a God. In fact, Swinburne employs the fon-nalism at the 
end of Chapter 13 to show that the probability of the occurrence of a religious experience e is 
higher given the hypothesis of theism h than given either only background knowledge k- the 
occurrence of e anyway, or in formal terms P(elk) - or the denial that there is a God 
[P(el-h. k)] (see Swinbume 1991: 275). Nevertheless, apart from this and another brief 
reference to the fonnal Bayesian reasoning (see 1991: 260), there is nothing in his discussion 
of religious experience that involves Bayes's theorem. He justifies this exception to his 
approach by arguing that, since the principle of credulity has a fundamental and simple 
character, and is sufficient to ground the evidential value of religious experience, he does not 
need to interpret these issues via the apparatus of Bayes's theorem (see Swinburne 1991: 
275). 
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Still, it is hard to understand why the principle of credulity makes Bayes's theorem 
superfluous. The principle and the theorem in fact play considerably different roles. The 
former serves to ground the explanatory power of theism over religious experience and the 
latter to forinalise the probabilistic reasoning involved in the assessment of the theistic 
hypothesis. Bayes's theorem is invoked to record in a rigorous way the inductive relations 
between the hypothesis of theism and various pieces of evidence, putting them in a clear and 
manageable probabilistic form. Although the principles of credulity and testimony are a 
priori like Bayes's theorem, they are used not to convey the argument or to highlight its main 
logical relations, but to claim that theism is the best explanation for that phenomenon. At this 
point, Swinburne could be accused of overlooking the purely formal role of Bayes's theorem 
in his own approach, a criticism I made of Prevost (1990) in Chapter 2.1.2 (pp. 46f). 
In fact, it is a widely held opinion among Swinburne's commentators 5 that he does not 
need the Bayesian approach in his discussion of religious experience because he is here 
involved in a very different way of arguing in favour of the rationality of the belief in God. 
According to this interpretation, Swinbume opts to treat religious experience as an exception 
to his general method of argumentation. 
However, the use he makes of religious experience is better understood in a different 
way. In Swinburne's approach, the religious perceptual reports need to be backed up by 
epistemological principles so that he can show that theism is the best explanation for them. 
By means of the credulity and testimony principles he intends to provide these grounds. If 
successful, he could claim that there is a phenomenon that no rational person can deny, which 
is much better explained if there is a God than if there is not (see Swinbume 1991: 275). In 
order to account for this attitude of Swinburne to religious experience, the exception 
See, for example, Abraham (1985: 120), Prevost (1990: 
20), Franks (1985: 25), Clark (1984: 191), and Alston 
(1991: 195). 
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interpretation is therefore inadequate. The discontinuity between the methodology employed 
for this phenomenon and the other ones analysed by him is not irreconcilable. In other 
words, religious experience can still be interpreted as part of an argument for the best 
explanation, like all the others analysed in chapters 7 to 12 of The Existence of God. 
Swinbume follows a different method of analysis in Chapter 13 because he needs the 
credulity and testimony principles to show that theism has a higher explanatory power in 
relation to this phenomenon than naturalism. Yet, as a whole, Swinburne still provides an 
argument for the best explanation that can be formalised in Bayes's theorem and functions in 
the same way as the other arguments. 
What is special about the argument from religious experience is not so much its 
method, but its place in Swinbume's cumulative case for theism. According to Swinbume, it 
is only with the argument from religious experience that the feeble C-inductive argument 
provided by the other pieces of evidence can be turned into a strong P-inductive argument in 
favour of the theistic hypothesis. In other words, it is only the argument from religious 
experience that can make theism more probable than not, give it a probability higher than 
50%, and, consequently, make it demanding of acceptance by any rational being (see 
Swinbume 1991: 291). 
This is an awesome conclusion and implies a very dignified place for the argument 
from religious experience. Given the methodological character of the present thesis, I do not 
intend to assess the content of Swinburne's arguments, but merely the extent to which the 
approach he employs is appropriate for the discussion he engages in. In the next section, I 
will not analyse whether Swinburne is correct in his strong conclusion in favour of theism. 
Rather, following the methodological approach of this thesis, I will assess the weight of the 
argument from religious experience as against the other ones in the Bayesian structure of his 
Chapter 4 -Religious Experience and Bayesian Confirmation 118 
argumentation. As to the idea that we can make a universally acceptable argument from 
religious experience, this will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
3. Religious Experience and The Balance of Probability 
The surprising conclusion Swinbume gives to The Existence of God proved to be 
controversial not only in view of its content, but also as regards the calculations that were 
carried out. Swinburne describes his cumulative case in favour of theism in the following 
way. The starting point is to ascribe to the hypothesis of theism a prior probability that can 
be universally justifiable. For this purpose he resorts to the principle of simplicity, since he 
wants to keep in the background knowledge k only tautologies and irrelevant non-empirical 
information, since the first piece of evidence (the existence of the universe) encompasses all 
contingent phenomena there are. He then postulates in Chapter 5 that theism should be 
considered a simple hypothesis, at least simpler than its rivals (see Swinburne 1991: 284), 
which means P(h1k), h being the hypothesis that there is a God, may be low, but is higher 
than its altematives. 
As well as considering the existence of the universe, Swinbume deals with six other 
pieces of evidence e and claims that theism explains them better than ontological naturalism. 
However, he acknowledges some qualifications to his reasoning. The argument of morality 
and the problem of evil do not permit the intended incremental confirmation because while 
the former is too weak, the latter is neutral regarding theism, since it neither confirms nor 
disconfirms it, i. e. P(e1h. k)=P(e1k) (see Swinburne 1991: 277). In addition, the argument 
from history and miracles is not sufficiently detailed, permitting only a conditional 
conclusion i. e. if those happenings really occurred they would be positive evidence to theism. 
Moreover, the results concerning the argument from consciousness, providence and the 
problem of evil only apply if human beings have free will, a thesis that is far from 
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uncontroversial. Even with those gaps, however, Swinbume believes it is possible to reach a 
clear conclusion, which amounts to determining whether we have a good P-inductive 
argument for the existence of God - that is, whether P(hle. k)>V2- out of those C-Inductive 
arguments. 
The way Swinbume phrases the question he is attempting to answer in his general 
conclusion may prove misleading. In 'Where all the relevant factual evidence is included in 
e, and k is mere tautological evidence, what is the value of P(hle. k)? ' (Swinbume 1991: 278), 
he gives the impression that k in the overall calculation of the probability of theism is 
constituted of non-empincal evidence. However, just one page before, he asserts: 'For each 
of these phenomena e P(e1h. k)>P(e1k), where h is the hypothesis of theism, k are the 
phenomena previously taken into account (i. e. tautological evidence where e is the existence 
of the universe; the existence of the universe where e is its conforinity to order, and so on)' 
(Swinburne 1991: 277). In other words, he (correctly) admits that k is formed exclusively by 
non-contingent evidence only with regard to the cosmological argument. For the subsequent 
phenomena, the evidence considered previously must now be accounted as part of the 
background knowledge, that is, the existence of the universe in the teleological argument, the 
existence of the universe and of order in this universe in the argument of consciousness, and 
so forth. Indeed, Swinburne acts this way throughout the whole book (see Swinburne 1991: 
144,1735 181, and 227), but, surprisingly, he forgets this in his concluding balance of the 
probability of the theistic hypothesis. However, that procedure is exactly what makes the 
consideration of multiple independent evidence increasingly confirm a given hypothesis. In 
other words, it is by taking each prior piece of evidence as part of the background knowledge 
of the new argument that we can have a cumulative case in Bayesian terms. Technically 
speaking, this idea is called the conditionalisation rule, according to which the pnor 
probability at any one point is a function of its postenor probability in the preceding link in 
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the chain. Applying this notion, we have the following means of calculating the probability 
of a hypothesis in the light of many cumulative pieces of evidence: 
9 for evidence ei: P(h / e, k) = 
P(e, / h. k) x P(h / k) 
9 for evidence e2: P(h / e2 e, k) = 
P(e, / k) 
P(e2 / hke, x P(h / e,. k) 
P(e2 k. e, ) 
* for evidence e3: P(h / e3 e2 e, k) = 
0 for e7: 
P(e3 / h. k. e,, e2 
) XP(h / e2 e,. k) 
P(e, / k. e,. e2 ) 
P(h / e7 e6 e, e4 e3 e2 ek) = 
P(e7 / h. k. e, e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
) 
XP(h / e6. e,. e4 e3 e2 e, k) 
P(e7 / k. e,. e2 e3 e4 e, e6 ) 
According to Swinbume, an inductive cumulative case for theism may lead to a very 
strong argument in its favour. Separately they may be weak, but when taken jointly, the 
different pieces of evidence can make up a considerably strong argument. The following 
metaphor used by Swinburne is very eloquent in this sense: '[ ... I 
if you jam ten leaky buckets 
together in such a way that holes in the bottom of each bucket are squashed close to solid 
parts of the bottoms of neighbouring buckets, you will get a container that holds water' 
(Swinbume 1991: 14 footnote). So, the conjunction of many different pieces of evidence that 
are better explained by theism than by any alternative hypothesis will lead overall to a 
powerful argument in its favour. 
Following a view that I will criticise later on, Swinburne's calculations in the final 
balance of the probability of theism aim to apply Bayes's theorem without attributing any 
numbers to the probabilities involved. According to Swinburne, the components of Bayes's 
forinula should be interpreted this way: 'P(elh. k) is a matter of how likely it is if h is true (and 
k holds) that e will occur. P(elk) is a matter of how likely e is to occur at all, whether or not h 
is true. P(h1k) is the prior probability of h, how likely h is to be true a priori - that is whether 
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or not e holds' (Swinburne 1991: 282). Recall that for him, the prior probability of the 
hypothesis of theism is higher than of its rivals because, in Swinburne's words, '[ ... ] 
it seems 
impossible to conceive of anything simpler (and therefore a priori more probable) than the 
existence of God' (1991: 284). As for P(elh. k), i. e. the probability of the existence of a 
universe, of order in this universe, of conscious beings, of an environment that permits life 
and learning, and of extraordinary facts in history, he believes they become highly probable 
assuming the existence of the God of traditional theism. However, P(elh. k) is low, because 
God could have created many types of universe apart from the one that actually exists (see 
Swinburne 1991: 285). There is reason to believe God would have grounds for creating this 
actual universe, but since His existence is compatible with too many possibilities, the theistic 
hypothesis does not make e very probable either. 
On the other hand, if P(elh. k) should be considered low, the prior probability of those 
pieces of evidence P(elk) is to be taken as even lower. In order to justify this assertion, 
Swinbume resorts to a theorem of the probability calculus that states P(A/C)=P(A. B/C) 
P(A. -B/C), which gives us P(e1k)=P(e-h1k)+P(e. -h1k). In other words, the prior probability 
of the pieces of evidence e taken into account is the sum of the probability of e and the 
hypothesis of theism h on one hand and e and the negation of h on the other hand. According 
to the third axiom of probability calculus P(A. B/C)=P(A/B. C)xP(B/C), which means in our 
case that P(e. hlk)=P(elh. k)xP(hlk). Substituting 'P(e. hlk)' by 'P(elh. k)xP(hlk)' in 
P(e1k)=P(e. h1k)+P(e. -h1k), we have: P(elk)= [P(elh. k)xP(hlk)] +P(e. -hlk). Substitutingin 
Bayes's theorem, the result is: 
P(h / e. k) = 
P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) 
P(e / k) 
from which: 
P(h / e. k) = 
P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) 
[P(e / h. k) x P(h / k)] + P(e. -, h / k) 
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Since we have P(elh. k) x P(h1k) both in the numerator and in the denominator, we can 
wnte: 
P(h / e. k) = x X+ P(e. -, h / k) 
Consequently, the crucial factor in the calculation of the posterior probability of the 
hypothesis of theism is the extent to which we have evidence e and theism is false, that is, 
P(e. -h1k). Swinbume claims the only serious alternative to theism is ontological naturalism 
(an assumption that proved to be problematic). Yet, the pieces of evidence he takes into 
account are either too big or too odd for science to explain (see Swinbume 1991: 71). As a 
result, he concludes: 'the only plausible alternative to theism is the supposition that the world 
with all the characteristics which I have described just is, has no explanation. That however 
is not a very probable alternative. We expect all things to have explanations' (Swinbume 
1991: 287). 
According to Swinburne, given that -h leaves e unexplained, the result is that 
P(e. -h1k) is very low, given the high complexity and order of the universe. P(e. -h1k) would 
be even lower than the prior probability of theism, since, in his words, '[ ... ] 
it is far more 
likely to be something with the simplicity of God than something like the universe with all its 
characteristics crying out for explanation without there being God to explain it' (Swinbume 
1991: 288-9). However, if P(e. -h1k) is very low, P(elh. k)xP(hlk) is also very low, given it is 
the product of two low probabilities. In this case, he says, [P(elh. k)xP(hlk)] and P(e. -h1k), 
can be said to have approximately the same value (see Swinburne 1991: 289). As we have 
P(h / e. k) = x X+ P(e. -, h / k) 
And once P(e. -h1k) =X because [P(elh. k) x P(h1k)] and P(e. -h1k) have approximately 
the same value we then have the conclusion that P(h1e. k) will have a probability equal to or 
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less than V2, which falls short of a P-inductive argument for the hypothesis of theism, since 
given all the pieces of evidence discussed (except the argument from religious experience), 
the posterior probability of theism is not more than 50% (see Swinburne 1991: 289). 
Everything changes, however, when he puts down his trump card: the argument from 
religious experience. From the arguments above, Swinbume intends to have shown that, in 
the light of all other pieces of evidence analysed, theism has a probability equal to or less 
than 50%. As a result, as described in section 1 of this chapter, given the principles of 
credulity and testimony, we may consider religious experience as a fact much more probable 
if there is a God than if God does not exist. Consequently, he concludes in the very last lines 
of The Existence of God: 
On our total evidence theism is more probable than not. An argument from all the 
evidence considered in this book to the existence of God is a good P-inductive argument. 
The experience of so many men in their moments of religious vision corroborates what 
nature and history shows to be quite likely - that there is a God who made and sustains 
man and the universe (Swinburne 1991: 29 1). 
So, it is only by means of the argument from religious experience that theism becomes more 
probable than not, since the cumulative confirmation provided by the other pieces of evidence 
was not able to accomplish this task. As I said at the end of section 2, this makes the 
argument from religious experience of central importance. 
The complicated reasoning above (see Swinbume 1991: 281-289, particularly pages 
286 and 289) can be clarified if we put it in formal terms: 
(1) P(h / e. k) = 
P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) 
P(e / k) 
(2) P(e / k) = P(e. h/ k) + P(e. --, h / k) 
Bayes's theorem 
Theorem 
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(3) P(e. h/ k) = P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) 
(4) P(e / k) =[ P(e / h. k) x P(h / k)] + P(e. -, h / k) 
(5) P(h / e. k) =- 
P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) 
[ P(e / h. k) x P(h / k)] + P(e. --ih / k) 
(6) P(h / e. k) = 
124 
Third axiom 
3 Substitution of 
P(e. h/k) 
14 Substitution of 
P(e/k) 
x 
X+ P(e. --ih / k) 
(7) P(e. --, h / k) = P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) =X 
x 
(8) P(h / e. k) X+X 
1 





8 Division by X 
In Swinburne's calculations, then, the posterior probability of theism given all pieces 
of evidence (except religious experience) and background knowledge is at most 0.5 6. The 
evidence of religious experience tips the balance in favour of theism because, given the 
principles of credulity and simplicity, the belief that there is a God is by far the best 
explanation for that phenomenon. 
However, one step in Swinburne's argument is difficult to follow. Step (7) above is 
highly questionable. It is not because the probability of the existence of the phenomena e and 
the negation of theism (P(e. -, hlk)) is very low that it has the approximately the same value as 
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the product of P(elh. k) and P(h1k), which individually have a higher value. A probability 
value can be 'very low' in infinite different ways, and there is scarce reason to think the 'very 
low' value of the product of P(elh. k) and P(h1k) and the 'very low' of P(e. -h1k) have the 
same value or, in any case, that the posterior probability of theism is not higher than 0.5. As 
a result, the reasoning that permitted him to conclude that the posterior probability of theism 
(before considering the evidence of religious experience) is not higher than V2 is in fact 
mistaken, because it is based on a deeply implausible estimate. In other words, religious 
experience could not tip the balance in favour of theism because Swinbume's reasoning was 
not able to show that the balance was not already in its favour. 
In addition, Swinburne argues that the probability of the hypothesis of theism is not 
very high in view of the pieces of evidence he analyses with the exclusion of religious 
expefience because God's existence is compatible with too much (see Swinburne 1991: 285). 
Now, it is hard to understand Swinburne's reasoning here. In order to establish the 
conclusion that P(elh. k) is high it does not matter whether there are other possible phenomena 
e that could be understood by means of the hypothesis h. The fact that God could also have 
created worlds different from the actual does not interfere with the explanatory power of 
theism over the many phenomena of this existent world. The fact that theism is compatible 
with too many alternative worlds is not a problem for its explanatory power over the actual 
world, but an indication that its scope is too large. As we saw in Chapter 1, according to 
Swinburne, scope is a factor that interferes in the prior probability of a hypothesis, rather than 
in its explanatory power. If scope determines the posterior probability of theism in a way that 
makes P(hle. k):! ý 0.5 before considering religious experience, then Swinburne must hold that 
ior probability of it is scope and not simplicity which is the most important criterion for the pri II 
' Swinb 
i 
urne in fact claims that P(hle. k)! ý 0-5, but to simplify the formal account I put it as an equation. This 
point xvill make no difference to the critical remarks that follow. 
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theism. In other words, in order to appeal to the scope of the thelstic hypothesIs to grant a 
special place for religious experience in his final balance of the probability of theism, 
Swinburne would need to revisit his dismissal of scope in his earlier treatment of prior 
probability (see Swinbume 1991: 106). 
Two recent articles also dispute the way Swinburne carried out the calculations of his 
final balance of probability. In a paper intended to follow through Swinburne's Bayesian 
method, Charles Gutenson attempts to show that Swinbume's conclusion is far too weak. He 
starts from the tautological expression according to which P(hlk)+P(-hlk)=1, which we have 
already seen above. Since the prior probability of theism and the prior probability of 
hypotheses that are not the theistic one are complements, they must add up to 1. Gutenson 
calls P(-hlk) 'the rivals of theism', and quoting Swinbume when he said that "'[t]he intrinsic 
probability of theism is, relative to other hypotheses about what there is, very 
high ... (Swinbume 1991: 106), Gutenson concludes that P(hlk)>P(-hlk), a move that is 
crucial to his whole argument. Now, given that these probabilities add up to 1, and admitting 
that P(h1k) is higher than its complement, P(h1k) will certainly be higher than V2 (see 
Gutenson 1997: 245). 
The next step is just a quotation of Swinburne's own view that for each phenomena he 
discussed in his cumulative case, P(e1h. k)>P(e1k), that is, each piece of evidence is more 
probable given that there is a God than when considered in isolation (Swinbume 1991: 277). 
From that, we have that P(e1h. k)1P(e1k)>l, by a pure mathematical step. Now, given Bayes's 
theorem: 
P(h / e. k) = 
P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) 
P(e / k) 
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And given that 
P(e / h. k) 
> 1, and that P(hlk)> 1/2, we have: P(h1e. k)=(>I)x(>V2), 
P(e / k) 
which amounts to say that P(hle. k) is surely higher than 50%. 'In other words', concludes 
Gutenson, 'every individual argument is Itself a good P-inductive argument. Therefore, It 
seems that Swinburne is entitled to a stronger conclusion than he claims' (Gutenson 1997: 
245). 
However, Gutenson's argument makes a mistake that even he takes into account. In 
his own words, '[ ... ] one might argue that I have unfairly collapsed a number of theories into 
what I called "the rivals to theism... (Gutenson 1997: 245). He justifies this move on the 
grounds that, according to Swinburne's own assumptions, the prior probability of theism 
should not be taken as higher than 0.5 only if. a) there were more than one alternative to it, 
and b) if the prior of theism were not considered higher than of its rivals. 
In fact, Swinburne's own ambiguity is to be blamed if we regard Gutenson's 
calculations as mistaken. As we saw5 Swinburne considers P(h1k) higher than its rivals, but 
he does not think theism has only one alternative. He asserts that 'The only plausible 
alternative to theism is the supposition that the world with all the characteristics which I have 
described just is, has no explanation' (Swinburne 1991: 287, emphasis mine). In other words, 
apart from the brute fact thesis, there are other alternatives that he dismisses on the grounds 
of their complexity, like dualism, polytheism or gods with finite powers (see Swinbume 
1991: 104 and 287). Given that these hypotheses are potentially infinite (we could think of 
one finite god, two finite gods, and so forth)7 , even if their prior probability is very, very 
low, 
we cannot just turn our backs on them. Asa whole, the conjunction of these very improbable 
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hypotheses may add up to much more than 0.5, if we include in the sum the brute fact 
hypothesis. That is why Swinbume affirms that '[ ... ] P(h1k) is fairly low, although very high 
relative to that of other hypotheses about what exists; P(-hlk) will be fairly high, not too far 
below F (Swinburne 1991: 286, footnote 2). So, theism is more probable than any 
alternative taken individually, but much less probable than the sum of all possible 
explanations that exclude theism. 
As a result, there are reasons to hold that Gutenson's calculations do not match 
Swinbume's ideas, despite all the ambiguity of the latter, and that, consequently, his claim 
that Swinburne should coherently conclude that each C-inductive argument is in fact a P- 
inductive one, does not follow. Nevertheless, Gutenson may really be said to have a point 
when he maintains that Swinburne's conclusion is too weak. This is the same result the 
Austrian philosopher Winfried Uffler arrives at in his reconstruction of Swinburne's final 
balance of the probabilities. In contrast with Gutenson, however, Uffler opts for following 
Swinburne's account of his concluding balance more strictly. Still, unlike Swinburne, who 
restricts his discussion to a comparative usage of probability (see Swinburne 1991: 17), 
Uffler ascribes figures to the different items of his Bayesian calculation. In doing so, Uffler 
conforms to David Bartholomew's advice, according to which the best way to convey 
uncertainties is with numbers, since numerical expressions are much more precise and able to 
show us the consequences of the assumptions we made in our probabilistic arguments, even if 
we run the risk of unfair interpretations (see Bartholomew 1996: 36-7). 
In his exposition, Uffler also calls attention to the fact that, in being an inductive 
case, Swinbume 9s reasoning must obey the conditional i sation rule mentioned above. We 
need to take the posterior probability of the calculation conceming evidence el as the prior 
7 The idea that we should start from the consideration of a potentially infinite set of alternative hypothesis was 
already criticised in Chapter 3 of the present thesis (pp. 93ff. ). 
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probability for the argument regarding e2, and so forth. L6ffler interprets Swinburne's idea 
that P(h1k) is low, but much higher than P(e. -h1k) (see Swinbume 1991: 288) as follows: 
P(hlk)=0.00001 and P(e. -hlk)=0.0000001. He ascribes to P(elh. k) the same value as P(h1k) 
to signify that the foriner is also low, but not too low (see Swinburne 1991: 285). 
Accordingly, he constructs the following table with the results of his calculations (see Lbffler 
1999: 97): 
After the... P(h1k) P(ei-71h. k) P(el-7. -hlk) P(hlei-7. k) 
I st piece of evidence 0.00001 0.00001 0.0000001 0.000999000999 
2 nd piece of evidence 0.000999000999 ... 0.00001 0.0000001 0.090826521344 
3 rd piece of evidence 0.090826521344 ... 0.00001 0.0000001 0.900819745968 
4 th piece of evidence 0.900819745968 ... 
0.00001 0.0000001 0.989020879219 
5 th piece of evidence 0.989020879219 ... 0.00001 0.0000001 0.989990199196 
6 th piece of evidence 0.989990199196 ... 0.00001 
0.0000001 0.989999901990 
7 th piece of evidence 0.989999901990 ... 0.00001 
0.0000001 0.989999999019 
As a result, the more pieces of evidence e are made more probable given a hypothesis 
h than given its negation, the more h gets confirmed by e. More importantly, the table above 
shows us that already after the third piece of evidence the posterior probability of theism goes 
well above 0.5. So, if this reconstruction of Swinburne's cumulative case is correct, we do 
not need the argument of religious experience in order to have a P-inductive argument in 
favour of theism. To show that the posterior probability of theism is more than 50% it would 
be enough to show that the values suggested above for P(h1k), P(elh. k) and P(e. -h1k) were 
correct for at least three pieces of evidence, as for the traditional cosmological, teleological 
and providence arguments, for example. 
Uffler raises a possible objection to his reconstruction which , in 
fact, is also 
applicable to Swinburne's proposal in general. One might dispute that the pieces of evidence 
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considered by the cumulative case are really independent i. e. that there is no causal link 
between them. Technically speaking, this is a crucial element for a probabilistic calculation. 
If A and B are independent objects, then the probability of their conjunction is given by the 
product of their respective probability, that is, P(A. B)=P(A) x P(B). In case there is a causal 
link between A and B, then they should be expressed in tenns of conditional probability, that 
is, P(A. B)=P(A) x P(B/A) and P(B. A)=P(B) x P(A/B). As a result, if the pieces of evidence 
used by Swinbume are not genuinely independent, they do not have the same cumulative 
effect, making a much weaker case in favour of theism. 
In fact, the degree of dependence may determine a very different result, as the case of 
multiple testimony can illustrate. In commenting on Hume's discussion of miracles, the 
American statistician William Kruskal asserts that the probability of a miracle having really 
happened given many testimony reports will vary across a range whose extremes are 
determined by independence. If the witnesses are completely independent, then the 
probability of a miracle having occurred becomes a function of the number of witnesses, 
increasing to very close to 1. 'At the opposite extreme, if the observers behave in a wholly 
dependent way and give the same answer, the conditional probability is the same as for a 
single observer' (Kruskal 1988: 932). So, we cannot dismiss this objection very easily, since 
a strong degree of dependence may turn a multiple cumulative case into a simple argument 
that depends on one sole piece of evidence. 
Uffler replies to this potential objection with two arguments. Firstly, he says, despite 
our tendency to associate the occurrence of conscious beings with the existence of order in 
the universe, for example, 'there is no conceptual tie between those features of the world, and 
one can imagine worlds where some of these features are absent. Hence', Uffler suggests, 
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cwe can rightly treat our six or seven pieces of evidence as independent pieces' (Uffler 1999: 
98). So , it is perfectly possible that there would be the same natural laws we have in a 
universe exactly equal to the one we know, but where no conscious beings came to exist. 
Secondly, and more importantly, he argues that 
If there should really exist a conceptual, or at least a probabilistic tie between the various 
pieces of evidence, then this tie exists no matter how the world came into existence. For 
example: If it was God who created the ordered universe with conscious beings, then it is 
also more likely that he created a fine-tuning in the universe as well. Hence a rise of the 
likelihood of the "later" pieces of evidence does not only influence the denominator of 
Swinburne's theorem, it also raises P(elhAk), and this term appears in the numerator and in 
the denominator. Hence the increase in P(el-hAk) in the denominator is partly neutralized 
by the increase of P(elhAk) in the numerator (Uffler 1999: 98). 
In other words, since in our calculation we are considering not only the likelihood of theism, 
but also of its negation, a potential dependence among the pieces of evidence will not change 
the final result very much. However, Uffler is careful to assert that the increase in the 
likelihood of the negation of theism will be 'partly neutralized' by an increase in the 
likelihood of theism. In fact, it is difficult a priori to determine the extent of this 
neutralisation. 
Can we really consider the facts Swinburne uses to discuss the probability of theism 
as an explanatory hypothesis to be independent? I cannot find a clear answer in the relevant 
parts of his works (see, for example, Swinbume 1991: 14-5, where we should expect a 
statement about this issue)8. As seen above, however, Uffler advances an important 
argument in favour of Swinburrie's position, namely: we can think of a possible world where 
some of the phenomena at issue occurred but not all applied (an ordered and providential 
universe but without conscious beings, for example). So, the existence of the universe, of 
order, of good conditions for the appearance of life, of conscious beings, the occurrence of 
8 In view of Kruskal's observation about the widespread neglect of the question of independence in introductory 
textbooks on probability, this comes as no surprise (see Kruskal 1988: 937, footnote 
20). 
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extraordinary facts in history and of religious experience can all be coherently conceived as 
having being caused by God in an unrelated way. Each of them could be thought of as 
independent evidence of God's action, and, consequently, of his existence. 
Yet, one could counter that the occurrence of religious experience obviously depends 
on the existence of conscious beings, that the existence of conscious beings depends on the 
existence of a world where they can survive, and the existence of a providential world 
presupposes that there is a universe that is ordered. So, even if we could think of these facts 
as being independently caused by God, in fact they seem ontologically connected. In this 
way, they would afford much less support for the hypothesis of theism than Swinburne 
intended. We can at least say that this problem of whether the pieces of evidence used by 
Swinbume are really independent does not seem easy to settle. 
As regards the place of religious experience in Swinburne's argument, the discussion 
above allows me to raise two points. Firstly, if Uffler's calculations are right, then there is 
no reason to postulate a privileged place for religious experience in Swinburne's cumulative 
case, since already after the third piece of evidence the posterior probability of theism goes 
well above 50%. Secondly, if the pieces of evidence that confirm the hypothesis of theism 
are genuinely independent, allowing for an absolute confirmation of theism at the end, then 
the order of presenting them should be of no consequence. Instead Swinburne starts with the 
existence of the universe and progresses until he gets to religious experience, giving the 
impression that they are in a linear, unidirectional sequence of dependence. As we saw, he 
advances two reasons for this ordering. (1) If we are to judge the initial prior probability only 
on the basis of simplicity, then we have to put in e all empirical information, leaving for k 
only tautologies. In order to do this, we have no choice but to start from the cosmological 
argument. (2) We need to have independent foundations to ground our belief in God in order 
to make the argument of religious experience really effective, that is, we need to show that 
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the hypothesis of theism has a non-negligible probability before we can use the argument 
from religious experience (see Swinbume 1991: 271). 
However, if we do not rely on the controversial principle of simplicity for anything as 
suggested in Chapter 3, and if we do not count on religious experience as decisive for a P- 
inductive argument for theism argument, we need not present the whole case for theism in 
that suspicious order. In this way, we can maintain some hope of defending the 
independence of the case's pieces of evidence and, consequently, of maintaining the 
cumulative character of the argument. In other words, if we may only consider religious 
experience after discussing the other arguments, then the independence of the pieces of 
evidence is unden-nined and they stop being cumulative. 
If Swinbume wanted to put forward a C-inductive argument from religious experience 
for theism, then the only formal requirement would be that the prior probability of theism was 
not zero. As he argues in several places, we could only reject from the outset any claim that 
an experience of God has some evidential value if we had proof that God does not exist (see 
Swinburne 1981a: 194 and 1996: 136). His purpose, however, was not to show that religious 
experience yields a good C-inductive argument, but that it has 'considerable evidential force' 
(see Swinbume 1991: 275), and that 'it ought to be taken as veridical' (see Swinbume 
1991: 270). In order to have this force, the argument from religious experience would need to 
be backed up by independent evidence that theism is probable (see Swinburne 1991: 271). In 
this way, the argument from religious experience would be able to make theism more 
probable than not. However, as I argued above, if theism has the explanatory power 
Swinburne postulates, then it becomes more probable than not well before the argument from 
religious experience is introduced. 
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In the next chapter, I will attempt to show that, apart from being otiose given 
Swinburrie's cumulative case argument, there is reason to doubt the force of religious 
experience as a basis for a good objective public inductive argument in favour of theism. 
Chapter 5- Problems with Swinburne's Argument from 
Religious Experience 
In Chapter 41 described how Swinburne uses religious experience to argue in favour of 
theism. We saw that his strategy was to employ the principles of credulity and testimony so 
that he could claim that the hypothesis of theism is by far the best explanation for the 
phenomenon of religious experience. Applied to religious experiences, the principle of 
credulity would allow us to say that, unless there are reasons to believe otherwise, if a subject 
S seems to have perceived God, then S has perceived God. In other words, other things being 
equal, the fact that many claim to have perceived God is a powerful piece of evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis of theism, since this is the best explanation for that phenomenon. 
In the present chapter, I will challenge Swinbume's conclusion that religious 
experience provides an objective, acceptable for all and forceful piece of evidence in favour 
of theism. In this critical discussion, three main issues will be stressed: 1) the disanalogies 
between religious experience and sense perception that can damage Swinburne's argument, 
2) the challenge posed to his proposal by naturalistic explanations of religious experiences, 3) 
problems posed by religious pluralism to his argument, especially as regards the 
identification of God in religious experiences. 
1. The Analogy between Religious Experience and Sense Perception 
Swinburne's efforts to argue that religious experience has evidential value are centred 
in the idea that since the way we perceive objects through our non-nal senses provides 
grounds for believing that the respective objects exist, perceptions of 
God should be taken as 
evidence of His existence. In other words, there is a strong analogy 
between religious 
experience and sense perception, one that permits 
him to say that scepticism regarding the 
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fonner is as irrational as to the latter (see Swinburne 1991: 254 footnote). As a result, a 
crucial point to be addressed in a criticism of his position here at issue is the correlation 
between religious experience and sense perception. 
Michael Martin holds, however, that it is possible to be sceptical of the evidential 
value of religious experience without having the same attitude towards sense perception. To 
ground his assertion, Martin points out that when we do not perceive the presence of a 
sensory object this is prima facie reason for us to believe it does not exist, or that it is not in 
the particular place we surveyed. He calls this the 'negative principle of credulity' or NPC, 
which reads 'if it seems (epistemically) I to a subject S that x is absent, then probably x is 
ý11 absent' (see Martin 1986: 83). 
Swinburne does not agree that the perception of God's absence can be grounds for 
believing that God does not exist, because we cannot control the conditions under which God 
will manifest Himself (see Swinburne 1991: 249). In addition, Swinburne claims that the fact 
that one person does not see an object 0 while another one does is not enough to say that 0 is 
not present and we can still maintain that 0 was there (see Swinburne 1991: 263). In fact, 
when there is a disagreement about a perceptual belief of this kind, the result can be exactly 
the opposite of what Swinburne proposes, that is, it may be more sensible to believe that 0 
was not present. As McKim correctly observes, the resolution of this kind of disagreement 
will depend on the context of observation, on the relative expertise of the observers and on 
some other circumstantial elements (see McKim 2001: 212). In other words, if the person 
who claims 0 was not present had a better functioning perceptive apparatus or was an expert 
in that type of object or was better placed for observing 0, then we had better believe 0 was 
not present, despite the fact that another person has affinned he saw the object. 
II Episternically', as xve saw in Chapter 4, means a use of verbs like 'seem', 'look' and 'appear' according to 
which they describe what the subject is inclined to 
believe on the basis of his experience (see Swinbume 1991: 
245-6). 
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Martin's point, however, is that if we do not know the conditions under which we 
could expect to perceive God, then this affects the evidential value of purported experiences 
of both God's absence and presence (see Martin 1986: 84). So, if we do not know in which 
circumstances God will manifest himself to someone then how can we ascertain that that 
experience was really of God? According to Martin, the inductive inference from the 
appearance to me of a table, to the hypothesis that the table was present given certain 
conditions C only becomes strong if we can assume that if the table were really not present 
and conditions C obtained, then the table would not appear to me. In sum, the inference from 
the perception of an object 0 to the existence of 0 is only inductively strong if we know the 
sufficient conditions for the appearance of 0 so that we can determine whether the perception 
was authentic. 
William Rowe has a similar point to Martin's when he says that 
Since we don't know what circumstances make for delusory religious experiences and we 
don't know what the conditions are which, if satisfied, one would have the experience of 
God if there is a God to be experienced, we can't really go about the process of 
determining whether there are or are not positive reasons for thinking religious experiences 
to be probably delusive (Rowe 1982: 90-1). 
As a result9 Rowe concludes, the application of the principle of credulity is not warranted in 
the case of religious experiences, and if the argument from religious experience depends on 
the application of credulity principle, as Swinburne claims, then this argument fails as 
evidence for the existence of God (see Rowe 1982: 
91)2. 
This important distinction between sense perception and religious experience is spelt 
out by Richard Gale when he argues that the latter does not fulfil the 'epistemological 
requirement' that he believes is crucial for the evidential value of any sensory claim. This 
prerequisite for considering a perceptual statement genuine is basically that in order to have 
2 Jerome Gellman has interesting replies to both Martin and Rowe (see Gellman 1997: 59-60 and 68-9). 
However, since Gellman does not ground his case in the idea that scepticism 
directed to theistic experience is as 
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an initial plausibility conferred by the principle of credulity, experiences '[ ... ] must 
be 
subject to defeaters, tests or checks, failure of which lowers this prima facie probability' 
(Gale 1994c: 59). 
According to Gale, there are three tests that are crucial for the evidential value of a 
sense perception claim that religious experiences cannot meet. The first one is what he calls 
the 'causal test', which requires that in order to generate rational belief, a perceptual claim 
must have been caused in the right way to the perceiver. In other words, the perceiver must 
have been positioned in the correct place and with his perceptual apparatus working properly. 
We can only claim that there is a table in the room based on our perception if we are correctly 
positioned for discerning that and if our capacity for observing it is in good order. This test, 
however, does not apply to religious experiences, because, since God is by definition a non- 
spatial being and is said to appear to anyone He chooses, it does not matter where the 
perceiver is or whether his perceptual mechanism is working well, for God can overcome any 
of a perceiver's limitations (see Gale 1994c: 60). 
The second test is the agreement among different observers, by means of which a 
perceptual claim can be falsified by either a better positioned and trained witness or by a 
larger number of observers with the same capability. The position and the number of people 
standing in the same place where a purported religious experience occurred, as we saw above, 
cannot disconfirm the authenticity of an experiential claim of this kind, because God can 
choose to appear to only one person in a group of people standing in the same place. As to 
the level or type of training required for testing a statement like this, Caroline Franks says: 
[ ... ] we 
have little idea of the sort of training which would enable one to have veridical 
experiences of God or other supernatural forces. The kind of training which might seem 
appropriate - theological training, engaging in religious rituals, guidance in meditation by 
irrational as scepticism directed to sense perception (see 
Gellman 1997: 49-50), his arguments do not apply to 
the point I am discussing here. 
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a spiritual master or guru - does not by any means guarantee that one will have veridical 
experience of God, if he exists; and theists agree that genuine religious experiences may 
occur spontaneously to theologically na*fve and even irreligious subjects (Franks 1985: 28). 
The problem for religious experiences, Gale argues, is that the agreement of other observers 
regarding the content of a purported theistic perception cannot be used as confirming it either. 
We cannot rationally admit the very employment of a criterion that is only useful to prove but 
not to disprove (see Gale 1994c: 60). This asymmetry observed in religious experience but 
not in sense perception is another important difference between them, Gale claims. 
The third type of test that is fundamental for ascribing veridical status to religious 
experience is what Gale calls 'the prediction test'. According to this criterion, a sense 
perception claim is considered authentic as long as we can predict who will have the 
experience and the circumstances that will confirm the content of that mental occurrence. 
The possibility of reproducing the conditions for a veridical perceptual claim to be true is 
clearly not available to the case of theistic experience, since this experience, if it occurs, is 
freely brought about by God, whose will is conceived as totally out of any external control or 
constraint (see Gale 1994c: 61). 
So, if Swinbume's ultimate argument from religious experience for theism is founded 
on an analogy between religious experience and sense perception, then the arguments above 
pose considerable obstacles to his proposal. However, all these criticisms have force if we 
direct them against Swinburne's proposal to take religious experience as an objective 
argument for theistic belief that will convince anyone regardless of background. In other 
words, as we saw in Chapter 4, Swinburne's proposal for religious expenence was to use it as 
confirmatory fact in an inductive argument favouring theism. In so far as we accept, 
through the principle of credulity, that theism is the best explanation for religious experience, 
then it becomes a powerful argument for the belief that there is a God. Yet, there is good 
reason to believe that the analogy between sense perception and religious experience is not 
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strong enough. As Martin suggests, we can reasonably be sceptical regarding the objective 
evidential value of religious experience without implying scepticism concerning sense 
perception (see Martin 1986: 92). 
Still, these criticisms do not apply if we adopt a different approach to religious 
experience that dispenses with any strong analogy with sense perception or that does not aim 
to make of purported experiences of God the basis for an objective and universally acceptable 
inductive argument. One point that most critics of Swinburne's use of religious experience 
do not deny is that we observe a strong subjective conviction formed in those who enjoy a 
religious experience (see Davies 1993: 136, Gale 1994c: 61, Mackie 1982: 185, for example). 
This strong subjective conviction is commonly accompanied by a remarkable change in 
behaviour, which is pointed to by most mystical traditions as the decisive test to distinguish 
veridical from non-veridical instances of religious experience. Indeed, according to Peter 
Losin, the existence of this distinction based on this sort of commonly observable change in 
behaviour provides some reply to the argument by Rowe, Mai-tin and Gale that religious 
experiences are non-testable in their authentiCity3. Yet, it is true that, as Gale observes, the 
type of holiness according to which we can objectively evaluate the genuineness of a 
religious experience varies from tradition to tradition (see Gale 1994c: 61). In this case, the 
correct evaluation of an authentic religious experience will be possible only inside a 
particular religious tradition. Consequently, a religious experience can still have evidential 
value in the context of a specific religious circle, although not universally, as Swinburne aims 
to show. 
So, it might be possible to afford religious experience a place in the epistemology of 
religion different from the universalistic appeal Swinburne aims to give to it. In this case, it 
3 James Beilby observes that Rowe's requirement that we specify the conditions under which the experience of 
an object is delusive makes his argument from pointless evil to atheism inconsistent. 
In addition, Rowe would 
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would become a justification for religious beliefs by mystical perception within the range of a 
certain tradition, and the analogy with sense perception stops being crucial and becomes 
important only to reply to the accusation of circularity. In fact, what we have here are the 
main ingredients of the alternative consideration for the role of religious experience in the 
epistemology of theism which I will consider in the next chapter. Before proceeding to 
analyse that option, however, let us discuss the other two main objections to Swinbume's 
argument from religious experience. 
2. Naturalistic Explanations of Religious Experiences 
By 'naturalistic explanations of religious experience' I mean here the accounts of this 
phenomenon that dispense with the notion of God to understand purported theistic 
perceptions. So, naturalistic explanations of religious experiences are accounts of that sort of 
mental happening which generally appeal to pure psychological, sociological or cultural 
causes to elucidate reports of theistic experience. 
Swinburne refers to this kind of explanation while dealing with the fourth challenge to 
the application of the credulity principle to religious experience. However, he does not 
elaborate very much on these alternative explanations, since he claims that since God is 
omnipresent and the ultimate cause of everything, then if He exists He must be the cause of 
every religious experience. Consequently, the only way to show that God was not the cause 
of a religious experience is by producing a proof of His non-existence, which has not been 
done yet. 'Hence', concludes Swinburne, 'any causal processes at all which bring about my 
experience will have God among their causes; and any experience of him will be of him as 
present at a place where he is. And so if there is a God, any experience which seems to be of 
have much trouble in justifying the common belief in the existence of other minds, for which we do not have 
objective and non-circular conditions of testing either (see Beilby 1995). 
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God, will be genuine - will be of God' (Swinburne 1991: 270). In this way, naturalistIc 
explanations are ruled out from the outset. 
The problem with stating that 'if there is a God, any experience which seems to be of 
God, will be genuine - will be of God' is that it amounts to asserting what Michael Levine 
calls 'the essential veridicality of any religious experience given the existence of God' (see 
Levine 1990: 207-8). In other words, it implies that there can be no non-veridical religious 
experience if there is a God. The first unacceptable consequence of this view is that even if a 
religious experience were enjoyed under the influence of LSD it must be genuine. By the 
same token, we should take at its face value the insane serial killer's assertion that his crimes 
were committed following God's call. Both cases would have to be taken as authentic 
religious experiences if we were to accept that, granted God's existence, all religious 
experiences are essentially veridical. Apart from being absurd, these consequences ignore the 
first limit to the principle of credulity as stated by Swinbume himself (see Swinburne 1991: 
265), since, although there are positive reasons to doubt the reliability of the subject or the 
circumstances under which he had the experience, we would still have to accept the reported 
experience as genuine. 
In addition, according to Levine, if we accept Swinburne's claim, then the principle of 
credulity becomes redundant for those who believe in God (see Levine 1990: 215). Yet, 
Swinburne engages in a laborious argument to show that there is good reason to trust our 
senses prima facie and to treat religious experience in the same way. Moreover, even those 
who undergo a theistic perception, like St. Theresa D'Avila, for example, generally hold that 
there are non-veridical religious experiences i. e. that some of these occurrences were not 
caused by God but the devil. These reasons, then, seem sufficient to reject Swinburne's 
dismissal of naturalistic explanations and to justify a more careful consideration of the threat 
they pose to his argument from religious experience. 
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According to Jeff Jordan, there are two conditions for a veridical perception of God: 
1) that God was present to the place where He has been allegedly experienced (the presence 
condition), and 2) that God was the cause of that experience (the causal condition) (see 
Jordan 1994: 60). A naturalistic explanation would suffice to undennine the evidential value 
of religious experience by showing that at least one of those conditions did not obtain in the 
religious case. As to the presence condition, one could attack it by arguing that we do not 
need to show that God does not exist or is not omnipresent to contend that He was not present 
to the purported experiencer. It would be enough to say that, although God is present 
everywhere if He exists, His presence is episternically inaccessible to us, given His infinitude 
and our limited apparatus. 
We could also impugn the causal condition of religious experiences by showing that 
either God had no causal input in them or that God was not a relevant or appropriate cause of 
them (see Jordan 1994: 62-3). So, we could maintain that God was either not a necessary 
condition of religious experiences or that His causal action was not sufficient to account for 
that sort of experience. When Swinburne argues that God's omnipresence and His role as 
ultimate cause of everything are grounds for the authenticity of religious experiences, he is 
meeting the necessary condition for God to be considered the cause of alleged theistic 
perceptions, but not the sufficient one, if we use Jordan's distinction. 
However, pointing out a cause other than God for a religious experience does not 
mean to say that He was not the cause of any experience, for, as Jordan says, j ... ] religious 
experiences could be overdetermined: they may admit of more than one sufficient causal 
condition at a time' (Jordan 1994: 63). In other words, in accepting that if God exists He is 
the ultimate cause for everything, we need to agree that God has causal input in every 
purported religious experience. Yet, we can still argue that the subject's perception was not 
caused by God in any relevant or appropriate way. So, if my experience of God is explained 
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by the fact that I had taken a hallucinogen or that I was socially or psychologically 
determined in my perception, then my experience will hardly have any evidential value for 
the existence of God. 
Thus, the indication of a sufficient naturalistic cause to explain a report of religious 
experience damages the evidential value of these experiences even if one cannot prove that 
God, who would be the ultimate cause of the hallucinogen existing and acting or of the fact 
that human beings have minds or constituted societies, does not exist. According to Jordan, 
we need to bear in mind the difference between God intending an experience, which is 
something we cannot predict given His sovereign will, and His permitting an experience. In 
the fon-ner case, God is the appropriate and relevant cause of the religious experience. 
However , in the case where God only permits a religious experience but 
does not intend it, 
then He would not be appropriately connected to the purported perception of Him, and 
consequently this experience would not constitute evidence for God's existence. In sum, 
naturalistic explanations may hold that even if God exists, religious experiences may not be a 
genuine indication of His existence, i. e. that theism is not the best explanation of this kind of 
phenomenon. 
It is exactly because he thought that one can provide an adequate and non-theistic 
account of religious experience by means of naturalistic explanations that John Mackie did 
not see any evidential value in this kind of experience. Based on the psychological approach 
of William James's Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), Mackie observed that 'since 
these experiences are of kinds which are psychologically understandable without the help of 
any specifically religious assumptions, they do not in themselves carry any guarantee of a 
supernatural source. There is nothing intrinsically very remarkable or distinctive about them. 
This obviously holds for any single "religious experience"' (Mackie 1982: 
180). For Mackie, 
religious experiences are generally very dependent on a specific tradition, 
for typically the 
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experiencers only have purported contacts with supernatural entities that belong to the 
tradition they have adhered to. 
In addition, the central doctrines of any religion are hardly given in an experience 
(McKim also observes that religious experiences are doctrinally ambiguous (see McKim 
2001: 227)). Consequently, Mackie holds, 
The very most, then, that an argument from religious experience could give us is much less 
than either the philosophical theist or the adherent of any specific faith demands. Even if 
these experiences were witnesses to some further truth, it could only be, as James says, the 
existence of some greater friendly power, whose precise identity and character are left 
wholly indeterminate (Mackie 1982: 182-3). 
In other words, objectively speaking, if we follow James's classical account, religious 
experience will not be clear evidence for theism, as such. However, we may concede that it 
could be used to back an argument for the existence of a being with less definite contours 
such as the 'Ultimate' or the 'Sacred Transcendent'. 
However, for Mackie, the real weakness of religious experiences as evidence in 
favour of theism is that they can be explained by natural means. The study of religious 
beliefs and purported experiences on the assumption they should be explained non-religiously 
has very much developed since Hume's The Natural History of Religion (1957). Authors like 
Feuerbach, Marx, Freud and Durkheim are amongst those who contributed prommently to 
this multidisciplinary effort. Clearly, none of the individual naturalistic accounts is a 
satisfactory explanation for the religious phenomenon, but conjointly, it may be argued, they 
can well explain fundamental strands of that complex human activity by reducing it to its 
psychological, social, historical and cultural components. It is also true that a naturalistic 
explanation of religion does not amount to a disproof of theism, since the truth-value of a 
belief is not necessarily related to its origin. Even so, they can still play an important role in 
supporting atheism, since, according to Mackie, 
[ ... ] it contributes indirectly and subordinately 
to the case against theism. Our reply to the 
argument from religious experience to further, supernaturalist, claims, even when these are 
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as tentative and unorthodox as those put forward by William James, was that we need not 
postulate any supernatural source or sources for these experiences, since they can be fully 
explained on purely natural grounds, by reference to otherwise familiar psychological 
processes and forces (Mackie 1982: 197). 
For Mackie then, given that naturalism has equivalent or better explanatory power and is 
more economical, religious experiences cannot be taken to confirm the theistic hypothesis in 
any objective and compelling way. 
However, there is also reason to doubt the explanatory power of naturalism relative to 
religious experiences. According to R. A. Naulty, Mackie's naturalistic explanation does not 
take into consideration a crucial particularity of religious experiences. For Naulty, the best 
way to explain why the experiencers consider those experiences as religious is by recognising 
their powerful and wonderful character, which put them beyond ordinary experience (see 
Naulty 1992: 2). Moreover, the effect those experiences have on those who undergo them is 
generally also beyond the ordinary. The degree and character of the remarkable changes in 
behaviour observed to happen to those who claim to have had a religious experience are 
hardly compatible with its characterisation as an ordinary psychological phenomenon. 
Clearly, as an inductive argument, this is not conclusive. Even so, claims Naulty, we can at 
least say that this phenomenon becomes better explained by postulating the veridical 
character of religious experiences than any alternative naturalistic explanation (see Naulty 
1992: 7). 
This argument against naturalistic explanations of religious belief can also be 
countered, but, for the moment, the main point I would like to make is that, once Swinburne's 
argument that all religious experiences should have God as their cause fails, his case become 
much less compelling. In other words, even if we accept that one may have reason for using 
theism to explain purported perceptions of God, the naturalist also has strong arguments in 
his favour. Even if psychological and social explanations taken in isolation can be rebutted, 
as a whole they form an alternative account to theism that cannot 
be dismissed very easily. if 
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so, Swinbume's attempt to provide an inductive argument from religious experience that 
should be accepted by everyone and that had the power of tipping the balance in favour of 
theism faces a considerable obstacle here. 
In addition, religious experience appears to be much more adequate as a base for an 
argument for the existence of a general being with religious meaning rather than specifically 
the one postulated by traditional theism. This idea will be discussed in the next section, 
where I will analyse the problems posed by religious pluralism to Swinbume's argument 
from religious experience. 
3. Religious Pluralism and the Identification of God 
3.1 The problem of religious pluralism 
The negative import of diversity and conflict among religious experiences is 
considered by Swinburne when he discusses the second challenge to the application of the 
principle of credulity to religious perception. Recall that this challenge casts doubts on the 
reliance of purported perceptions of objects 0 on the basis of frequent flaws in the 
recognition of 0 in the past. So, if I proved to be wrong in recognising wild birds in the past 
I had better not to believe my senses that I saw a certain bird B instead of another of a similar 
species D. Applied to religious experience, this charge maintains that since different 
irreconcilable divine entities are said to have been perceived in reports of religious 
experience, the evidentially objective value of these happenings is undermined. Analogously, 
if people could never agree about the recognition of a certain species of bird, we would have 
reason to doubt people's ability to identify that species and, consequently, whether that 
particular species of bird really existed. If we never agree as to the object of religious 
experience, this experience cannot be evidence for the existence of any of the alleged 
supernatural entities perceived. 
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Swinbume's reply to this objection is that the conflict presented by religious pluralism 
is in fact superficial. The variety of entities identified in religious experiences could be mere 
manifestations of the same referent. God (that is, the being Swinbume defines as '[ ]a 
person without a body ( ... ) who is eternal, is perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly 
good, and the creator of all things' (Swinburne 1991: 8)) can be named in different ways, 
according to various cultural traditions. However, these different cultural traditions are in the 
end talking about the same supernatural entity which they fail to grasp in full. In 
Swinbume's words: 
Religious experiences in non-Christian traditions are experiences apparently of beings who 
are supposed to have similar properties to those of God, or experiences apparently of lesser 
beings, or experiences apparently of states of affairs, but hardly experiences of any person 
or state whose existence is incompatible with that of God (Swinburne 1991: 267). 
As a result, the only possible consequence of the religious pluralism charge would be a 
restriction in the way we present more detailed claims of religious perception. These claims 
should be rephrased in more general terms (see Swinburne 1991: 266). 
However, as Michael Martin points out, it is not enough to say that the different 
religions recognise a supernatural entity that in fact has characteristics in common with God 
to dismiss the threat posed by religious pluralism. Sharing common features that pennit a 
single reference in apparently contradictory perceptions may be a necessary condition for 
relying on religious experiences as a source for believing that there is a God. Yet, that is in 
itself insufficient to grant that prerogative to them. As Martin correctly observes, 
Swinburne must do more than argue that the beings described in the religious experience of 
non-Western cultures 'have similar properties' to those of God in the Western tradition in 
order to show no incompatibility. He must show that these beings do not have any 
properties that are incompatible with properties of God (Martin, 1986: 86). 
In other words, Swinburne's strategy of rephrasing claims of religious experience in less 
committed ways only works if nothing incompatible remains after the entities allegedly 
perceived have been identified Nvith the God of traditional theism. However, as Martin 
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observes, the task of showing that the Christian God is compatible with the image of God of 
many strands of Hinduism is far from easy, if possible at all. The personal identity and 
radical transcendence of the former seems clearly contradictory to the impersonality and 
pantheistic character of the latter. No reduction seems able to eliminate that incompatibility. 
As a result, the thesis that religious experience is in fact evidence for irreconcilable claims 
and thus that it has no universal and objective value appears to stand firm in view of 
Swinbume's proposal. 
Moreover, we could add with Caroline Franks Davis that Swinburne cannot claim that 
the impersonal and pantheistic object of the eastern experience is merely the apparent 
perception of God's absence, which, according to him, is not evidence against the theistic 
hypothesis (see Swinbume 1991: 263). This move is barred to him because the eastem 
mystics do not formulate their experience in a negative way, but as a positive perception of 
an atheistic void reality, which is incompatible, in so far as it is contradictory, with theistic 
experiences (see Franks 1985: 30). 
Swinburne's way of dealing with the problem of religious pluralism should be 
distinguished from a reduction of apparently contradictory religious perceptions to a lowest 
common denominator, such as the one adopted by Franks Davis (1989) and Rudolf Otto 
(1928). In the lowest common denominator strategy, one does not claim that non-theistic 
religious perceptions are merely a misinterpretation of experiences of the God of theism. 
Instead, one recognises incompatibilities among the different religious perceptions, but claim 
that they in the end refer to a single supernatural reality that Is not to be 
identified with the 
God of philosophical theism, but which can generically be called 'the 
Ultimate' or 'the Holy'. 
For Franks Davis, the mystical experiences reported by believers of different religions can 
provide good evidence for the following 'common core' claims: 
(i) the ultimate reality is 
different from the mundane world of physical bodies; (n) there is a deeper self in us that 
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depends and participates in the ultimate reality; (iii) the ultimate reality is holy, eternal and of 
supreme value; (iv) the ultimate reality can be described as a loving power with whom 
individuals can have a personal relationship, but all descriptions of the ultimate are 
fundamentally inadequate; (v) the focus of the experience is a sense of connection with the 
ultimate; (vi) the union with the ultimate is the human summum bonum (see Franks Davis 
1989: 191). To this list, Byme adds (vii) the ultimate can also be expenenced as an 
impersonal principle (see Byrne 1995: 129)4. 
However, even if a lower common denominator approach is adopted, it would still run 
the risk of not doing justice to the intensity and vigour of most mystical perceptions. The 
radical re-interpretation this approach demands would mean turning our backs on what 
brought about their vivid conviction that there is a God (or whatever supernatural entity they 
claim to perceive). Certainly the sheer fact of expressing that sort of experience in a 
propositional way implies a degree of diminution in its initial vibrancy, but the method 
postulated by Swinburne to circumvent the problem of religious pluralism threatens to 
disfigure completely their original content. It is not only a question of putting a vivid mental 
occurrence into words, but of restricting these words to something that is universally 
compatible with other so-called experiences of the divine. On the other hand, under the 
condition that it must be generally compatible, the experience of the divine will most 
probably become an insipid and too abstract concept that is too far from the religious life 
whence it was initially acquired. 
Moreover, there even seems to be reason to disagree with Swinburne's view that there 
is no incompatibility at least regarding the perception of different lesser supernatural beings, 
as when one claims to have talked to Poseidon instead of to the angel that guards the seas in 
4 If there are mystical experiences of an Impersonal principle, then religious experience can also 
be evidence for 
some of the hypotheses Swinburne does not consider in 
his comparative assessment of theism (see discussion of 
this problem in Chapter 2.1.3, pp. 48f. 
). 
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the Jewish tradition (see Swinburne 1991: 266). The problem with the compatibility between 
lesser supernatural beings is that, as Martin alludes, the figure of Poseidon and the Jewish 
angel belong to completely different cultural backgrounds that are hardly compatible (see 
Martin 1986: 88). The belief in a certain entity cannot be totally detached from the world- 
view that works as a general framework for any experience of it. We cannot talk of these 
lesser supernatural beings in isolation from that framework. If so, although we can say that a 
purported experience of Poseidon is not in principle incompatible with that of the angel that 
guards the seas, their broad religious traditions are indeed irreconcilable, since one is 
monotheistic whereas the other is polytheistic. 
So, the core of Swinburne's response to the challenge of religious pluralism to the 
evidential value of religious experience is a distinction between an objective element that 
would be common to all apparent conflicting perceptions of God, and a cultural and personal 
contribution that is responsible for that misleading appearance. In the common denominator 
strategy, which I distinguish from Swinbume's approach, pluralism causes no harm to 
religious experience if we take the cultural/personal input as inessential and due to our 
intrinsic inability of grasping the wide and deep mystery of the divine. The divine is well 
beyond those historical and local interpretations, but is their common final referent. 
Apparently incompatible claims based on religious experience would not cancel each other 
out because they point to the same direction ultimately. But this lower common denominator 
strategy will not make religious experience strong evidence for Swinburne's specific theistic 
hypothesis. 
Moreover, Swinburne's move presupposes that we can reach a clear conclusion about 
the roles played by the so-called internal and external inputs to expenence. This in fact is one 
of the most discussed issues in the epistemology of perception. A great number of 
inten-nediate positions have been suggested between the ones of na*fve realism on one side 
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and extreme idealism on the other. In essence, the former maintains that experiences are the 
product of passive apprehension of external objects, which are independent of our mental 
states, personal opinions or cultural backgrounds. Idealism on the other hand, stresses the 
fact that experiences are had by subjects who shape them according to their mental structures, 
and end up creating what we normally take to be 'reality'. Each of these extreme positions, 
whose representatives we can already find in the early manifestations of Western philosophy, 
focuses on one of the poles of the subject-object relationship that constitutes experience. 
Whatever our position in this debate, given its length and importance in the history of 
philosophy, it is unlikely that a conclusive theory of experience will ever be reached. 
What Swinbume holds9 however, is that we must at least admit that there is an 
objective external component in our experience so that we can avoid the sceptical bog (see 
Swinbume 1991: 254, footnote). In other words, the principle of credulity grants us the right 
to believe that x exists given our perception of x by warranting the assumption that there is an 
external objective element in our perception. Even if we do not know exactly the parts 
played by the external input and by our own contribution to this relationship, we must admit 
there is something objective in it, otherwise we are doomed to scepticism regarding the 
existence of the world, which, Swinburne holds, is irrational. If we accept that religious 
experience is analogous to the experience of empirical objects, and if we want to avoid 
scepticism, we must agree that there is a hard core within religious experiences that has not 
been created by our minds or by our cultural tradition. If so, the recourse to the distinction 
between external and internal inputs to religious experiences is still a way of meeting the 
challenge of religious pluralism. In other words, we could still say that the apparently diverse 
religious experiences could well have been generated by the same fundamental reality. 
According to Martin, however, this option is closed to Swinburne if it amounts to 
distinguishing between interpretation and perception in religious experience. This is so 
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because Swinburne had already dismissed this distinction in his defence of the general 
applicability of the credulity principle to religious experiences (see Martin 1986: 87). 
However,, what Swinburne was specifically denying was the possibility of drawing a sharp 
line between interpretation and perception founded on any specific list of basic sensible 
characteristics, as the empiricist tradition has aimed to do (see Swinburne 1991: 257-8). We 
cannot identify real perception with 'perception of sensible characteristics' mainly because 
the notion of sensible characteristics is too vague to serve to any purpose, and because such a 
list will never be complete. In other words, Swinburne's rejection of the phenomenalist 
criterion for distinguishing between interpretations and genuine perception does not 
contradict his acceptance of this distinction in principle. 
In any case, we can nonnally be said to recognise things like 'Victorian tables', 
although 'Victorian' will hardly figure in any list of sensible characteristics. The fact that we 
cannot distinguish interpretation and real perception specifically in the empiricist fashion 
does not prevent us differentiating between an internal and an external component in 
perception in general, although we have no clear criterion to tell them apart. Moreover, 
despite the fact that Swinburne does not state this idea explicitly, his definition of experience 
as a mental going-on that nonetheless is prima facie evidence for believing the existence of 
an external object clearly presupposes this differentiation (see Swinbume 1991: 244 and 
254). As a result, I believe that Swinburne's distinction between a common referent to all 
religious experiences and the diverse names and particular ways to convey this contact with 
the divine is consistent with his rejection of the empiricist reduction of 'real perceptions' to 
those expressed in terms of 'sensible characteristics'. We can maintain coherently that in our 
perceptions there is a component that is provided by our own beliefs and perceptual apparatus 
and another one that is independent from them without committing ourselves to any explicit 
way of defining what belongs to what. If this is the case, then the specific incompatibilities 
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among different religious traditions and particular problems of expressing the fundamental 
common referent of religious experiences do not prevent us from postulating this common 
referent in principle. 
However, the admission of the possibilitY that there is a theistic reference to all 
religious perceptions is much less than that which Swinburne aims at with his argument from 
religious experience. Instead of an entitlement claim - that is, the different religious 
experiences could be referring to the God of theism - he proposes that theism is the best 
explanation for those phenomena. However, given the irreconcilable incompatibility between 
the God of traditional theism and the reports of religious perception from non-theistic 
religions, the same referent strategy adopted by Swinburne cannot be sustained. The most 
those who defend the evidential force of religious experience can plausibly expect is to claim 
that the diversity of religious experiences refers not to God as understood by Swinbume but 
to a common denominator supernatural reality. This, however, falls far short of Swinbume's 
aim for his argument from religious experience for theism. In other words, in view of 
religious pluralism either his argument is implausible or has to resort to an approach that is 
not helpful to his programme. 
3.2 The identification of theistic perceptions 
J. William Forgie draws an important distinction between taking theistic experiences 
as an authentic perceptual occurrence as opposed to a fraud or a hallucination and taking 
them as experiences of God and not something else, once they are considered authentic. In 
other words, we have on one hand the problem of the authenticity of those experiences as 
perceptions and, on the other hand, the question of identification of their accusative (see 
Forgie 1986: 146-7). 
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Concerning the issue of identifying the object of a perceptual experience, Forgie 
proposes that we should isolate the content of the experience that corresponds to the specific 
features of its object and distinguishes it from something else. So, in seeing a cat and an 
adult lion there must be a content in my perception of those animals that permits me to 
identify and distinguish them such as, for example, their respective sizes. This element in 
perception that we take to correspond to the object of our experience, Forgie calls 
phenomenological content. A perception is phenomenologically justified if my identification 
of an object 0 in contrast with an object Q is based on the content provided by the perception 
itself as opposed to any background belief I consciously hold. 
If, for example, it seems to me you are a Uruguayan and not an Argentinean after 
having heard your voice, but if I am not capable of distinguishing these two very similar 
accents, then my identification of your nationality was not phenomenologically justified. Let 
us say, however, that you were talking about the decisive match in the World Cup finals in 
the distant year of 1950, when Uruguay beat Brazil at Maracand by 2-1, and that you were 
capable of providing minimal details of that match in a very enthusiastic way. Even if I could 
not identify your nationality by your appearance only, from what I know from alternative 
sources of information (first-hand testimony, books, videos, etc) I would have reason to 
believe you were Uruguayan. My identification of your nationality is not due solely to the 
content of my perception, but to what I know about football history and the way that 
particular event in 1950 is praised by Uruguayans in general but not so much by 
Argentineans. Forgie claims this way of identifying the object of our perception is based on 
extra-experiential considerations he calls 'auxiliary beliefs from our epistemic base' (see 
Forgle 1986: 148). 
So, fundamentally, the identification of an object of perception is achieved by means 
of the phenomenological and non-propositional content of the perception itself and the 
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auxiliary beliefs from our epistemic base. This means that in order to be epistemically 
justified, the identification of 0 requires both that our perceptual apparatus is working 
properly, and that our auxiliary beliefs are reasonable and capable of providing justification 
for the perception of 0, whatever the concept of justification we adopt. 
Yet, apart from these instances of justification for the perception of 0, there are also 
some special considerations that permit us to withhold assent from a perceptual belief, which, 
according to Swinburne's principle of credulity, is prima facie true. Forgie calls them 
'spoilers' and divides them between those concerned with the authenticity of the experience 
as a real perception and those concerned with the identification of the object perceived. It is 
upon the second type of spoilers, the ones related to the identification of 0, that Forgie 
elaborates further. 
The identification of an object of perception 0 can be challenged in four ways. 
Firstly, via true information that falsifies the identification such as in the example above, if 
the person I thought was Uruguayan were to show me documents proving he is Argentinean. 
Secondly, if we have data that falsify the beliefs on which the identification is based, 
although we cannot say the identification itself is false. In this case, we can say the 
identification is un ustified because it lacks good reason to be made in this way. In our i 
example, this would be the information that today's Uruguayans generall do not care about 
that historic footballing event, and that Argentineans are particularly interested in what 
happened in the 1950 World Cup. Thirdly, the identification of 0 can be said unjustified not 
because it is based on false infori-nation, but because it is based on incomplete or insufficient 
data for the purpose of justification. In this case again we are entitled not to accept the 
perceptual belief in question. In our example, this would correspond to a situation where I 
was not certain whether Uruguayans place so much value on that event in 1950, and I did not 
know for certain whether Argentineans were particularly interested in football history. 
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Fourthly, we may rationally refuse to embrace any of the rival identifications of a perceptual 
content because none of them provides sufficient justification for its assertions and we have 
no infonuation that undennines any of the alternative explanations for what was perceived. 
In our example, this would be the situation when the interlocutor does not say anything 
particularly related to his nationality, and my ability to distinguish among Spanish accents 
from South America is poor. Forgie calls this last challenge of someone's perceptual belief a 
'stalemating spoiler', when we have prima facie reasons for taking as true all the 
incompatible identifications of a perceptual belief, but no way of solving the conflict (see 
Forgic 1986: 150). 
According to Forgie, Swinburne concentrates the potential criticisms of perceptual 
beliefs on claims that falsify the identification of an object of experience, i. e. the first and 
second elements pointed out above. The charges of non-justified identification and the 
stalemating spoilers turned out to be completely overlooked. Indeed, Swinburne holds that 
the identification of God as the accusative of a religious experience is made using concepts 
that are available to us in the perception of mundane entities (see Swinburne 1991: 268). 
However, this only makes for the possibilit that the theistic identification is correct, since 
the theist can associate a certain tone and emphasis in the voice he heard with God's' attribute 
of omnipotence, for example. Yet, even if this association is justifiable, it is far from 
compelling, since the 'authority' perceived in the voice heard needs not necessarily be 
associated with the God of traditional monotheistic religions. In other words, we may still 
I yi withhold judgement by saying that either there are alternative forms of class' f ngtheobject 
of a purported theistic experience or that there is no way of adjudicating between them 
conclusively. 
As stated above, although it can be argued that there is reason to take theism to be a 
better explanation than the naturalistic accounts for the phenomenon of religious experience 
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as a whole, this matter is the subject of an ongoing debate and is far from being settled. 
Moreover, given the problem of religious pluralism, it is doubtful whether even the 
identification of an entity like the God of traditional theism is objectively justifiable in the 
way Swinburne suggests in view of the reports of religious experience available. One would 
be justified in withholding judgement because there is a sort of intellectual deadlock. As a 
result,, even if we consider that the principle of credulity can be applied to religious 
experience, there is plenty of room for not accepting them as a decisive and universally 
acceptable piece of evidence in favour of theism. As I attempted to show above, not only can 
this phenomenon be adequately explained in naturalistic terms but even its identification as a 
perception of God can rationally be put in doubt in view of religious pluralism. 
As we saw, Swinburne puts the difficulty of recognising God in a purported 
perception as one of the forms taken by the second challenge to the application of credulity 
principle to religious experiences. The second challenge to the application of the credulity 
principle casts doubts on the possibility of identifying an object, given the difficulty of doing 
so in the past. So, if I proved to be bad at discriminating South American Spanish accents in 
the past, I had better not rely on my belief that you are Uruguayan and not Argentinean. 
However, when applied to religious experiences, this type of criticism is topped up with 
suspicions about the very possibility of recognising an entity like God through induction, 
since He is not easily available to our normal perceptual range and since His features are not 
easily identifiable through perception. As I mentioned at the end of the previous section, 
Swinbume responds to these remarks by pointing out that we can recognise a being we had 
never met before and that, although God's traditional attributes are not easy to grasp 
perceptually, they are similar to behavioural qualities of people. We can correctly match 
personal characteristics with someone we had never seen given the person in question 
possesses the attribute in a very high degree (see Swinburne 1991: 268). 
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For Forgie, however, the main obstacle posed by the problem of recognising God in a 
religious experience refers to the very possibility of having an experience of a person that is 
so unlike persons we normally encounter. It is not that we could mistake God for something 
else in a religious experience, but whether we in fact would ever be able to state objectively 
that we perceived God at all. I held previously that Swinburne's concept of experience 
implies the distinction between those elements in it provided by our own beliefs and those 
that are external to our mind. That distinction is equivalent to Forgie's opposition noted 
above between identifying an object 0 through its phenomenological content and recognising 
0 by means of our auxiliary beliefs about 0. When a subject S claims he had a theistic 
experience, he cannot allege this was of God in view of its phenomenological content only, 
since, Forgie argues, there is no phenomenological content of such an experience that could 
be uniquely identified with God (see Forgie 1984: 16). 
According to Forgie, to see the reason why no theistic experience could be identified 
by its phenomenological content, we should consider that 'God' is not a proper name. 
Instead, we should take 'God' as the abbreviation of the description of any being that matches 
the features of being 'the omnipotent, omniscient, all-good, everlasting and worthy-of- 
worship creator of the universe', an idea with which Swinbume agrees (see Swinburne 
1993: 241 and 291). So, to perceive an omnipotent agent amounts to having experienced the 
causative action of an unlimitedly powerful being. Yet, even if we agree with the idea that 
we can perceive the action of causation (with which Forgie disagrees see Forgie 1984: 20), 
there is no way of experiencing that a being has unlimited powers. 
By the same token, Forgie claims, the property of omniscience, defined as having true 
beliefs about everything (under the limits of logic), cannot be phenomenologically gasped 
either. There is no experience that can guarantee by itself that its Object is of somebody 
bearing the property of being omniscient. Nothing that you can possibly perceive in an agent 
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A can objectively manifest how many beliefs A has and whether they are true. In other 
words, nothing can be identified as omniscient from the mere phenomenological content of 
perception. Similar analyses can be made for the attributes of eternity, oninibenevolence and 
being worthy of worship. 
If the perception of God cannot be identified by its phenomenological content only, 
then it must be conjoined with the auxiliary beliefs we have about God in order to be 
justified. According to Forgle, however, if a purported experience of God cannot be justified 
by the phenomenological content of perception, there is reason to hold that this kind of 
experience does not receive objective justification from the side of auxiliary beliefs either. 
This is so because religious experiences are fundamentally ambiguous, that is, no 
identification of their contents is any more plausible than another (see Forgie 1986: 153). In 
other words, when a theist claims he has had an experience of God, the beliefs on which he 
bases his recognition are influenced by his particular upbringing and religious forination and 
do not purely express a connection between his mental activity and God. If a religious 
experience can be identified in more than one way and if this identification owes more to the 
particular cultural tradition of the experiencer than to the perception itself then the 
recognition of a mystical perception as being an experience of God is unjustified in universal 
and objective tenus (see Forgie 1986: 154). 
Moreover, the amorphousness of religious perceptions, which is revealed by the fact 
that no auxiliary belief has a privileged status in identifying the object of that kind of 
experience, appears to lead to an intellectual deadlock. According to Forgle, the acceptance 
of the principle of credulity implies that all beliefs that in principle suit the experience enjoy 
the same presumption of truth (see Forgie 1986: 155). As a result, he says, we have a 
stalemate: 
The stalemate emerges as follows. When we accept the POC [Principle of Credulity] we 
must suppose: (T) that there is prima facie evidence that a God-experient's releý'ant 
auxiliary beliefs are true; and that (J) that they justify his identification of the object of his 
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experience. But it would be arbitrary to accept T without also assigning prima facie truth 
to any belief by any person - including the belief that J is false. So accepting the POC 
requires us to suppose that there is prima facie evidence that J is true and prima facie 
evidence that J is false (Forgie 1986: 156). 
In other words, the credulity principle pennits us to give prima facie probability to any belief 
that is well-suited to a purported religious experience, not only theistic ones. If some of those 
beliefs are incompatible with theism, then a contradictory situation is created, one which 
cannot be solved by the principle of credulity alone. The principle used by Swinbume to 
show that theism is the best explanation for religious experiences falls short of doing the job, 
because it is compatible with too much and a specific identification of the object of those 
experiences is not sustainable without a great deal of conceptual background which he cannot 
presuppose in the non-theist. 
So, the core of Forgie's argument that we cannot apply the principle of credulity to 
support theistic perceptions is that there cannot be any phenomenological content 
guaranteeing that a perception is of God. In other words, he claims that this kind of report 
depends too much on auxiliary beliefs, which vary enon-nously among the different religions 
and world-views and do not pennit any specific identification. So, even if we allow for the 
idea that religious experiences as a whole are a phenomenological evidence for the belief in a 
unspecified Ultimate Reality, the identification of this phenomenological content with the 
God of traditional theism is heavily dependent on very particular background beliefs (see 
Byme 1995: 133). In other words, to admit that Swinbume's arguments succeed in showing 
that religious pluralism is not a real threat to the evidential value of religious experience in 
general does not mean this is the case as regards the perception of God. As a result, religious 
pluralism may be a problem for the specific case of theistic experiences even If it is not a 
problem for the more indeterminate idea of perception of the Sacred Ultimate. 
In sum, the difficulties conjointly put by the strong disanalogies between religious 
experience and sense perception, the need to take more seriously naturalistic explanations 
for 
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religious experiences and the difficulties posed by religious pluralism end up forming a 
considerable case against Swinburne's argument from mystical perceptions for theism. In the 
next chapter, I will analyse an alternative means of employing the phenomenon of religious 
into a Bayesi experience for justifying theism so that it could be integrated I ian approach to this 
problem in a different way from Swinburne. 
Chapter 6- Mystical Perception and Doxastic Practice 
In the previous chapter I concluded that Swinburne's approach to religious experience faces 
considerable difficulties in providing a universal and objective argument for theism from 
religious experience. The objections raised by naturalistic explanations, religious pluralism 
and its weak analogy with sense perception indicated that the most Swinburne could achieve 
was a defensive argument in favour of the possibility of grounding theistic belief in religious 
experience. 
In the present chapter I will explore an alternative epistemology of religious 
experience. In what follows I will interpret William Alston, particularly in his book 
Perceiving God (1991), as approaching the matter in a very different way from Swinburne. 
However, as Alston himself recognises, there is some kinship between the two enterprises. 
Both of them consider religious experiences as putative perceptions which play an important 
part in the justification of the belief in God. In order to justify why religious experiences 
should be taken as perceptions, both authors develop a theory of perception according to 
which what seems to a subject to have been perceived should be taken at face value until it is 
proved false. Central to these theories of perception are, respectively, Swinburne's principle 
of credulity and Alston's concept of social doxastic practice. Yet, as Alston carefully 
observes, 
Swinburne's principle applies to experience-belief pairs individually, in isolation, while in 
my approach a principle of justification that applies to individual beliefs is grounded in a 
defence of the rationality of socially established doxastic practices. This provides support 
for my position that is unavailable to Swinburne (Alston 1991: 195). 
In other words, while Swinburne's principle of credulity aims to justify individual beliefs 
formed through religious perception, Alston's approach allows for a wider treatment of the 
matter, since it deals with the whole process of belief formation. In addition, as we will see 
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next, while Swinbume fon-nulates an argument from religious experience, this is not Alston's 
intention Instead, Alston alms to take the alleged perceptions of God as a direct non- 
inferential awareness that provides grounds for prima facie justification for those who 
participate in a particular religious doxastic practice (see Alston 1991: 298). 
In what follows I will be guided by a particular interpretation of Alston's proposal. A 
fundamental feature of my reading is that it takes the doxastic practice approach as having no 
claim to provide a universal argument cogent for both theists and secular believers, but as 
arguing that the theist is entitled to forin beliefs about God according to a practice that is 
conditioned by a particular religious background. In this minimalist interpretation, if I do not 
take part in a doxastic practice then I do not have its conceptual background that allows its 
participants to perceive the particular kind of objects to which the practice refers. In other 
words, although participants in a socially established doxastic practice are practically justified 
in forming beliefs by means of it, non-participants are entitled to doubt its outcomes. 
Although it does not square very well with the initial intentions of Perceiving God (see 
Alston 199 1: 10) this weak interpretation seems more consistent with the results Alston 
achieves and is sufficient for my purposes This point will become clearer after the 
exposition of Alston's approach. 
' Notwithstanding Alston's interpretation of Swinburne's enterprise (see Alston 1991: 3, note 2). As I held in 
Chapter 4, Swinburne in fact uses the principle of credulity to provide prima facie justIficat, on for beliefs 
generated throu-Ii purported perceptions of God. However, in doing so, what 
he aims to do is to use religious 
experience in an inductive argument in favour of theism. 
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What I will attempt to show in this chapter is that this more comprehensive approach 
by Alston sets his theory free from many of the problems that plague Swinburne's proposal. 
However, what Alston can achieve with that falls far short of the lofty situation SwInbume 
envisages for religious experience in his epistemology of religion. Alston cannot provide a 
universal and forceful argument that tips the balance in favour of theism and should be 
rationally accepted by theists and atheists alike. In order to ground this conclusion, I will 
start by presenting an overview of Alston's theory of mysti I "cal perception as a reliable 
doxastic practice. Subsequently I will test his approach against the main difficulties faced by 
Swinburne's proposal. In the last section of this chapter, I will analyse the extent to which 
Alston is able to provide objective justification for theistic belief on the basis of religious 
perception and how he treats this problem. 
The length and detail of the following analysis is justified by the two principal alms of 
this thesis, namely the discussion of Swinburne's religious epistemology and the suggestion 
of an alternative way of using Bayes's theorem and religious experience in the justification of 
theism. Alston's epistemology of religious experience provides a good point of comparison 
that helps us to understand better this important element of Swinbume's proposal. Further, 
the method employed by Alston to justify religious perception will prove particularly helpful 
in determining how to handle the problem of the attribution of a prior probability to theism. 
In my exposition of Alston I will need to untangle two important notions of 
justification: justification as entitlement, and justification as tiruth-indicative. This 
clarification can only come after the exposition of Alston's approach, and will be performed 
in section 3.2. Prior to that point I will use phrases like 'justified belief without explicitly 
determining which of the two notions they refer to. 
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1. Alston and Mystical Perception as a Reliable Doxastic Practice 
The main goal of Alston's project is to show that purported perceptions of God can be 
a good basis for some theistic beliefs, such as that God exists. In order to accomplish this 
plan, he needs to put forward both a theory of perception and a concept of epistemic 
justification, and to show that one may apply them to religious experience to make of it a 
source of justified beliefs. In fact, another preliminary consideration is in order: instead of 
(religious experience', Alston prefers the expression 'mystical perception'. The reason is that 
the notion of 'religious experience' is too broad, and Alston proposes to focus his analysis on 
a narrow range of phenomena within those occurrences in people's mental life that have 
religiou relevance. As a subset of religious experience defined in this sense, Alston 
considers only those happenings in which God 'appears' or 'presents Himself to us as so- 
and-so (see Alston 1991: 34). Those situations in which occurs a presentation of God to 
someone, Alston calls 'mystical perception'. 
1.1 The nature of mystical perceptions 
When we talk about perception, the model that comes to mind is clearly sense 
perception, and Alston does not deny this (see Alston 1991: 102). The next step in his 
argumentation is then to show that there is such a thing as a mystical perception. In order to 
meet this challenge, Alston presents some important examples of alleged perceptions of God 
and discusses whether they correspond to what we call perception. Saint Theresa D'Avila, 
Angela of Foligno and many other Christian and non-Christian mystics have produced reports 
of mystical experiences in which they were made aware of the presence of God in a way that 
did not depend on any of their own efforts. They talked about their experiences as things that 
were completely different from the mere thinking of, reasoning about or remembering 
God. 
The experiences came to them independently of their will and 
left on them a strong 
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impression of God's presence. In sum, the reports seem at first to converge on the 
characteristic of a presentation of God and, consequently to qualify as perceptions (see Alston 
1991: 16). 
Given that the perceivers identify these cases of direct involuntary perceptual 
awareness with recourse to the traditional attributes of God in the leading theistic religions 
(see Alston 1991: 29), can then we accept prima facie their claim of having perceived God? 
In order to answer this question, Alston considers some obstacles to the idea that God could 
be the object of direct non-sensorial perception. A first objection could arise from 
considering the differences between purported mystical perceptions and our common 
paradigm in this area,, sense perception. As a matter of fact, Alston acknowledges many 
striking differences between the two. In contrast with sense perception, mystical perception 
is: 1) not always accompanied by sensory content, 2) a rare phenomenon accessible only to a 
few people, 3) very dim, meagre and ambiguous in the information it conveys, 4) related to a 
being experience of whom is not universal (see Alston 1991: 36). Being so different from the 
model furnished by sense perception, can we still take the mystical experiences considered by 
Alston as perceptions? 
Alston's general answer to this issue is based on his 'theory of appearing'. The 
fundamental requirement for a phenomenon to be classified as perceptual is the presentational 
character of the object to the perceiver and the direct awareness of that by the subject of 
perception. Both these characteristics are present in the reports of mystical experience 
considered by Alston. In other words, both sense and mystical perception share a generic 
identity of structure that qualifies them as perceptions according to the theory of appearing 
(see Alston 1991: 36). If it is the theory of appearing that sets out the requirements for an 
occurrence to be considered a perception, then the fact that mystical perceptions do not have 
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sensory content is indeed irrelevant 2, as long as it is a presentation of God to the direct 
awareness of the perceiver. Moreover, claims Alston, there is no reason to suppose that the 
possibilities of experiential appearance are exhausted by the powers of our sense organs (see 
Alston 1991: 17). 
On the basis of the theory of appearing, Alston establishes some crucial tests for 
accepting the possibility of there being mystical perceptions. Yet in order to carry out these 
tests, we need to assume the possibility of God's existence. Indeed, despite being a matter of 
philosophical debate, few philosophers assert that it is impossible that God exists. So granted 
that there could be a God, the first question about the possibility of God being perceived 
according to the theory of appearing is this: is it possible that He should be the object of a 
mystical experience? First of all, claims Alston, it is important to deny any a priori 
constraints on what can appear to our experience. We know what can appear through 
experience itself, and there are no empirical data against the possibility of God's 
manifestation (see Alston 1991: 59). In fact, the opposite is the case, even considering that it 
is a rare phenomenon enjoyed by few. Even the infinitude embodied in the concept of God is 
not an obstacle to finite beings like us perceiving Him, for we do not need to perceive the 
whole of x in order to perceive x (see Alston 1991: 60). 
In addition, Alston dismisses the theological objection that we cannot perceive God in 
His divine simplicity, in which God's essence is equal to His existence. We can only 
perceive God according to the attributes with which we normally identify Him in the major 
monotheistic religions. 'That means, no doubt', Alston says, 'that we grasp Him in an 
imperfect manner suited to our limitations, rather than that He is "seen as He is". But that 
should be the reverse of surprising' (Alston 1991: 63). In fact, there are theological reasons 
2 Alston defends the idea that some mystical perceptions have sensory content, but he does not base his 
epistemological analysis on them. For more on this see Pappas (1994) and Alston's reply in 
1994a. 
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in the monotheistic religions, which support the idea that mystical perceptions of God are 
possible, like the idea of loving communion between men and God asserted by Christianity, 
although always in an imperfect way due to our limitations. 
In sum, reports of mystical perception show a mode of consciousness distinctively 
perceptual, satisfying the condition for a perception on the side of the subject. On the other 
hand, mystical perception complies with the fundamental requirements for a perception on 
the side of the object according to the theory of appearing by being a presentation 
independent of the perceiver's will. Given these two basic conditions for a subject S to be 
said to perceive an object x, then we can take mystical perception as a type of perception, 
holds Alston (1991: 66). 
1.2 The justification of perceptual beliefs and the doxastic practice approach 
In order to understand how we can be justified in believing the contents of mystical 
perceptions, especially the belief that there is a God, Alston discusses some features of what 
we call justification. Firstly, we should distinguish between the activit of justifying and the 
state of being justified. In general, the former implies the employment of appropriate 
inferential or grounding relations that constitute conditions for asserting that we have reasons 
to believe a certain idea. The activity of justifying leads us then to a mediate fonn of being 
justified. However, the state of being justified can also be immediate. This occurs when our 
belief is not formed based on reasons but on more direct modes of awareness such as 
experience and propositional self-evidence. So we can be immediately justified in believing 
p because we perceived the object x to which p refers (see Alston 1991: 73). 
JustIfication is an evaluative status that is subject to different degrees. One can be 
more or less justified as well as prima facie or unqualifiedly justified. 
Prima facie 
justification is justification until no considerations to the contrary are produced. 
It means we 
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can hold the corresponding belief as 'innocent until proven guilty'. An unquallfiedlyjust, fled 
belief is one that deserves to be accepted as true independently of further inquiry. Insofar as 
justification is an evaluative matter, we say that to be justified is good in the sense that it is 
positive rather than that it is a duty, obligation or responsibility 3. On this non-deonto logical 
conception of justification, to be justified in believing p, says Alston, 'is to be in a strong 
position for realizing the epistemic aim of getting the truth' (Alston 1991: 73). In other 
words, being justified in accepting p means having an adequate ground or basis for believing 
4 
that p is true 
In general, the experiential justification of perceptual beliefs is only prima facie. In 
other words, beliefs generated by both sense and mystical perception can only be held until 
we do not have a stronger reason for rejecting their initial probability. A perception ofp does 
not guarantee to S that p is true, but confers on S the prima facie immediate justification for 
believing p to be probably true until further evidence shows otherwise. Alston distinguishes 
two types of 'overriders', that is, reasons for reducing or eliminating the prima facie 
probability of a perceptual belief p; reasons to think p to be false - which he calls 'rebutters' 
- and reasons to think that the ground of the belief does not have force in the particular 
instance - the 'unden-niners' (see Alston 1991: 79). 
It is important to stress that, for Alston, we can be immediately justified in holding a 
perceptual belief, that is, we can take a belief to be true based only on pure experiential 
awareness of the object. For him, it is crucial that we do not confuse the levels of being 
perceptually justified in 'believing x' and the inferential and highly conceptualised steps 
3 One of the main reasons for holding that being justified is a matter of axiology instead of obligation is that 
since believing is involuntary, we cannot be blamed or held responsible for accepting an unjustified belief (see 
Alston 1991: 73), an idea with which Swinburne also agrees (see Swinburne 1981b: 25f). 
4 According to Alston, the requirement that the ground be such as to make it objectively likely that the belief be 
true does not need to be attainable on reflection to the subject of the belief In other words, the Justification of p 
to a subject S does not need to be directly accessible to S, but can depend on conditions that are external to the 
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needed for 'believing that I am justified in believing x'. In the latter we clearly need to 
employ complex predicates to interpret and reconstruct our perceptual experience, as well as 
to consider the context in which the perception has occurred in order to be entitled to the high 
level belief that we are justified in believing x. On the other hand, we cannot deny that in the 
identification of the object of perception and in the attribution of a property to it we need 
background information. Even so, these background assumptions need not figure as 
propositional contents of the perceptual belief, since they can be taken as internalised skills of 
experiential recognition. Indeed, the fact that we rarely form beliefs about our own 
experience, but that we concentrate on what we are perceiving instead, is reason to believe 
that there is some room for purely experiential justification of perceptual beliefs (see Alston 
1991: 91). 
Nevertheless, Alston concedes that the immediate perceptual awareness of x and the 
internalised background assumptions that are needed in order to permit the identification of x 
form an interdependent system, which must be considered as a whole in the task of justifying 
perceptual beliefs (see Alston 199 1: 100). Recall that for him, to be justified in believing p 
means having an objectively adequate ground that is strongly indicative of the truth of p (see 
Alston 1991: 99). Since this ground is a complex mixture of background non-sensory beliefs 
and immediate perceptual apprehensions, which the perceiver can handle correctly or not, we 
can take the fonnation of perceptual beliefs as a practice, an activity that can be evaluated 
according to standards for correct belief forination. In view of this, Alston introduces his 
concept of 'doxastic practices', which are ways of fonning beliefs on the basis of grounds - 
background assumptions and perceptions, for example (see Alston 199 1: 100). In other 
words, a doxastic practice is a way of forming beliefs as outputs of certain inputs such as 
subject. In proposing this, Alston declares his preference for an externalist concept of justification (see Alston 
1991: 75). 
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sense perception, mystical perception, testimony, memory or the reading of crystal balls. The 
problem of whether a certain perceptual belief is justified - for example, the belief that there 
is a God, that stems from many mystical perception reports - becomes then the problem of 
whether the corresponding doxastic practice is capable of generating true beliefs. In Alston's 
words: 
We can then ask whether one or another such practice serves as a source of justification, in 
other words, whether the fact that a perceptual belief stems from such a practice renders it 
prima facie justified. And since I am working with a "truth-conducive" notion of 
justification, this will involve asking whether the practice is reliable, whether it can be 
relied on to produce mostly true beliefs (Alston 1991: 100-1). 
The task of showing whether we can be justified in believing, based on perception, that there 
is a God then becomes the challenge of showing that fonning beliefs from mystical 
perceptions is truth-conducive, that is, that its corresponding doxastic practice is reliable. 
According to Alston, in order to assess the degree to which a doxastic practice is 
reliable we need to determine the truth-value of its outputs, or at least of most of them, since 
the more true outputs the practice generates the more reliable it will be. However, if we take 
the case of sense perception, which is the main model of perceptual doxastic practices, we are 
faced with the problem of epistemic circularity. In other words, as Alston says, 'we must 
either use sense perception as the source of our premises, thereby already assuming that it is 
reliable, or else get our premises from some other source(s) that we would have reason to 
trust only if we already had reason to trust sense perception' (Alston 1991: 107). 
The problem of epistemic circularity in the justification of sense perception leads 
Alston to adopt a kind of negative coherentism. Since in order to justify the sensory 
perception doxastic practice (SP) we need to rely on sense perception again, and since we 
cannot help fori-ning beliefs the way we do, the best alternative is to assess SP's reliability 
according to the amount of inconsistency it generates. In this way we judge SP primarily 
ea set by its own p on-n of coherentism according to cnt n nnc, ples. This fi I is called 'negative' 
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because it merely requires for a doxastic practice to be reliable that it does not imply too 
many contradictory beliefs from an internal point of view (considering only the practice 
itself) as well as externally, in relation to other more established practices (see Alston 1991: 
170). As this negative condition can always be broken in the future even if the practice has 
so far complied with it, this negative coherentism amounts to saying that doxastic practices 
that have been in use by a group of people are 'innocent until proven guilty'. In other words, 
we may consider them reliable in a prima facie manner, until massive internal or external 
contradictions force us to think otherwise. 
It is crucial to distinguish the prima facie reliability of the sense perception doxastic 
practice as a whole and the prima facie probability of a singular sensory belief A single 
perceptual belief owes its initial probability to the fact that it is the output of a reliable 
doxastic practice, from which we can expect to have mostly true beliefs. As regards singular 
beliefs, what we have in this approach is a sort of foundationalism, that is, beliefs are justified 
as long as they result from prima facie reliable doxastic practices (see Eberle 1998: 302). 
However, the fact that there is no neutral or common ground from which we can Judge 
the reliability of a doxastic practice does not mean that anything goes. Alston suggests some 
criteria to discern whether the degree of reliability of a doxastic practice is sufficient or not. 
These criteria emerge from the consideration of the elements that constitute the nature of 
doxastic practices in general. One thing that wards off the threat of absolute relativism in 
Alston's epistemology is that there is no ontological relativism implied in it. In other words, 
all doxastic practices form beliefs about the one single reality, and the inconsistencies 
between their outputs is a primary factor in inter-practice evaluation (see Alston 1991: 155). 
Yet, how can we choose between the practices when there is a conflict in the beliefs 
they form about the world? In order to answer this question, we need to consider some 
characteristics of doxastic practices so that a criterion for inter-practice comparison can 
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emerge therefrom. Apart from forming beliefs in both a basic and inferential way, doxastic 
practices also involve ways of evaluating, testing and correcting beliefs fonned in them. 
Alston calls this set of procedures an 'overrider system'. According to Alston 
A belief is unqualifiedly justified (by the standards of the practice in question) provided it 
is prima facie justified (formed on the right kind of basis in accordance with the built-in 
principles of the practice), and there are no sufficient overriders (rebutters or undernuiners). 
It is not necessary for unqualified justification that the subject has determined that there are 
no sufficient overriders, only that there are none (Alston 1991: 159). 
Overrider systems only work when they employ elements of various doxastic practices, as 
when SP turns to memory and deductive inference in order to check the truth of a given 
perceptual belief This is an example of another characteristic of doxastic practices,, namely 
their mutual dependence in many instances of operation and testing of beliefs (see Alston 
1991: 160). 
However, the acknowledgement of this deep inter-connection does not prevent Alston 
from defending a characteristic of doxastic practices that is central to his programme, that is, 
that they are irreducible to each other. As he asserts, 
Each practice, as we have seen, carries its own distinctive modes of justification, its own 
distinctive principles that lay down sufficient conditions for justification, not only prima 
facie justification but also, through its overrider system, unqualified justification as well 
(Alston 1991: 162). 
In other words, each doxastic practice has a considerable degree of autonomy, an autonomy 
that includes the power of judging a certain belief as justified without the interference of 
other doxastic practices. Alston does not give further justification for this claim aside from 
the fact that he does not see much hope that this kind of reductionist programme will work in 
relation to SP,, and believes this could also be shown to be true of other doxastic practices 
(see Alston 1991: 162-3). 
In addition, there are some other characteristics of doxastic practices that are also 
Firstly, we should cons, important to the problem of justification of perceptual bell I* 
der 
their pre-reflective character, that is, the fact that we engage in them and 
forrn beliefs 
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therewith before we are able to criticise or even to be aware of them (see Alston 1991: 163). 
Secondly, this pre-reflective character comes in great part from the fact that doxastic 
practices are socially established by socially monitored learning, and that they are socially 
shared, albeit to varying degrees of universality (some groups are much larger than others 
are). In other words, we learn to form beliefs in a certain way from a very early age, even 
before we are able to reflect upon them, and this usually happens through the reinforcement 
and support of the social group to which we belong. Thirdly, the practice will presuppose 
some particular background beliefs, which will serve to infonn the beliefs formed through 
them. Nonetheless, despite the foundational character of its background beliefs, they are not 
immutable, which means that doxastic practices themselves can change (see Alston 199 1: 
164). 
These characteristics of doxastic practices reduce to a great extent the kind of 
justification we can aim for. In particular, the irreducible character of doxastic practices and 
the impossibility of justifying them without incurring epistemic circularity mean that the most 
we can expect here is a sort of practical rationality. By practical rationality Alston means the 
rationality of actin in forming beliefs the way we usually do, in contrast with epistemic 
rationality, which presupposes an approach to rationality that searches for its objective 
grounds, but which is not feasible in the present context. As a result, Alston proposes that we 
should consider as prima facie practically rational all doxastic practices that are '[ ... ] firmly 
rooted in [their] devotees from early in life, interconnected with other practices in a form of 
life, and socially established [ ... 
]', no matter how widely distributed they are (see Alston 
1991: 169). 
Although it seems to be fair to grant practical rationality to the kind of doxastic 
practices Alston suggests, we may wonder whether this approach does not end up 'opening 
the gates too wide', permitting any means of forming beliefs to be rational In this practical 
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sense. Alston replies to this objection by stating that the initial ungrounded plausibility 
should be granted only to socially established practices (see Alston 1991: 170). In addition, 
there are criteria for taking back the prima facie rationality granted to a doxastic practice. As 
we saw the main ones are internal or intra-practice consistency and external or inter-practice 
consistency. Internal consistency is just a question of not forming too many contradictory 
beliefs, though some degree of them is in fact inevitable. The criterion of external 
consistency, however, presupposes considering some doxastic practices as more firrnly 
established than others. The prima facie justification of the less secure diminishes if they 
contradict the better established ones. In order to consider how relatively firm a doxastic 
practice is, we need to consider how universal is Its employment, how important it is in our 
lives, how innate they are, how difficult it is to get rid of it or how obvious its principles seem 
to be (see Alston 1991: 171). Still, even taking into account these criteria, we ought to allow 
some room for intra and inter-practice contradiction that does not necessarily undermine the 
reliability of the doxastic practices involved (see Alston 1991: 172). 
In addition to the criteria for assessing doxastic practices mentioned above, another 
way to evaluate the reliability of a doxastic practice is by referring to its self-support. In 
other words, the more a certain way of forming beliefs produces results that are valuable to 
our lives the more support it provides for itself Self-support is then typically a practical 
matter, since it is intimately related to things that we do and that happen to us. However, 
even though a question of practical rationality, self-support can also be seen as a sign that the 
doxastic practice is reliable, as the source of an inference to the best explanation for the good 
fruits they provides us with (see Alston 1991: 174). 
Alston admits that it is one thing to show that we are practically rational in engaging 
in a doxastic practice but quite another to claim that the doxastic practice in question is 
reliable. 'Nevertheless', he holds, 'I believe that in showing it to be rational to engage in SP I 
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have thereby not shown SP to be reliable, but shown it to be rational to suppose SP to be 
reliable' (Alston 1991: 179). In other words, the commitment involved in adhering to a 
doxastic practice means that it would be incoherent to form beliefs using the formational and 
evaluative mechanisms the practice provides and yet not to believe it to be reliable, at least 
prima facie. Clearly, this practical argument does not amount to showing in an epistemic 
sense that socially established, firmly rooted, interconnected doxastic practices are reliable. 
The most it can aspire to is to assert that it is reasonable to take them to be reliable. 
Granted that we are practically justified in assuming a doxastic practice like sense 
perception to be reliable, since there is no non-circular epistemic way of doing so, what about 
the beliefs generated by SP? According to Alston, 
The lower epistemic status we have settled for attaches to the higher-level claim that SP is 
reliable, not to the particular perceptual beliefs that issue from that practice. As for the 
latter, what we are claiming is still the full-blooded (prima facie) justification of Chapter 2 
that involves likelihood of truth (Alston 1991: 18 1). 
In other words, it would be a level confusion to think that the particular sensory beliefs 
fori-ned from SP are also only practically justified. Instead, given that we are reasonable in 
believing SP to be reliable, we can take sense perception beliefs as likely unless there is 
reason to believe otherwise. Since we cannot help believing our senses as a whole, and since 
we are in principle reasonable in doing so, we are entitled to take the beliefs formed 
therefrom as prima facie justifiably true. 
So, granted Alston's premises, the doxastic practice approach of justification permits 
us to consider some beliefs as justifiably true given they are formed under a doxastic practice 
that is prima facie practically reliable. 
1.3 The justification of mystical perception beliefs 
The next step in the long chain of reasoning elaborated by Alston to show how 
igious beliefs is to explain how religious eXPenence can provide grounds for rell (if at all) the 
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doxastic practice approach can be applied to the justification of mystical perceptions. For 
Alston, mystical perceptions form a particular doxastic practice insofar they display a series 
of similarities concerning their content (such as perceivable features and activities of God) 
and the way this content manifests to the perceivers (see Alston 1991: 185-6). However, it 
must be admitted that different religions present many alternative pictures of the content of 
mystical perception, and that from their sometimes mutually incompatible background beliefs 
they generate different overrider systems. The potential pluralism resulting from the 
existence of various alternative background beliefs and overrider systems in mystical 
doxastic practices as a whole leads Alston to narrow his analysis down to what he calls 
Christian mystical doxastic practice (CMP) (see Alston 1991: 192-3). 
According to Alston, given the general analysis of doxastic practices made above, 
CMP displays features that are typical of them (see Alston 1991: 187)5. It is acquired and 
engaged in well before one is explicitly aware of the practice as such. CMP has an overrider 
system based on a distinctive set of presuppositions. Its participants are involved in other 
practices as well, with which CMP interacts. CMP is socially transmitted and shared, and is 
subject to change, as its background beliefs evolve in history (see Alston 1991: 187-8). 
Given these structural elements that constitute a doxastic practice, CMP should then be 
entitled to the same prima facie reliability to its participants as any way of forming beliefs 
with such characteristics. 
Nevertheless, although CMP has the same basic features as other prima facie reliable 
doxastic practices, Alston acknowledges some reasons for denying this status to the Christian 
Mystical Practice. He rejects these objections on the grounds that they commit either the 
fallacy of double standards or the unjustified move of epistemic imperialism. By the fallacy 
5 Strictly, in the mentioned passage Alston is talking about mystical doxastIc practices In general. The 
application of the same reasoning and same conclusion to CMP, however, is clearly unproblematic. 
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of double standards,, Alston means the denial to CMP of something that is granted to other 
doxastic practices with no especial reason for this discrimination. Epistemic imperialism 
means re . ecting the reliability of a doxastic practice because of the requirements proper to a j 
different one. Given the autonomy of doxastic practices and the irreducible character of their 
distinctive modes of justification, it simply does not make sense to rule out one doxastic 
practice as unreliable because it does not follow the pattern of another. 
I will analyse the criticisms to this approach and Alston's replies later on in this 
chapter. For the moment, what is important to notice is that once we accept the practical 
rationality argument for taking doxastic practices as prima facie reliable, and once we 
recognise the Christian mystical perceptual doxastic practice as a full member of that class, 
we have no reason to deny that CMP is prima facie justified. As a result, given the belief that 
there is a God is one of the main outputs from CMP, the participants of this mystical doxastic 
practice are at least initially justified in taking it to be true. 
2. Alston's Approach and Swinburne's Difficulties 
As we saw in the previous section, Alston's way of using religious experience to 
ground theism depends upon taking the belief that there is a God to be a product of a doxastic 
practice that is both perceptual and based on a religious conceptual scheme. According to 
Alston's theory, the theist is justified in his belief that God exists because he takes part in a 
socially established way of forming beliefs that is irreducible and autonomous as regards any 
other doxastic practice, although it interacts with many of them. The justification for his 
belief stems from the fact that the mystical doxastic practice to which he belongs permits him 
to take most reports of perception of God as true until good reasons to the contrary are 
provided. 
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As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, the main difference between Alston's 
and Swinburne's approaches to religious experience is that in the latter, the principle of 
credulity is intended to justify prima facie each belief individually. Further, for Swinbume, 
the justification of religious experience reports makes for a powerful and universal argument 
for theism, while in Alston mystical perceptions ground theism non-inferentially, through 
immediate awareness, and are a basis for a prima facie belief in the corresponding doxastic 
practice. As I held in Chapter 5, however, Swinburne's proposal for religious experiences 
faces many serious difficulties. In this section, we will see how Alston's alternative fares in 
view of these problems faced by Swinburne's position. Recall that my reading of Alston's 
approach is that he does not intend to provide an argument for the best explanation for 
theism, as Swinbume does. Instead, Alston's account is interpreted here as making an 'equal 
entitlement claim', i. e. that the participants in CMP are practically justified in believing that 
CMP is reliable, and thus particularly entitled to accept its outputs as true. 
2.1 Naturalistic explanations and the Christian mystical doxastic practice 
As I described in Chapter 5, Swinburne provides two answers to the problem of 
naturalistic explanations for religious experiences. First, he suggests that since, according to 
theism, God is the ultimate cause of everything, the only way to show that He is not the cause 
of religious experience is by proving that God does not exist. As we saw, however, the idea 
that 'if there is a God, any experience that seems to be of God will be of God' (Swinburne 
1991: 270) is untenable. Second, Swinbume asserts that naturalistic explanations lack the 
explanatory power of theism in accounting for religious perceptions. Theism explains the 
occurrence of religious experiences better than naturalistic explanations do. However, we 
saw that this could only amount to an objective argument for religious experience if there 
were only one way of interpreting the content of religious experiences. Yet, it seems to be 
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the predominant position in the epistemology of perception that in order to identify the object 
of a perception we need background concepts (see, for example, Forgle 1986: 146). Further, 
in view of a unique object of perception like God, the amount of auxiliary beliefs is so large 
and so specific that, given religious pluralism, any argument for theism from religious 
perception faces enonnous obstacles. So, even if the secular believer need not necessarily 
embrace a naturalistic explanation, he is certainly justified in suspending judgement as 
regards the explanatory power of theism to account for religious experience. As a result, 
even if the existence of naturalistic explanations does not totally undennine the evidential 
value of religious experience, it blocks its function as a universal, compelling argument, 
which was Swinburne's original intention. In other words, if we do not accept the 
corresponding auxiliary theistic beliefs, we do not have to accept that religious experiences 
are better explained by theism than by naturalistic accounts. 
The difficulty posed by naturalistic explanations to Swinburne's approach to religious 
experience simply does not affect Alston's position at all. What the latter aims to show is 
that the participants of CMP are justified in fort-ning beliefs using mystical perceptions as 
inputs and given the overrider system and conceptual background beliefs furnished by 
mainstream Christianity. Naturalistic explanations do not undermine this claim but only offer 
an alternative to it 6. In sum, according to my interpretation, Alston's position regarding 
religious experience does not face the difficulties posed to Swinburne's theory by the 
naturalistic explanations. For the doxastic practice approach, it is sufficient that the 
participant in CMP be rationally entitled in a pragmatic sense in fort-ning beliefs about God 
from this kind of perception. As I read him, Alston is not t ing to show that all must rely on ryi 
the outputs of CMP. 
6 Nevertheless, Alston also suggests some arguments against the efficacy of naturalistic explanations of mystical 
perceptions (see Alston 1991: 230ff). 
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2.2 CMP and the analogies with sense perception 
We saw in Chapter 5 that one of Swinburne's most fundamental arguments for the 
evidential value of religious experience was that if we were sceptical of religious perceptions, 
we should also be sceptical of sense perception, which is clearly an irrational position. In 
other words, there is a strong analogy between religious experience and sense perception so 
that the application of the credulity principle to the latter should also be granted to the former 
(see Swinbume 1991: 254n). 
A number of criticisms of Swinbume's claimed analogy were set out in Chapter 5.1. 
They related to: 
a) the impossibility of repeating the causal conditions for the occurrence of theistic 
perceptions; 
b) the lack of the characteristic checking procedures found in ordinary perceptions; 
c) the lack of criteria for falsifying a perceptual belief by means of better positioning 
or better training. 
As we can infer from the exposition presented in this chapter, these criticisms do not 
apply to Alston's approach to religious experience with the same force. In postulating that 
CMP is a particular perceptual doxastic practice, he willingly embraces the idea that an 
alleged perception of God can only happen under the framework provided by a particular 
doctrinal background. This particular conceptual background provided by a specific tradition 
is also responsible for the overrider system of CMP, whose job is to criticise and test the 
mystical perception claims in the light of their consistency with the Christian doctrine. Since 
the checking procedures are predominantly internal, the authenticity of a particular theistic 
perception is a matter of coherence with the doxastic system provided by CMP. 
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Above all, however , in contrast with 
Swinburne's proposal, the analogy between 
sense perception and mystical experience does not play the role of justifying theistic 
perception in Alston's epistemology of religious experience. As Alston argues, 
It is true that I sometimes point out that critics of CMP are employing a double standard, 
criticizing it for features that it shares with SP, which they accept. However, responses to 
criticisms aside, the positive argument for CMP is based on my theory of doxastic 
practices. The basic contention is that it is prima facie rational to engage in CMP, not 
because it is analogous to SP in one or another respect, but because it is a socially 
established doxastic practice; and that it is unqualifiedly rational to engage in it, as we shall 
argue in the next chapter, because we lack sufficient reason for regarding it as unreliable or 
otherwise disqualified for rational participation. It is true that it is rational to engage in SP 
for precisely analogous reasons, but no explicit reference to SP is required to present the 
case for CMP, any more than it is necessary to bring in an analogy with swimming to 
present the case for the legality of jogging. It is true that swimming is legal for precisely 
the same reason that jogging is legal (it violates no laws), but it would be grotesque to 
suppose that the case for the legality of jogging depends essentially on an analogy with 
jogging (sic) [swimming] (Alston 1991: 223-4). 
In other words, the analogy with sense perception is important only as a reply to the 
accusation of circularity in the justification of religious perceptual beliefs. SP and CMP are 
made part of the same genus, namely that of 'doxastic practices', a key concept in Alston's 
solution to the problem provoked by the epistemic circulanty we are trapped in through 
attempting to justify sense perception claims. Indeed, apart from this basic similarity, Alston 
frequently emphasises the discrepancies between these two kinds of perception, particularly 
in their overrider systems, their respective degree of universality and the way each of them 
fits into the general category of doxastic practices. All this emphasis on the differences 
between sense perception and mystical perception would make for a bizarre strategy if 
Alston's argument were basically from analogy (see Alston 1991: 223). In addition, he 
frequently stresses the likeness of CMP to doxastic practices other than SP (such as memory) 
(see Alston 1991: 199 and 216, for example). 
Alston's argument against scepticism towards SP is that it is practically irrational, 
since we presuppose SP's reliability in our actions (see Alston 1991: 150). However, 
if 
withholding judgement is not a serious option for all of us who take part in 
SP, this does not 
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seem to be the case as regards CMP. In other words, those who were brought up in the 
appropriate Christian communities cannot help forming beliefs from CMP, and would be 
practically irrational if they did so. However, the same charge of irrationality cannot be 
pressed against the naturalist. For the naturalist, scepticism towards CMP is not practically 
irrational, since he is not a participant In it. If this reasoning is correct, then , in contrast to 
Swinburne, Alston's position admits that someone might be sceptical regarding religious 
experience without denying the evidential value of sense perception, since it is clearly 
possible that someone belongs to SP without participating in any of the various mystical 
perception doxastic practices available. On the other hand, the participant in a specific 
religious doxastic practice, say CMP, may claim the same type of justification as the one 
available to other legitimate practices, provided that CMP has the crucial characteristics of 
doxastic practices in general. 
2.3 The problem of religious diversity 
Alston deals with the problem of religious diversity very carefully. The reason for 
this special treatment is that, in contrast with other difficulties in his approach, this particular 
problem cannot be dismissed under the headings of 'double standard' or 'epistemic 
imperialism' (see Alston 1991: 255). The problem of religious diversity is considered by 
many critics and Alston himself the main challenge to be faced by his doxastic practice 
approach to religious experience. 
We can pose the religious diversity question by saying that , if different religious 
perceivers claim to have exPenenced different supernatural entities that are in the end 
incompatible with each other, then we had better not to take their reports at face value. 
Religious diversity raises the possibility that all mystical perceptions are delusive. The best 
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way to explain this diversity in religious experience reports may be to take them as mere 
social constructs that vary in history and society. 
As we saw, Swinbume responds to th's problem by dIstInguIshing between the 
objective and universal element to which these perceptions refer from the specific cultural 
and inessential inputs projected into it. Religious diversity would only occur as a result of 
ascribing different meanings to the same unique referent. This is analogous to the various 
interpretations we can give to a single event accessible to sense perception. To handle it, we 
just need to distinguish interpretation and reference in perception, without establishing what 
defines each of them too precisely (without saying that the language of perception should be 
reduced to phenomenal terins, for example). To answer the problem of religious pluralism 
we simply need to rephrase the particular reports of religious perception in more general 
terms (see Swinburne 1991: 266). As we saw, however, religious pluralism represents a 
serious problem for Swinburne's approach when it comes to the identification of God in 
religious experience. The range of particular auxiliary beliefs needed for recognising a 
perception as theistic makes it very difficult to hold an argument from religious experience 
for theism. 
Very much in line with Swinburne's position, Alston himself objects to 
characterisation of the problem of religious diversity which I presented above. According to 
Alston, we need not accept that in view of incompatible reports of religious experience they 
all should be taken as fictitious. There can still be a transcendent reality, but it would be one 
that human cultures have been unable to recognise entirely yet (see Alston 1991: 267). As a 
result, Alston prefers the following formulation of the problem posed by religious diversity: 
Since each form of MP [mystical doxastic practice] is, to a considerable extent, 
incompatible with all the others, not more than one such form can 
be (sufficiently) reliable 
as a way of forming beliefs about the Ultimate. For if one is reliable, then most of the 
beliefs that issue from it are true; and hence, because of the incompatibility, a large 
proportion of the beliefs issuing from each of the others will be false; and so none of those 
others is a reliable practice (Alston 1991: 268-9). 
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So, even if it is possible for one mystical doxastic practice x to be justified, the other ones that 
are incompatible with x will not be reliable at all. However, we have no external grounds to 
justify the reliability of x in view of the others, rather only reasons furnished by each doxastic 
practice in their particular system of beliefs. As a result 
[ ... ] even if some form of MP is reliable, we have no non-question-begging grounds for deterrMning which one that is; and hence it cannot be rational for a person to suppose any 
particular form to be reliable (Alston 1991: 269). 
Posed in this way, the problem of religious pluralism is of a very distinctive sort in the 
doxastic practices approach. On the one hand, it refers to inter-practice questions, since it 
asks for criteria external to each religious doxastic practice. On the other hand, it does not 
consist in showing that there are massive contradictions with a more finnly established 
practice, since none of the rival MP's displays this credential. Alston's critics conclude that, 
given that there are no independent reasons acceptable to all practices to show that one form 
of MP is epistemically supenor to its nvals 7, we have no justification to take any of them as 
reliable. 
In response, Alston suggests a comparison with a case of conflicting beliefs in other 
doxastic practices. When different beliefs are forined from sense perception about the same 
occurrence, we have the means to decide which of the conflicting outputs is correct, given the 
mechanisms of checking provided by SP. It is at least in part because we have the means of 
testing the rival reports that this disagreement weakens the confidence each witness may have 
in their own version. An analogous situation occurs if we consider the relative reliability of 
different doxastic practices about a single matter, which is objectively verifiable, like the 
weather forecast. In this case we have methods for determining which report is the most 
probable and consequently which weather forecasting practice is the most reliable according 
7 In fact, Alston believes that there are such independent reasons for clairri-ing the superiority of the Christian 
Mystical Doxastic Practice, but he prefers to Nvork Nvith a ý, vorst case scenario (see Alston 1991: 270). 
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to the statistical data. According to Alston, it is the existence of these methods which 
undennines the truth-value of particular beliefs or discredits entire doxastic practices (see 
Alston 1991: 270-1). 
However, there are two reasons to believe that no such methods for adjudicating 
among doxastic practices in the case of conflicting religious perceptions exist. First, each 
religion constitutes an autonomous doxastic practice, with different criteria of testing that are 
non-reducible to each other. Second, we know of no independent objective parameter to 
judge which doxastic practice fares better in the aim of forming beliefs about God's 
manifestations. If we do not have any way of showing that CMP is right or wrong, Alston 
asks, '[ ... ] why should we take the absence of such a proof to nullify, or even sharply 
diminish, the justification I have for my Christian M-bellefs [Manifestation-beliefs] (Alston 
1991: 272)? ' In other words, the absence of a method to decide the most reliable of 
conflicting doxastic practices means that religious diversity is not a reason for a Christian to 
n 
abandon his confidence in CMP. 
Yet, Alston does not deny that this problem weakens the degree of justification the 
Christian can claim for CMP. In fact, if the sole basis for a positive evaluation of CMP were 
that it is a socially established doxastic practice that has not been shown to be unreliable, then 
religious pluralism would reduce its epistemic status to a great extent (see Alston 1991: 275- 
6). Yet the existence of a significant self-support in favour of CMP counterbalances that 
diminishing effect, and confirms the Christians' confidence that this practice gives at least a 
good approximation to the truth. In his words, 
Given the "payoffs" of the Christian life of the sort just mentioned [growth in sanctity, 
serenity, peace, joy and other fruits of the spirit], one may quite reasonably continue to 
hold that CMP does serve as a genuine cognitive access to Ultimate Reality, and as a 
trustworthy guide to that Reality's relations to ourselves, even if one can't see how to solve 
the problem of religious pluralism [ ... 
] (Alston 1991: 276). 
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The Christian could still 'sit tight' with CMP, even considering that the experiential basis 
provided by mystical perceptions is much less significant than is claimed in the Christian 
doctrine and even if there is no means of saying whether CMP is more reliable than other 
mystical doxastic practices. The participant can still enjoy the instances of self-support 
provided by the practice and can be consoled by the negative claim that there is no reason to 
say CMP is not the most reliable religious practice. 
In response to criticisms of his solution to the problem of religious diversity 8, Alston 
argues that the adept of a certain religious mystical doxastic practice may lack universal 
grounds for arguing that the outputs of other incompatible practices are false. Still, he is 
justified in doing so from the point of view of his own practice. As long as we have no 
means of deciding which of a range of conflicting practices is false, we cannot say that their 
respective adherents are not justified (i. e. entitled) in forming beliefs according to them (see 
Alston 1994b: 179-80). 
In sum, the religious diversity problem prevents any mystical doxastic practice from 
using an offensive strategy, such as that adopted by Swinburne, but it does not stop a 
religious doxastic practice acting defensively. The existence of rival practices precludes 
CMP from holding in an overall independent way that the other, incompatible, practices are 
not justified, but it ives room for CMP to argue that this incompatibility does not make it 9 
unjustified. As we can see, the pnce of avoiding this difficulty is to weaken and particularise 
the claim of justification for CMP, since given Alston's approach we must admit the same 
kind of position for other socially established religious doxastic practices, such as the ones 
that stem from Islam, Judaism and other religions. Their adherents can claim that they are 
reliable with equal justi ication 
9. 
8 See Schellenberg 1994. 
9 Another criticism that deserves to be mentioned is in Tilley (1994), in which it is argued that 
diversity of 
positions is a problem even w thin CMP, an issue that Alston clearly acknowledges 
(see Alston 1994b: 176 
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In conclusion, religious pluralism poses considerable problems for a universalistic 
argument from religious experience of the kind Swinbume proposes, but it is not so harinful 
to Alston's proposal, at least the way I am reading it. In other words, although a positive 
argument for theism from the phenomenon of religious experience looks problematic in view 
of religious pluralism, the possibility of forming bell I defended. 'efs through CMP can still be 
The particularity of the conceptual background knowledge needed for identifying God in a 
mystical perception is not a problem for an approach that admits the existence of many 
particular religious doxastic practices. Still, as usual regarding any philosophical project, 
Alston's approach is not totally free from objections. In the next section, I will analyse a 
couple of them and see what then remains of Alston's position regarding religious 
experience. In doing so I will be able to discuss whether I can make any use of this theory in 
my own methodological suggestion for the epistemology of theism in the final chapter. 
3. Alston and his own Critics: The Degree of Justification of CMP 
In the previous section, my intention was to show that Alston's handling of religious 
experience could escape almost totally unscathed fTom the main criticisms directed against 
Swinburne's approach. In this final part of the present chapter I aim to examine what we can 
expect from a proposal that proved to be so immune to objection. In order to do so, let us see 
the consequences for Alston's position of two objections raised specifically against his ideas 
on the matter. Given the enormous literature on Alston, the brief review that follows cannot 
claim to be exhaustive. My interest here is simply to have a clear picture of the alternative 
that Alston's approach to religious experience presents to Swinbume's proposal. In doing so, 
I also want to reveal the limits of the former in order to see whether I can still use it in my 
alternative account of how to employ Bayes's theorem in the Justification of theistic belief 
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The two problems I will analyse here refer to 1) Alston's idea that mystical doxastic 
practices are entitled to their own checking system, and 2) that his proposal gives grounds 
only for a subjective belief that there is a God. 
3.1 The checking system of CMP 
According to Evan Fales, any type of perception must meet some criteria in order to 
stand as an authentic way of putting us in contact with extra-mental reality (see Fales 1996: 
22). For Fales, the crucial problem with a content as tenuous as those of theophanies is that it 
makes the task of checking the accuracy of beliefs founded upon them very difficult, or in 
Alston's terminology, their overrider system is very deficient. In his examination of the 
testing system in CMP, according to Fales, 'it will emerge that there is a quite general 
difference between the domains of SP and CMP which hamstrings cross-checking in CMP 
and precludes any parity with SP', a move that would be essential to Alston's pretensions 
(see Fales 1996: 25). The key factor behind the main strategies of confirmation and cross- 
checking of perceptual beliefs is a presupposition about the causal structure of the world and 
our place as perceivers in that structure. This presupposition consists of three theses: 1) 
events of significance to sense perception have multiple causes and effects, 2) causal 
interactions can be combined in many different ways, 3) perception of an object involves the 
creation of a causal link between features of that object and our sense experience (see Fales 
1996: 28). 
According to Fales, '[ ... ] proper cross-checking requires a causal picture 
linking God 
with theophanies "in the right way", a picture that CMP doesn't supply', and which is a 
necessary condition of any doxastic practice aimed to provide information about extra-mental 
objects (see Fales 1996: 34). He rejects the criterion of authenticity of mystical perceptions 
based on the good fruits that result from it because as the devil could well disguise his ends 
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through good works, there are no clear means to tell whether a mystical perception was of 
God or Satan. Moreover, not only do we not know what God's intentions are, but we also 
have very plausible explanations of the good fruits of mystical perceptions which do not 
appeal to the existence of God, but rather to sheer secular reasons such as those pointed to by 
psychology and anthropology. As a result, while in sense perception we can check the 
authenticity of empirical beliefs through the many causes and effects observable in a physical 
causal chain, we cannot check the place of God in the perceptual causal chaln. 'The trouble 
with theophanies seems to be, briefly', argues Fales, 'that we have no such multiple lines of 
detection by means of which to "triangulate" the alleged divine cause; or at least none that 
don't converge [ ... ] on some mundane segment of the causal story' (Fales 1996: 36). In 
conclusion, CMP does not have a sufficient overrider system to confer an objective and 
perceptual character to the beliefs it fonns (see Fales 1996: 38). 
Although Fales' critique of Alston echoes that of otherslo,, I do not believe it damages 
Alston's proposal very much, at least in the reading I am giving to Alston here. First of all, 
Alston claims quite correctly that we only know of what we can perceive by experience (see 
Alston 1991: 59). A priori criteria for establishing criteria of possible objects of perception 
need positive justification, and the ones acceptable currently do not rule out God as such an 
object. In addition, for Alston, the perceptual character of mystical perception is provided by 
the fact that an immediate awareness of God as doing or being so-and-so does not depend on 
the perceivers' effort. Further, from the side of the object of perception (God), the reports 
describe a presentation to the perceivers' experience. We could only deny that there could be 
a presentation of God in a mystical perception if we had reason to doubt the sincerity of the 
reports or had reasons ruling out the possibility that God exists and can cause a perception of 
10 See also Gale 1994a. 
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Him in us. Until these reasons are provided, we can hold prima facie that God is presented in 
a mystical perception, given the specific background concepts of a theistic doxastic practice. 
In requiring that mystical perception be submitted to the same kind of test available to 
sense perception, Alston's critics make the mistake of epistemic 1mperiallsm. As I held 
-'ý-ove Alston has no trouble in admitting that CMP's ovemder system is not as good as the av 9 
one SP displays (see Alston 1991: 220). Alston does not deny that SP's system of checking 
enables us to distinguish more clearly between correct and incorrect sensory beliefs than that 
which we obtain from CMP concerning mystical perceptions. This, however, does not justify 
the imposition of the parameters available in sense perception to mystical perception, since 
they refer to different kinds of reality. These kinds of reality may well require different types 
of tests, and that is what his position regarding the autonomy of socially established doxastic 
practices aims to secure. As Alston holds, to claim that the tests applicable to sense 
perceptions are a necessary condition for any extra-mental experience demands arguments 
that have not been furnished by his critics so far. 
In sum, once we grant to Alston his theory of perception and his doxastic practice 
approach, it becomes very difficult to deny that mystical perceptions qualify as perceptual 
and that they belong to a way of forming beliefs that displays its own ways of criticising and 
checking the authenticity of its outputs. As we saw, given that Swinburne proposes an 
argument from religious experience aimed at everyone, this defence of religious perception 
based on a particular system of checking is not sufficient for his purposes. As for Alston, if 
there is a weak side in his proposal regarding religious experience, it does not appear to be in 
his claim that there is nothing wrong in considering them as perceptual in character. 
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3.2 CMP's degree of justification 
By far the most frequent remark in the available literature against Alston's proposal 
relates to the type of justification he provides for the Christian mystical perceptual doxastic 
practice. The idea of a practical justification for the reliability of doxastic practices is 
particularly criticised. Recall that for Alston, since we do not acqui I ice ire a doxastic practi 
consciously, we only become able to criticise it after employing it for a long time to form 
beliefs. Given that we cannot help forming beliefs in this specific way, and since all attempts 
to justify this process end up in epistemic circularity, the best we can aim for is to show that 
we are reasonable in believing it to be reliable. 
According to Mathias Steup, however, the fact that we cannot help engaging in a 
doxastic practice does not mean we are irrational in being sceptical about the outputs of that 
same doxastic practice. For him, 
Epistemic reasons for skepticism about SP must be judged on their own merit, without 
disrrLissing them right off the bat because it is practically impossible to act upon them by 
shutting down one's sensory faculties. Alston's position, however, carries with it such a 
preemptive, and in my opinion, unjustified dismissal of skepticism about the reliability of 
SP (Steup, 1997: 414). 
The room for scepticism,, according to Steup, is due to the fact that the recognition of the 
impossibility of taking myself out of a doxastic practice is a psychological statement with 
nothing to do with the epistemic credentials of this belief-forming mechanism. The fact that 
we are stuck with a doxastic practice does not mean we need necessarily take it to be reliable. 
From the fact that SP is practically rational it does not follow that SP is epistemically reliable. 
For Steup, what complicates the project of justifying perception episternically is the 
constraint on episternic justification posed by Alston. In requiring that for a belief to be 
epistemically justified it must be based on grounds that are reliable indication of the belief s 
truth, Alston was simply demanding too much, making this enterprise impossible. 
Along the same lines, Norman Kretzmann remarks that because Alston's concept of 
justification is too demanding, the author of Pet-ceiving God falls to Justify mystical 
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perceptual practices in a truth-conductive way (see Kretzmann. 1994: 89). What Alston ends 
up offering us is a justification of religious doxastic practices that is basically deontological, 
given the character of the notion of practical rationality (see Kretzmann 1994: 86). The 
problem with justifying doxastic practices on the grounds that it is unavoidable to believe in 
their outcomes since they are strongly establi 11 in our 'shed in our society and firmly embedded i 
psyches is that it is too pennissive, for even seances and newspaper horoscope would then be 
reliable practices (see Kretzmann. 1994: 88). Consequently, for Kretzmann, 
[ ... ] what Alston calls the perception of God can make an important contribution to the 
grounds of religious belief only subjectively. Objective grounds of religious belief are still 
to be sought mainly or solely in the old, familiar, still vital enterprises of natural and 
philosophical theology (Kretzmann 1994: 68). 
In other words, what it turns out that Alston demonstrates is something that a broadmincled 
atheist would easily grant, namely that St. Theresa was entitled to believe that God exists in 
view of her mystical experiences and given her particular background beliefs. This means, 
however, only that she did not forge a false report and that her reliance on mystical 
perception was consistent with her religious beliefs, which is still far from implying that her 
experiences were objectively valid or veridical. 
Yet, although these criticisms hit a very sensitive point in Alston's epistemology of 
perception, it is still possible to find robust responses to them in his writings. Let us start 
with the idea that scepticism is still a possible alternative in view of the practical justification 
Alston suggests for the reliability of SP, since the central question of episternic justification 
would still remain untouched. For the author of Perceiving God, scepticism regarding the 
socially established doxastic practices we are used to employing is not a serious possibility, 
since it would amount to the incoherent position of acting at all times on the assumption that 
they are reliable and yet simultaneously doubting their capacity to produce true beliefs (see 
Chapter 6- Mystical Perception and Doxastic Practice 195 
Alston 1991: 150). The question is not whether SP is reliable, which we do not really doubt, 
but how we can show that it is so (see Alston 1991: 106). Since there is no deeper or more 
objective position from which we could judge our doxastic practices, given that we need 
them to form beliefs anyway, the best we can do coherently is to assume that we are more 
rational in supposing them to be reliable, as we are already doing in practical terms. 
still , in doing so, Alston is not claiming that he demonstrated that SP is epistemically 
rational, in the sense of it being probably true that SP is reliable (see Alston 1991: 180). The 
critics above are right to stress the difference between being epistemically and practically 
rational. Alston in fact also emphasises that he never intended to provide episternic 
justification for SP or any other doxastic practice (see Alston 1991: 182 and 1994b: 172). 
Indeed he has not been able to justify doxastic practices epistemically simply because this 
does not seem to be a feasible task (see Alston 1994b: 177). Clearly, one way out of this 
situation is to deny the concept of justification as implying likelihood of truth, as Steup 
suggests. The problem with this weaker alternative is that in doing so we abandon the main 
objective of belief forination and cognition in general, which is the search for the truth 
(Alston 1991: 148). 
Moreover, Alston claims that, although his approach can produce only a practical 
justification for the reliability of established doxastic practices, his proposal positively 
provides epistemic justification for particular beliefs that stem from those practices. Failing 
to realise this distinction involves a level confusion (see Alston 1991: 181). In other words, 
assuming that we are reasonable in taking SP to be reliable, this practical justification pen-nits 
us to take the beliefs fon-ned therefrom as prima facie likely to be true. Beliefs receive 
support within a doxastic practice; that is, unless they are ruled out by the ovemder system, 
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they can be considered prima facie probably true. The reason for a particular belief may be 
only internal in Alston's proposal, but this is so, again, because to him we have no external 
grounds for the rationality of any broad domain of belief. In sum, the Christian is entitled (on 
grounds of practical rationality) to regard the outputs of CMP to be epistemically (i. e. in a 
truth-conducive way) justified. However (and this is perhaps Kretzmann's main point), the 
non-Christian is entitled to the opposite stance concerning the epistemic justification of 
CMP's outputs. 
Yet, even if CMP does not provide universal grounds for theistic belief, these are not 
subjective either, as Kretzmann implied above (see also Gale 1994a, in which this assessment 
is expressed in the title itself). Rather, the belief is based on interpersonal and socially shared 
grounds, which is also a means of putting considerable constraints on individual beliefs about 
God through the overrider systeml I. In this sense, the doxastic practice approach is not too 
permissive, since not every way of forming belief has a strong overrider system nor is it 
necessarily socially established. The social or interpersonal character of doxastic practices 
prevents the individuals that take part in them from believing whatever they want. Instead, 
they need to follow rules and patterns that are included in the background knowledge of the 
community of believers to which they belong. Alston certainly opens the gate for some 
suspicious belief forming systems, but he also acknowledges grounds for the criticism of 
existing practices which can lead even to their abandom-nent, given a certain amount of either 
internal or external inconsistency (see Alston 1991: 170). 
Still, even if we grant that in Alston's system the justification of the belief in God is 
not subjective and that his approach is not too pennissive, critics are right in arguing that we 
II About this, see also Alston's reply (I 994a) to a paper by Robert Adams (1994). 
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have no objectively valid argument for theism from his epistemology of religious experience. 
As Gale correctly points out: 
Thus, Alston's apologetics can be seen as giving some reassurance to those well launched 
along the pathway of faith that their faith is not a completely unreasoned one, though those 
who are not, in James's wonderful phrase 'among the saving remnant' will have different 
intuitions about this. Maybe this is all Alston can really hope to show (Gale 1994b: 148). 
Alston also admits that we do not have an objective argument from religious experience like 
the one Swinburne intends to provide 12 (see Alston 1994b: 175). In fact, this admission fits 
well with my interpretation of Alston's programme, i. e. that the ground furnished by CMP is 
accessible and effective only for those that participate in that specific doxastic practice. 
In addition, it is an important and sometimes overlooked aspect of Alston's proposal 
that the grounds religious experience gives to the belief that there is a God should be 
combined with other sources for the justification of theistic belief, as he holds in the final 
chapter of Perceiving God. In this sense, his contribution is not an alternative to the use of 
natural theology advocated by Kretzmann, but a complement to it. CMP serves to render its 
participants prima facie justified in believing that God exists through reported perceptions of 
God that pass the scrutiny of CMP's overrider system, but this is not the end of the story. In 
the debate with non-participants of CMP, the Christian will need to employ other resources 
such as, for example, the arguments of natural theology. In Bayesian terms, CMP pen-nits its 
participants to ascribe a considerable prior probability to theism given their particular 
religious background, but the likelihood of the theistic hypothesis (P(elh. k)) can only be 
shown to be high given commonly acceptable evidence. 
However, the critics of Alston's enterprise seem correct in one crucial point, namely 
that the degree of justification CMP can expect must be much lower than the one enjoyed by 
basic doxastic practices like sense perception, memory and testimony. According to the 
12 In my view, but perhaps not in Alston's. See note I of this chapter. 
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author of Perceiving God, even considering the many instances that count against the 
reliability of CMP, its adherents can still count on it as a reliable way to forin prima facie true 
beliefs about God. Alston concedes that CMP is less firm than many other doxastic practices, 
since it generates more inconsistencies than other more established ones (see Alston 1991: 
236), that its overrider system is much less efficient than SP's (see Alston 1991: 220), and 
that the religious diversity problem diminishes our confidence in CMP (see Alston 1991: 
275). However, he still insists that this does not sharply diminish the justification the 
Christian has for M-beliefs in CMP (see Alston 1991: 220,238 and 276). Despite all these 
problems, its participants can still enjoy the prima facie epistemic justification to their beliefs 
about God provided by CMP (Alston 1994b: 175 and 1991: 194). 
Yet, there seems to be a problem with taking a belief forming system with so many 
problems as reliable in an unqualified way. It seems more accurate to say with Gale that the 
addition of these multiple little flaws ends up making a cumulative case against the reliability 
of the mystical perception doxastic practice (see Gale 1994b: 147). On the other hand, 
Alston is right in claiming that we cannot say that these difficulties undermine CMP totally or 
that its adherents are irrational in forming beliefs from it (see Alston 1991: 275). 
A way out of this deadlock is an idea with which Alston agrees but which he does not 
develop very much, namely that justification is a matter of degree (see Alston 1991: 72). As 
Robert McKim observes, there are many gradations between the full-blooded prima facie 
justification provided by a finn doxastic practice like sense perception and the very weak 
reliability conferred by a suspicious belief forming mechanism like the reading of crystal 
balls (see McKim 2001: 247). 
McKim suggests three parameters that reduce the practical rationality of judging a 
doxastic practice to be reliable, which he calls ( restrainers'. The first is the existence of 
disagreement, which tends to indicate a low degree of justification for any of the conflicting 
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observations (see McKim 2001: 249). The second is the extent to which what is perceived is 
ambiguous, uncertain, and capable of being identified in different ways (McKim 2001: 250). 
The third parameter refers to how much the doxastic practice is operating in conditions that 
cast suspicion of malfunctioning or of working under extreme pressure (like seeing a lake in 
the desert under high temperature and low humidity). 'When a restrainer is operative', holds 
McKim, 'the doxastic practice in question may still be relied upon, but only with caution and 
in awareness that one may be out of one's depth. The justification that is conferred in such 
conditions is reduced' (McKim 2001: 25 1). 
As a result, McKim proposes that Alston's two alternatives of either totally accepting 
or totally denying a doxastic practice are not the only ones available. In his words, 
There are alternatives to either 'sitting tight' with your practice or abandoning it: one can 
sit loosely with it, or at any rate one can do so in the case of religiously based MPs. It is 
not practically rational to carry on with business as usual under the DAM [disagreement, 
ambiguity and malfunctioning] conditions (McKim 2001: 252). 
So, even allowing for the autonomy and irreducibility of doxastic practices, and that CMP is 
a socially established way of forming beliefs, the admission of several restrictions in its 
mechanisms implies a reduction in the justification for its outputs to a lower grade than the 
full-blooded epistemic justification postulated by Alston. 
Now, if the prima facie justification provided by CMP is a matter of degree, then there 
is no problem, in principle, in putting this degree in a probability figure. As we saw, 
according to Alston, CMP serves to render its participants prima facie justified in believing 
that God exists, or, in Bayesian tenus, it provides grounds for ascribing a considerable 
probability to theism prior to apologetic debates with non-participants. However, in the 
reading of Alston's proposal adopted in this chapter, this justification is restricted to the 
participants in this particular doxastic practice, and does not provide an objective and 
universal standpoint from which to attnbute a probability. Moreover, if McKim's 
observations are correct, the degree of justification is not very high (given the ambiguity and 
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disagreement involved in mystical perception), although not very small either (since it is a 
socially established doxastic practice with a considerable degree of self-support) in the 
context of the debate with secular believers on the justification of theism. In any case, CMP 
may permit its participants to ascribe a prior probability whose value will be considerably 
higher than that which Swinburne's principle of simplicity allows. 
Still, the particularism of CMP prevents us from using religious experience as a means 
of attributing a prior probability to theism if we adopt Swinburne's approach to Bayesianism, 
since for Swinburne we need universal, neutral and impersonal criteria for ascribing priors, 
like the principle of simplicity. However, if my arguments in Chapter 3 are correct, there is 
good reason not to accept Swinburne's simplicity principle as this objective criterion for 
attributing an initial probability to the hypothesis that God exists. Indeed, in the next chapter 
will discuss some reasons not to accept the whole theory of probability that is behind 
Swinbume's suggestion of that pnnciple as a guide to the ascnption of pnors. In light of an 
alternative theory of probability to Swinburne's, I will propose another way of using religious 
experience in the justification of theism in a Bayesian way. In so doing Alston's ideas will 
prove very helpful. 
In conclusion, according to my interpretation, Alston's epistemology of mystical 
perception protects his approach from the attacks which undermine Swinburne's appeal to 
religious experience. Instead of employing religious expenence in an inductive argument for 
theism as Swinbume does, Alston is happy with making an 'equal entitlement claim'. For 
him, given a particular conceptual background the way we fonn beliefs from religious 
experience may entitle theists to form the belief that there is a God. On the other hand, this 
higher immunity to criticism has the price of preventing him from providing an objective and 
universally efficient argument for theism from religious expenence. Even so, the doxastic 
practice approach may be able to grant to theists some initial probability that theism is true. 
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Religious experience can then assume a role in a Bayesian approach to the justification of 
theism that is very different from the one attributed to it by Swinbume, an idea that will be 
developed in the final chapter. 
Chapter 7- Swinburne and the Intersubjective Theory of 
Probability 
The object of the present chapter is the search for an alternative to Swinburne's theory of 
probability. Based on an alternative theory of Bayesian probability I intend to incorporate the 
phenomenon of religious experience in the estimate of the prior probability of the'sm. In the 
first section of this chapter, I will present Swinburne's account of the logical theory of 
Bayesian probability, which he advocates. Then I will introduce the subjective theory of 
Bayesian probability, which directs strong criticisms against the logical theory. In the third 
section, I will analyse some limits of subjective Bayesianism and some of Swinbume's 
counter-attacks to the subjective theory. In the final section of the present chapter, I will then 
present the inter- subjective theory of probability as a good alternative to the two above. By 
using the inter-subjective theory I can explain how to employ religious experience in relation 
to Bayes's theorem in the next and final chapter of this thesis. 
1. Swinburne and the Logical Theory of Probability 
Probability is commonly said to be 'Janus-faced', that is, like the Roman mythological 
figure, it has two faces, one turned to objects and events, and another one to beliefs and 
hypotheses'. Generally speaking then, probability is a proportion, the measure of a degree 
that can be applied on the one hand to objects and events, and on the other hand to beliefs and 
hypotheses. A degree of probability expresses the status of a belief or state of affairs in a 
range that goes from zero, which indicates impossibility or falsity, to one, which denotes 
certainty, necessity or truth. The emphasis on one of the 'faces either the epistemological 
I On this, see Gillies (2000: 18). 
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or the physical - and the way the degree is described is what defines a particular theory of 
probability. 
Historically, we can distinguish four major theories of probability, which are 
commonly called the logical theory, the subjective theory, the frequency theory and the 
propensity theory. While the first two admit the idea of probability of hypotheses, both the 
frequency theory and the propensity theories usually claim that we can only apply the concept 
of probability objectively and scientifically to events or classes of objeCtS3 . As we will deal 
with the logical and the subjective theories more extensively in this chapter, let us make a 
brief mention here of the other two. The frequency theory was proposed in what is 
considered its canonical form by Richard Von Mises, one of the most important associates of 
the Vienna Circle. In this theory, probability deals only with sets of repetitive events and 
collections of objects, which are defined by a particular attribute that occurs in each of the 
elements of the set in varied degrees. In Von Mises' formulation, the defining attributes of 
the sets and the respective degrees (frequencies) of them in each individual are data to be 
obtained empirically, from observation. 
Despite being initially a proponent of the frequency theory, Karl Popper concluded 
later on that this was not a satisfactory account of objective probability, since it was not 
capable of providing probability values for single occurrences, given its exclusive focus on 
classes of repeatable events. So, using Von Mises' theory we are capable of stating what is 
the probability of a given attribute occurring in a class of individuals (say the proportion of 
Oxford professors who attend a religious service on Sundays), but not of a single event or 
individual (say the probability of Professor Swinburne attending a religious service next 
Sunday). As we will see in section two of this chapter, the attribution of probability values to 
2 In this brief description, I am very much indebted to GlIlles (2000). 
3 An important exception to this position is Reichenbach, who applied the 
frequency theory to the probability of 
hypotheses (see Reichenbach 1949). 
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single objects and non-repeatable events is easily solved by the subjective theory, which 
Popper strongly rejected given his strict objectivist conception of science. Popper suggested 
then the propensity theory of probability according to which we quantify the degree to which 
some generating conditions have the disposition to produce the observed frequencies, where 
both the theoretical terms 'conditions' and 'dispositions' are defined non-empirically. So we 
can have an objective probability of the conditions for something to happen even if these 
conditions are not repeated a large number of times. Single cases would be dealt with by the 
quantification of the propensity with which a particular result occurs given a certain set of 
conditions. However, according to Gillies, even if the propensity theory fails to deal with 
probabilities in a strict objectivist way, it was important for providing a non-positivist 
concept of objective probability, since it does not require that the theoretical ternis involved 
in the probability assessment be given by observation (see Gillies 2000: 125). 
1.1 The logical theory and Swinburne's correct criteria of induction 
Sensible to the appeals of the frequency and propensity theories, Swinbume develops 
a sort of pluralistic interpretation of probability. According to Swinbume, there are three 
kinds of probability. The first type is physical probability, which is '[ ... ]a measure of the 
extent to which some particular outcome is predetermined by its causes at some earlier time' 
(Swinburne 2001a: 56-7). So, the degree of probability of an event indicates the bias in 
nature predisposing it to happen following physical causes. As a result, we say that an event 
has physical probability I if it is 'physically necessary' rather than 'certain', since the notion 
here is not referring to a belief but to an object or phenomenon. In addition, observes 
Swinburne, 'physical probability is relative to time - as the time at which the event is 
predicted to happen or not to happen draws near, so (if that probability is not I or 0) the 
probability of its occurrence may change' (SwInburne 2001a: 57). In other words, with the 
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exception of events that are either necessary or impossible, which means they will either 
happen or not happen come what may, the physical probability of an object can vary 
depending on the relative proximity of the causal event that will trigger the occurrence of that 
object as an effect. 
The second type of probability discussed by Swinburne is statistical probability, 
which is, according to him, '[ ... ]a proportion of events, either in an actual or in a 
hypothetical class, that is a class generatable by a repeatable process' (Swinbume 2001 a: 57). 
Within this type of probability we should distinguish between 'actual statistical probability', 
which denotes a proportion in a finite class, and 'hypothetical statistical probability', which 
concerns the proportion in infinite sets. In other words, instead of causal relations, statistical 
probabilities refer to relative frequencies, whose propositions typically have a forin like 'the 
probability of an A being B is p'. The indefinite article of the statistical probability forin. 
indicates another important difference between physical and statistical probabilities, since in 
the latter the main reference is not to any particular individual in class A, but to the class as a 
whole (see Swinburne 1973: 12). Another important relationship between physical and 
statistical probabilities is that 'Statistical probability is concerned with what actually happens, 
or would happen under certain circumstances. Physical probability is concerned with what is 
inclined to happen, and so - in extreme cases - with what has to happen. The one entails 
deductively very little about the other' (Swinburne 2001 a: 60). In other words, what is 
physically improbable can keep happening ad infinitum leading to different measures of 
statistical and physical probability for the same kind of phenomenon. 
The real interest of Swinburne, however, is in what he calls 'Inductive probability'. It 
is the concept of inductive probability that covers the relationship between hypothesis and 
evidence, which is central to his Bayesian approach to the justification of theism. 'Inductive 
probability', Swinburne holds, 'is a measure of the extent to which one proposition r makes 
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another one q likely to be true (r and q may be complicated conjunctions or disjunctions of 
other propositions)' (Swinbume 2001a: 62). In this third type of probability we have a 
relationship between two propositions, as in the other two kinds, but in contrast with them, 
inductive probability is about the relationship between the two propositions, that II is s, t 
concerned with to what extent one proposition provides reason for believing another. 
For Swinburne, another important difference between inductive probability and the 
other two sorts is that inductive probability does not normally have an exact numerical value. 
In the tenns used in An Introduction to Confirmation Theory, we could say that inductive 
probability propositions are generally only either classificatory or comparative, but not 
quantitative 4. Classificatory propositions have the fonn 'evidence e renders probable 
hypothesis h'. Comparative propositions have the form 'evidence e renders hypothesis h 
more probable than evidence ei renders probable hypothesis hi'. And quantitative 
propositions read as in 'the probability of h given evidence e is p, where p is some definite 
number between 0 and I (see Swinbume 1973: 2). 
Further , in contrast to statistical and physical probability, inductive probability is in 
essence not an empirical matter and cannot be settled by observation of any kind. Inductive 
probability concerns the relation involved in a proposition being grounds for believing 
another one, which is an a priori, non-temporal issue. It refers then only to the contents of 
the relevant propositions, being independent of any further empirical considerations about the 
objects referred to in the propositions. In Swinburne's words, 'If I assess the evidence 
available to me now properly and conclude that on that evidence the probability of Jones 
having voted Republican at the last election is such and such, subsequent discoveries 
(including discovery for certain whether or not Jones voted Republican) cannot affect the 
4 As can be secn from the arguments presented in Chapter 4.3 (p. 128), this restriction is unnecessary in general 
Bayesian terms, although it is required by Swinburne's approach as we will see later on. 
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value of that probability, cannot show that I was mistaken in my judgement of it' (Swinbume 
1973: 12). The reason for this inalterability is that inductive probability is about how much 
the evidence e we consider supports our belief in a hypothesis h, i. e. it is about the relation of 
evidence to hypothesis, not about the probability of the events desch A 'bed in e having occurred 
(statistical probability) or even about the causes involved in the occurrence of the phenomena 
reported in e (physical probability) (see Swinburne 2001 a: 63-4 and 1973: 25-6). 
This way of characterising the probability of hypotheses on evidence pennits us to 
classify Swinburne as a proponent of the logical theory of probability. In fact he explicitly 
states that he is: 'So we have adopted and expounded the logical theory of probability as an 
account of the meaning of a considerable number of propositions about probability. Such 
propositions state the extent to which certain evidence renders probable a certain hypothesis' 
(Swinbume 1973: 28). As Swinbume correctly observes, the logical theory was classically 
proposed by John M. Keynes (see Swinburne 1973: 24). According to Keynes, probability is 
a logical relation between hypothesis and evidence, an idea that Swinburne accepts. 
However, there is an important difference between Swinburne's version of the logical theory 
and Keynes' version (see Swinburne 2001 a: 70, footnote 14), which concerns their respective 
theories about what makes what probable, a notion that will be clarified in what follows. 
It is from the logical relationship that characterises inductive probability that 
Swinbume extracts the concept of logical probability, which will be crucial to his 
probabilistic theory. Logical probability is a type of inductive probability in which the 
inductive support that a proposition q gives to a proposition r is measured not only by all the 
relevant logical possibilities and corresponding entailments, but also by the correct inductive 
criteria. A value that ideally could only be reached by a logIcally omn, sclent being, but 
to which we try to conforin our judgements of inductive probability on evidence but about the 
value of which we may make mistakes', says Swinburne (2001 a: 64). In other words, the 
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value of a logical probability is totally deten-nined a priori, according to the logical 
relationship between the actual contents of the propositions concerned and the correct 
inductive cnteria known by a logically omniscient being. 
So, from the notion that one proposition can make another one probable, included in 
the concept of inductive probability, we can reach the idea that there are correct criteria to 
assess the extent to which some evidence gives probability to a hypothesis. The reason for 
this , in Swinburne's words, is that, 
If we do not think that there are such criteria, then we must hold that no one makes any 
error if he regards any scientific theory compatible with observations and any prediction or 
retrodiction whatsoever from those observations as probable on the evidence as any other. 
On the basis of our evidence of what has happened so far, it would be as sensible to believe 
that cyanide will nourish and bread poison tomorrow, or that if we stand on concrete we 
shall sink into the ground, as to believe the opposite of these things (Swinburne 2001 a: 64). 
In Swinburne's hard rationalist programme, the rejection of the notion that there are correct 
criteria for inductive probability would lead to an irrational relativism in which totally 
implausible inductive inferences would be regarded as equivalent in value to the clearly more 
plausible ones. So, if, in science and our ordinary life, beliefs are to have at least a minimum 
of rationality, we should agree that there are correct criteria of inductive probability, even if 
we may make mistakes about them and they can in fact only be known in their entirety to a 
logically omniscient being. In other words, the rationality of scientific enterprise means we 
need to postulate that there are logical probabilities. 
In the field of inductive probability, Swinburne distinguishes the notion of logical 
probability from two other ways of considering probability on evidence, namely epistemic 
and subjective probabilities. These two other kinds of inductive probability do not fully 
respect the basic idea that the probability of hypotheses on evidence is ruled by purely logical 
factors. In contrast with logical probability, episternic probabilities do not postulate a 
logically omniscient being that knows all correct inductive criteria and logical entailments. 
s In epistemic probability, the support given from evidence to hypothesi is measured by the 
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laws of the probability calculus and the correct criteria of logical probability known to a 
particular individual or community. The problem with this kind of inductive probability, 
warns Swinburne, is that the choice among the many possible sorts of epistemic probability is 
largely arbitrary, that is, there is no reason we should adopt one instead of another (see 
Swinbume 2001 a: 69). 
The problem of arbitrariness becomes even more intense with subjective theories of 
probability. This kind of probability rejects the idea of objectively correct inductive criteria 
fumished by the probability calculus, stating that this is also a subjective matter. In other 
words, there is no such a thing as correct inductive criteria; all inductive inference is to be 
assessed according to patterns considered reasonable to an individual or community of 
individuals. 'So% he concludes, 'I distinguish from the primary kind of inductive probability 
-logical probability, the two kinds - epistemic and subjective. The latter are the assessment 
of logical probability by subjects of varying lack of capacity to apply correct criteria of 
logical probability, and varying degrees of false belief about what these are' (Swinbume 
2001 a: 70-1). 
Swinburne clearly favours the first kind of inductive probability, that is, logical 
probability, according to which the likelihood of a hypothesis on evidence is provided 
exclusively by the logical relationship between their respective propositional contents and by 
correct inductive criteria. In the passage cited above (Swinburne 2001 a: 70, footnote 14), 
Swinburne observes that this is one of his major objections to Keynes's position, since 
Keynes affinns that the inductive criteria that deterinine the epistemic probability value are 
relative to human capacities. As we saw above, for Swinburne, this admission leads to the 
risk of arbitrariness regarding inductive criteria. 
In defending a probability theory that demands the existence of objectively correct 
inductive cnteria, Swinburne needs tO state what these cntena are. As we saw in 
Chapter 
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he suggests four criteria to assess what makes what probable. Two of them are a posteriori, 
namely the criterion of yielding the data, and the criterion of conforming to background 
knowledge. The other two are a priori, corresponding to the scope of the hypothesis and the 
principle of simplicity that is the most important a priori inductive criterion to him. As we 
saw, Swinbume dedicates considerable effort to defending the universally applicable and 
impersonal character of simplicity as an inductive criterion, a position that has very important 
consequences for the way he analyses the prior probability of the theistic hypothesis. 
However, as I stated in Chapter 3, there are serious difficulties in the principle of 
simplicity, concerning its definition, applicability, justification, and the way it relates to the 
criterion of background knowledge. Recall that in Chapter 31 concluded that even If we 
grant to Swinburne that simplicity has a precise definition, that it can be unambiguously 
applied in inductive inferences, and that we can justifiably take it as evidence of truth, we 
could still take it as nothing but part of the background knowledge shared by a community of 
researchers. I also noted in Chapter 3 some problems regarding the factoring of the 
simplicity principle into Bayes's theorem. In fact, I argued that the very rati I by 
Swinburne to ground the principle of simplicity - that we need criteria for selecting the best 
hypothesis among an infinite set of possibilities - was based on too artificial and implausible 
a picture of theoretical activity in science. 
In any case, it is important to state precisely the nature of Swinbume's Bayesianism 
so that the alternative to be developed later on becomes clearer. As we saw above, for him, 
the probability involved in the relationship between evidence and hypothesis is a matter of 
logical entailment and correct inductive criteria. Swinbume defends the idea that the 
confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence (C(h, e)) is a matter of the probability of h given e 
(P(hle)) and he suggests that Bayes's theorem depicts all the correct criteria of induction from 
e to h (see Swinburrie 2001 a: 103). Specifically, his criteria concentrate on the assessment of 
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the prior probability attribution. As a result, we can distinguish Swinbume's theory of 
probability and confinnation as one involving the postulation of universal, a priori and 
impersonal criteria to assign prior probabilities to hypotheses in a Bayesian analysis. For 
Swinburne, then, we can assign probability values not only to classes of events, repeatable 
processes and physical propensities, but also to hypotheses in view of evidence. The 
probability of hypotheses is a logical relationship ruled by correct inductive criteria that fall 
mainly upon the attribution of prior probabilities in Bayes's theorem. It is here that the main 
difference lies between Swinburne's concept of probability and the one I will expound next, 
known as the subjective theory of probability. 
2. The Subjective Theory of Probability 
The subjective theory of probability was proposed initially by Frank Ramsey and 
Bruno de Finetti,, who arrived at similar conclusions independently. According to this theory, 
the probability of a hypothesis, event or uncertain quantity h is the degree of belief in h held 
by a person. For the subjective theory, then, probability is a degree of belief and is subject- 
related. For many subjective theorists this provides a concept that comprehends all three 
kinds of probability suggested by Swinburne. As the subjective Bayesian statistician 
Lawrence Phillips asserts, 'Probabilities are different from one another only in their values; 
we do not have one kind of probability for events and another kind for hypotheses; we do not 
have different kinds of probability for events involving people than for events involving 
things' (Phillips 1973: 13). 
In this way, the subjective theory suggests a much simpler account of probability than 
that defended by Swinburne. According to de Finetti, the concept of probability defended by 
his theory is the most adequate to common sense, and the most 'natural' (one of Swinburne's 
original senses of simplicity), for, as he says, 
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What do we mean when we say, in ordinary language, that an event is more or less 
probable? We mean that we would be more or less surprised to learn that it has not 
happened. We mean that we would feel more or less confidence that it will happen. 
Probability, in this as yet vague and obscure sense, is constituted by a degree of doubt, of 
uncertainty, of conviction, which our instinct makes us feel in thinking of a future event, 
or, anyway, of an event whose outcome we don't know (de Finetti 1989: 174-5). 
The probability of a hypothesis h is then defined by the opinion a given individual has about 
its degree of correctness. This opinion, clearly, may vary from one individual to another, 
which means that different probabilities can be attributed to the same case. Yet, the 
relativism that this conception may lead to does not frighten de Fi is as an inetti, who sees th" 
inevitable element in the idea of probability as degree of belief Indeed, for him, even the 
idea of 'equal cases' depends on the circumstances known or unknown to the individuals 
involved (see de Finetti 1989: 178). 
In fact, the subjectivists criticise the very notion of 'trials of the same phenomenon' 
that is so important to the frequency theory, which defends the idea of objective probability. 
Now, as we saw in section L, the frequency theory of probability aims to calculate the 
proportion of occurrences of a certain quality in a given class of individuals or repetitive 
events, for example, the percentage of British university lecturers who profess a religious 
belief In order to reach this figure while dealing with large or non-definite sets, we 
extrapolate it from the results we obtain from a small sample. The problem in defining a 
sample from which we extend the frequency of a certain attribute onto a given group of 
individuals is in managing to define a rule so that the sample is not biased. So, for example, 
we should avoid concentrating our research about the frequency of religious believers among 
British university lecturers either in the theology or in sociology departments, since this 
would probably give us a distorted measure. This proviso seems sensible given it is 
reasonable to expect a high concentration of religious believers in departments of theology 
and a smaller number of these in the sociology ones. 
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Still, one could ask whether the sort of care in handling samples as exemplified above 
does not include some subjective elements in the frequentist approach that aimed to assess 
probabilities objectively, regardless of the beliefs held by the researchers. In fact, unless we 
have reliable statistics regarding the proportion of religious believers in theology and 
sociology departments, the proviso above, however sensible it may seem, cannot be accepted 
in an objective determination of unbiased samples. 
This difficulty in the frequency theory is related to another problem regarding its 
purported objectivity, namely, the question of whether there are objective probabilities of 
single events, a question that, as we saw, motivated Popper to find an alternative to the 
frequency theory. To state this problem, let us suppose we are searching for the probability 
of a particular British driver's having a car accident. This probability may alter if we 
describe this British driver as a male aged 50 plus, a member of a class which is reportedly at 
a much lesser risk of involvement in a car accident than the British male driver under 30 or 
even than the average British driver. This being the case, the probability of single events 
seems to depend more on the way we describe the event - in other words, the way we assign 
the event to a reference class - than on the event itself This, however, is not compatible with 
a concept of probability being totally objective and independent of personal opinion. 
The usual way out that frequentists propose for this difficulty is the principle of the 
narrowest reference class. According to this rule (as stated, for example, by Salmon 1978: 
152 and Ayer 1963: 202), we should refer the individual case to the most specific class the 
event can be classified within objectively. Thus, in our last example, we should opt not for 
the broad class of British drivers in general, but for male 50 plus British drivers, as long as 
we have reliable statistics about these two classes of events. Though this principle may work, 
we unfortunately have no objective reason for following it. 
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Moreover, as Gillies points out (see Gillies 2000: 121), there may be more than one 
narrowest reference class in which we can classify the event. For example, suppose we have 
statistics about both male 50 plus British drivers who wear glasses, and those who drive only 
at the weekend, and admit that the individual In question fits both categories. It seems 
inevitable that the choice of reference class to categorise thi II imate is single case in order to est' 
his risk of car accident will have to follow the researcher's preferences, or at least his non- 
statistical inforination, since there is more than one way to classify the individual objectively. 
However, the frequentist approach to the probability of singular events faces problems 
even if there is only one reference class with statistical data available and into which the 
event can be included. As Keynes once observed, the exclusive regard for quantitative 
evidence may distort our probability estimate, since sometimes we have non-statistical 
information about the event that, nonetheless, constitutes good reason for refining our 
assignment (see Gillies 2000: 12 1). Let us assume the best way to classify our case regarding 
car accident risk is as male 50 plus British driver who wears glasses, for which we have a 
reliable statistics related to our issue. Yet, suppose we also know that our driver is a very 
careful man, who only dnves during the day and has had long experience as a professional in 
this area, and let us say there are no statistics available about this kind of person. In this case, 
we would be justified in assigning him a probability other than that suggested by the 
quantitative data. In other words, for the subjectivists, the estimation of single events 
probabilities ends up being based on subjective assignments. Thus, if these arguments are 
correct, the frequency theory project of getting rid of subjective elements entirely in 
ff probability estimation faces considerable di ICUltIeS5. 
5 In his interpretation of the design argument, in which he uses Bayes's theorem in a frequentIst way, Wesley 
Salmon also deals with the reference class problem (see Salmon 1978: 152). His thesis (that analysed from a 
frequentist point of view, the design argument statistically disproves the existence of God) is crItIcIsed by Nancy 
Cartwright. She points out that the samples he chooses and the assumptions he makes are therefore biased and 
that his argument ends up begging the question (see Cartwright 1978: 179 and 181). 1 cannot evaluate the 
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Yet, it is not only those who reject the concept of epistemic probability that the 
proponents of the subjective theory criticise. Despite giving probability estimates to 
hypotheses as well, the logical theory is not spared from critical remarks by the subjectivists. 
For the subjectivists the main problem with the logicists is that they look for a totally 
objective account of probability that is not possible. According to de Finetti, for example, 
'What is logical is exact, but it says nothing. Formal logic only teaches us to avoid an 
intrinsic contradiction among our opinions, in that it allows us to recognise the identity of the 
same opinion when it is expressed in various forms' (de Finettl 1989: 214). In other words, 
the only element we can have from logic regarding probability is the constraint of coherence 
in the attribution of probabilities, whose parameters are provided by the probability calculus. 
Apart from obedience to the laws of probability, there is no universally applicable and totally 
impersonal rule to direct our initial probabilistic estimates. 
This means that for the subjectivists, Swinbume's objective criteria for assessing prior 
probabilities do not deliver what they promise. In de Finetti's words, 'We have shown that to 
believe in the objective meaning of "a pnori" criteria is illusory: they give only subjective 
probabilities. If one is not happy with this subjective value, but wants to make it objective, 
one can only think of getting it from "a posteriori" criteria such as the observation of 
frequencies' (de Finetti 1989: 182). However, as we saw above, the observation of 
frequencies will not be able to furnish entirely objective criteria either, since the 
determination of frequencies also includes subjective elements. 
As seen previously, instead of admitting that the initial probability of a theory h is 
detennined by the opinions and the particular standpoint of the individual involved in the 
evaluation of h, Swinburne proposes that the Intrinsic probability of a proposition is governed 
weight of her criticisms here, but it is interesting to note that they at 
least fit in very well with the critical 
observations made above against the frequentist theory. 
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by its width or scope, fitness with background knowledge and, mainly, simplicity (see, for 
example, Swinbume 1973: 132). According to Swinbume, the wider the scope of a 
hypothesis the lower its prior probability, for the more it says about the world the more it may 
be mistaken. So 'all metals dissolve in any acid' is a priori less probable than 'all iron bars 
dissolve in hydrochloric acid' (see Swinbume 1973: 97-8), because when talking about all 
metals and any acid we are more likely to be mistaken than when we refer to a certain type of 
metal and a specific acid. 
However , if we apply the criterion of scope to predicates instead of to laws, we have 
the opposite result regarding a priori probability, that is, the wider is the predicate Q we 
ascribe to an object a the higher is the probability that a has the quality Q. Or in Swinburne's 
words, 
Thus suppose we are considering what will be the colour of a certain house a. Let 'Q F be 
'of any colour except black', and 'Q2' be 'magenta'. My suggestion is that Pr(QI1q) is 
intrinsically more likely to be found in intervals which include high values in the 
probability continuum, than is Pr(Q21a) (Swinburne 1973: 132). 
Still, one could counter this objection by arguing that the difference in the evaluation of prior 
probability afforded by these two considerations of width is due to the fact that they refer to 
different kinds of probability, namely inductive and statistical. Scope produces lower a 
priori prior probability in cases of inductive probability propositions. In the last quotation 
nil auove,, however, Swinbume was dealing with the statistical probability of an object bearing a 
certain quality, which is higher to the extent that there are more potential instances of the 
quality. Even so, it is not difficult to think of cases where these two types of probability 
merge, leading to an indefinite situation regarding the criterion of scope. In fact, Swinbume 
seems to suggest that the wider the predicate Q we attribute to an object a is, the higher the 
intrinsic inductive probability of the corresponding hypothesis will tend to be, when he says: 
So we have seen that P(hi) is a hypothesis that Pr(Qla) lies within some narrow interval, is 
higher if the interval includes I or 0 and is higher by and large for higher intervals in 
the probability continuum the Nvider is 'Q' (Swinburne 1973: 132). 
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If this interpretation is correct, then the notion of width and its corresponding criterion of 
scope serves to indicate both low and high prior probability, depending on the circumstances. 
If the proposition states a hypothesis about an object or event, and if it has a large scope, then 
it will mean a low prior probability. Yet, if the hypothesis is merely the prediction that a 
certain individual belongs to a certain class, then the wider the class the more probably true is 
the hypothesis. Thus, the proposition 'all animals have digestive organs , is a priori less 
probable than 'all pigs have digestive organs', because the former is more likely to be wrong 
than the latter given its wider scope. On the other hand, the existential hypothesis 'a is an 
animal' is more probable than the thesis that 'a is a pig' for the attribute of being an animal is 
wider than the attribute of being a pig. However, how would we evaluate the comparative 
prior probability of two hypotheses that combine an existential and a universal proposition 
according to the criterion of scope? For example, how to adjudicate as to the relative 
probability between 'all animals have digestive systems and a is an animal' and 'all pigs have 
digestive systems and a is a pig'? In a situation like that the criterion of scope will provide 
no clear answer, and the prior probability will need to be ascribed according to the judgement 
of the scientist. 
The difficulties do not lessen when we consider the criterion of simplicity. As I 
argued in Chapter 3.3 (pp-81f), given the many facets of the concept of simplicity, the 
possibility of two rival hypotheses presenting different facets of simplicity Is not negligible. 
Indeed, Swinbume is very aware of this (see Swinburne 1997b: 30) and suggests that the 
scientific community will be able to deal with these cases when they crop up. But this is an 
admission that the criterion of simplicity need rely on the scientists' discretion for its 
application in many cases. In the last analysis, the promise of delivering a completely 
objective evaluation of prior probabilities, precluding any influence of personal judgement in 
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scienti ic inference and according to totally universal and objective criteria, turns out to be an 
illusion, as Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, two important contemporary subjectivists, claim 
regarding non-Bayesian statistical methods: 
[T]he ideal of total objectivity is unattainable and ... classical methods, which pose as 
guardians of that ideal, in fact violate it at every turn; virtually none of those methods can 
be applied without a generous helping of personal judgement and arbitrary assumption 
(Howson and Urbach 1993: 12). 
As we saw above, subjectivists think that different individuals may reasonably have different 
degrees of belief in a hypothesis h given the same evidence e. Their concept of rational belief 
does not require a consensus based on logical laws, but is centred. in the notion of coherence, 
which is at the very heart of their method of establishing the axioms of probability. 
According to the subjective theory of probability, the measure of an individual's 
degree of belief in a proposition h is calculated by the extent to which he is prepared to act on 
h. Usually, this degree of belief in h is such that it leads to a corresponding action. The 
action is revealed in a betting situation. So, the strength of my belief that the sun will rise 
tomorrow can be measured by the rate at which I am prepared to bet on this proposition. This 
is described by Gillies as a psychological experiment in which a person bets on a certain 
outcome in a way that his betting measures his degree of belief that the outcome will happen. 
The bets are in money and the amount should be high enough to force the person to decide 
his degree of belief carefully (see Gillies 2000: 55f). 
The rate at which I am prepared to bet on h is my betting quotient, generally 
represented by the letter q. Given a stake S, the value I have to pay in exchange for S in case 
h is true is given by the value qS. In the situation proposed, the stake S is placed by someone 
else and can be positive (corresponding to my bet in favour of h being true) or negative 
(corresponding to my bet that h is false, that is, to my bet against h). Now, consider a 
situation in which I do not know of any additional infon-nation that could confer an advantage 
or a disadvantage to any side of the bet and then distort my degree of belief in h, I. e. that I do It) 
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not know whether the stake is negative or positive. Given this set-up, we have a "Dutch 
Book" if my betting quotients are such that they pen-nit my counterpart to choose a set of 
stakes S that leads me to lose money whatever the outcome is, which is clearly an undesirable 
situation for me. As a result, I will have a reasonable chance in a betting situation as long as I 
adopt a quotient that does not allow a Dutch Book to be made against me. 
What Ramsey and de Finetti demonstrated was that, in order for a set of betting 
quotients not to be subjected to a Dutch Book, the set of betting quotients (i. e. the assignment 
of probabilities) must be coherent, that is, it must satisfy the axioms of probability. In other 
words, my degree of belief in h taken as my disposition in acting in conformity with h must 
obey the axioms of probability calculus if I want to avoid a completely undesirable situation, 
which is losing money whatever happens. This necessity of conforming my degree of belief 
in a hypothesis h to the axioms of probability to avoid a Dutch Book is called the condition of 
coherence. From the condition of coherence which emerges from the Dutch Book argument, 
the Ramsey-de Finetti theorem deduced all the axioms of probability calculus, showing that 
those axioms are both necessary and sufficient for a degree of belief to be coherent 6. 
According to Gillies, this achievement is a strong argument in favour of the subjective theory, 
since it shows it as at least one of the valid interpretation of the calculus (see Gillies 
2000: 64). 
For the subjectivists, the axioms of probability calculus are not only an argument in 
favour of the subjective theory, but also a constraint on the assignment of prior probabilities 
in Bayes's theorem. For them, as we saw above, there Is no universal a priori rule to direct 
the attribution of priors, or, in Swinburne's terminology, there are no such things as intrinsic 
probabilities forced upon any rational being. For the subjective theory, each individual may 
6 For the proof of the Ramsey-de Finetti theorem, see Gillies (2000: 59-64) or Howson and Urbach (1993: 78- 
84). 
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assign to a hypothesis h the prior probability he thinks is correct as long as he complies with 
the axioms of the calculus, that is, as long as he is coherent in his estimate. A rational 
estimate of probability for a subjectivist is a coherent one, and not one that is guided by 
alleged universally correct a priori criteria of induction. 
However, as the critics of the subjective theory correctly point out (see, for example, 
Swinburne 2001a: 121), the coherence condition is compatible with an enormous range of 
probability estimations. This is a particularly difficult problem once we bear in mind that the 
subjective theory offers its conception as an account of scientific procedure (see, for example, 
de Finetti 1989: 173). Like Swinbume, many subjectivists see confin-nation as a probability 
relation in which Bayes's theorem is crucial in describing how evidence can confirm a 
hypothesis. Yet if each person may attribute a probability to a certain hypothesis which 
corresponds to his particular degree of belief in that hypothesis, what happens to the 
objectivity we expect from scientific reasoning? Bayes's theorem plays a crucial role in the 
subjectivists' answer to this question. 
As I said in Chapter 1.2.1 (p. 17), Bayes's theorem follows from the axioms of the 
probability calculus. From the mathematical point of view then, it is not controversial, and, 
in Bayesian circles, it is universally recognised as a condition for a coherent probability 
estimate. In Swinburne's application of Bayes's theorem to the justification of theism, there 
is an emphasis on one aspect of the kind of result this inferential tool can furnish, namely the 
final posterior probability we reach after considering the correct prior probability to be 
assigned to the theistic hypothesis (following his principle of simplicity) and the likelihood 
calculations (i. e. the probability of each piece of evidence in view of that hypothesis). Still, 
instead of stressing the establishment of a final posterior probability which should be 
accepted by any rational being, the subjective theory of probability sees Bayes's theorem as a 
fon-nula that regulates the way in which beliefs are updated on the receipt of evidence. In 
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other words, Bayes's theorem is seen by the subjectivists as a way of revising our previous 
opinion (i. e. our degree of belief prior to evidence) in view of pertinent data. Clearly, this is 
not a matter of conflicting views on this occasion, but simply one of emphasis, since 
Swinburne recognises the revising properties of the Bayesian rule while the subjectivists see 
it as a way of achieving a final posterior probability. The difference in emphasis, however, 
tells us something about the orientation of their respective theories of probability. 
It is in the idea that Bayes's theorem is a device for upgrading degrees of belief that 
the subjectivists find the answer to the problem of the objectivity of scientific probability 
estimations in science. In subjectivist terms, the problem could be interpreted as whether 
there is a betting quotient that is not only coherent and fair to a particular III but also 
objectively fair, i. e. that corresponds to the frequencies or any non-subjective measure of the 
occurrence of a state of affairs. The answer is given by the principle of Bayesian 
conditionalisation we saw in Chapter 4.3 (pp. I 19ff. ), according to which, the more data we 
learn that refers to our hypothesis h (i. e. data that are purportedly explained by our 
hypothesis) the more our prior probability for h approximates to its consensual or objective 
value. In this way, through the updating of opinion in the light of evidence, individuals who 
disagree about the prior probabilities of a given hypothesis and then attribute different values 
to it will come gradually to a convergence, which means that they will abandon their initial 
private opinions in favour of one that is more in conformity with evidence. 
This point becomes clear with an example formulated by the Bayesian statistician 
Lawrence Phillips. The situation is of an unscrupulous gambler who, by a lapse of his own, 
has two coins in his pocket, one fair and one biased which comes down heads about 60% of 
the time. He wants to play with the biased one, so that he can increase his probability of 
winning, but he cannot distinguish one coin from the other, which means he initially 
attributes probability of 0.5 to both the hypotheses (i. e. that he is playing with the biased one 
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or wit the fair one). Suppose there is another player who accuses him of unfairness (based, 
perhaps, on the way the unscrupulous gambler had previously behaved) and declares he is 
prepared to bet on a 0.8-0.2 chance that the coin is biased, that is, this player gives a prior 
probability of 0.8 to the hypothesis that the coin is unfair and 0.2 to it to being fair. In doing 
so, both contenders are complying with the axioms of probability calculus, since the total sum 
of their initial estimates is 1. 
Recall that Bayes's theorem is composed basically of two elements, namely prior 
probability and likelihood. In the present example, the prior probabilities are assigned as 
above. The next step then is to determine likelihoods in order to see how the prior opinions 
are updated in the light of evidence and whether there is really convergence of belief degree 
after considering the data. In contrast with their view about prior probability, likelihoods for 
the subjectivists are constituted from public data, that, although informed by categories that 
depend on the way the research was set up, do not reflect the personal opinion of any 
individual, but is the objective or consensual part of the Bayesian inference. Assume then 
that the players in our example flip the coin ten times in two series of five and produce the 
following sequence: HHTHHHHHTH, that is, the coin under scrutiny came up heads (H) 
eight times and tails (T) two times. Now, given that the tosses are independent of each other, 
in order to find the likelihoods we can apply the second corollary to the third law of 
probability, according to which P(A and B)= P(A)xP(B). So, we have for the first five 
throws: 
P(H and Hand T and Hand Hlfair coin)= 0.5xO. 5xO. 5xO. 5xO. 5 =(0.5)5= 0.03125 
P(H and H and T and H and Hlbiased coin)= 0.6 x 0.6 x 0.4 x 0.6 x 0.6 = (0.6)4 X 0.4 = 
0.05184 
ConsIder these values for one of the forms of Bayes's theorem gIven In page 18, 
according to which 
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P(hi / e) 
P(e / h) x P(hi) 
I P(hj) x P(e / hj) 
Then we will have for the gambler's probabilities: 
Hypotheses Priors Likelihoods Priors x 
Likelihoods 
Sums (E) Postenors 
Fair 0.5 0.03125 0.015625 0.041545 0.38 
Biased 0.5 0.05184 0.02592 0.041545 0.62 
And for the other player's: 
Hypotheses Priors Likelihoods Priors x 
Likelihoods 
Sums (E) Posteriors 
Fair 0.2 0.03125 0.00625 0.047722 0.13 
Biased 0.8 0.05184 0.041472 0.047722 0.87 
After five tosses, the players' initial disagreement as to whether the coin used was fair 
fell from 0.3 (to the gambler: 0.5, to the other player: 0.2) to 0.38 - 0.13= 0.25, which means 
a slight convergence of opinions. After the other series of five tosses, however, we have the 
following results (consider that, according to the conditionalisation rule, the new priors must 
be equal to the last posteriors): 
For the gambler: 
Hypotheses Priors Likelihoods Priors x 
Likelihoods 
Sums (E) Posteriors 
Fair 0.38 0.03125 0.011875 0.044016 0.27 
Biased 0.62 0.05184 0.032141 0.044016 0.73 
And for the other player: 
Hypotheses Priors Likelihoods Priors x 
Likelihoods 
Sums (E) Postenors 
Fair 0.13 0.03125 0.004062 0.049163 0.08 
F Biased 0.87 0.05184 0.045101 0.049163 0.92 
As a result, their opinions as to whether the coin was fair had to converge a little more 
after another series of tosses, falling from 0.25 to 0.27 - 0.08 = 0.19 in a way that was 
confinning the other player's suspicion that the coin was biased. 
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The above example illustrates the idea behind de Finetti's convergence theorem (also 
known as the exchangeability condition), according to which rival subjective opinions tend 
towards a consensual or objective value as long as evidence comes in, so that they will finally 
converge to a single value. To use logical tenninology, to the subjective theory, prior 
probabilities are the premises the inference starts from, and which are updated in view of 
relevant data. If the starting premises are corrected upon the reception of evidence, it does 
not really matter which premise one commences from, as long as the conditionalisation rule 
is obeyed. In fact, the revision of our prior probability in accordance with Bayes's theorem 
after obtaining data is a matter of coherence, since this theorem is part of the probability 
calculus. As Phillips claims, 
It is this feature of Bayes' theorem that saves Bayesian statistics from being wholly 
subjective. Initially subjective opinion is brought into contact with data through the 
operation of Bayes' theorem, and with enough data differing prior opinions are made to 
converge. This comes about because the prior opinions become less and less relevant to 
posterior opinion as more and more data are observed. Prior opinion is swamped out by 
the data, so that posterior opinion is controlled solely by the data. For a Bayesian, this is 
the only way in which data can 'speak for themselves' (Phillips 1973: 78). 
According to the subjective theory, we do not need any criteria apart from the axioms of 
probability to attribute prior probabilities and we can be satisfied with this procedure. We 
can stick to the idea that probabilities are individual degrees of belief, and so, in our 
confirmation theory, accept the fact that there is an unavoidable subjective element in 
scientific theorising, without dismissing the notion that scientific reasoning is in the end 
based on objective grounds. 
This claim, however , is not 
free from criticism. In the next section, I will analyse 
some of the problems in the subjective theory - particularly some raised by Swinburne - in 
order to suggest a more adequate account of probability for dealing with the question of 
theistic belief from a Bayesian point of view. 
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3. Arguments against Subjective Bayesianism 
Criticisms of the subjective theory of probability can be divided into those external to 
the Bayesian sphere and those internal to it. By criticisms external to the Bayesian field, I 
mean those coming from theories of scientific reasoning that reject any decisive role for 
Bayes's formula in the interpretation and critique of scientific method. Since this thesis 
intends to propose an alternative use of Bayes's theorem and religious experience in the 
epistemology of theism to the one proposed by Swinbume, the discussion of the limits of 
Bayesianism as a whole may well seem clearly out of my scope. Moreover, the problem of 
whether the Bayesian proposal furnishes an adequate account of scientific procedure would 
deserve a thesis (or many) on its own. 
Nevertheless, the discussion of two important difficulties with the Bayesian approach, 
namely the arbitrariness involving prior probability assignments and the old evidence 
problem, will prove particularly useful for the construction of my alternative proposal in the 
final chapter. These criticisms will be important because of the replies given to them by the 
Bayesian side, which will help me to formulate my own approach in Chapter 8. 
However, before discussing the external criticisms to the Bayesian method, I will 
analyse some remarks directed particularly against the subjective theory of Bayesian 
probability. Being a thesis devoted to Swinburrie's epistemology of theistic belief, I cannot 
fail to consider his own observations against the subjective approach. Subsequently I will 
expound a Bayesian theory of probability that attempts to incorporate some of the virtues of 
subjectivism, but that takes into account the main criticisms against the subjective theory. 
3.1 Some of Swinbume's criticisms of subjectivism 
By far the most common criticism of the subjective theory in confirmation theory is 
that it is incompatible with the ideal of objectivity in science. This sort of accusation seems 
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particularly fitted to de Finetti's account of subjectivism in which the only criterion for 
attributing prior probabilities is coherence. According to Maria Carla Galavotti, this position 
amounts to a pragmatist and anti-realist conception of probability (see Galavott' 1989: 239 
and 242). In other words, since the only restriction upon prior probabilities is compliance 
with the probability axioms, and since this can potentially be done III in an infinite number of 
ways, and since prior probability is a matter of an individual scientist's opinion, then this 
prior can hardly be an objective indication of what the world is like. In this sense, de 
Finetti's probability is fundamentally an instrument for reasoning and behaving in situations 
of uncertainty. It is a degree of personal belief that is guided by a prudential requirement 
given by the Dutch Book argument, not an objective measure of truth. 
Indeed it is to the difficulties of subjectivism in accounting for scientific reasoning 
that Swinburne directs most of his criticisms of the subjective theory. In contrast to An 
Introduction to Confirmation Theory (1973), where the subjective theory is dismissed rather 
quickly, Swinburne offers a much more careftil analysis of subjectivism in Epistemic 
Justification (2001). As in (1973), he holds that the subjective theory of probability is not 
aule to provide an adequate account of scientific induction, since the appeal to individual 
degrees of belief may lead us to all kinds of conclusions on the basis of the evidence 
available (see Swinburne 1973: 24). If the only criterion we have for assigning a probability 
value is what we believe to be true, then in fact there will be no way to tell when our 
inductive inference reaches a wrong conclusion. if we follow the subjective theory then 
anything goes, for there will be neither true nor false probability judgements, but only 
consistent or inconsistent ones. Swinburne claims, however, 'surely no one really believes 
that any way of extrapolating data and reaching predictions about the future is as likely to 
give true results as any other' (Swinburne 2001 a: 69). As we saw in the first section of this 
chapter, he believes that there are correct criteria of inductive probability, which almost all 
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accept as provi ing correct guides about what makes what probable. In mixing up the correct 
inductive patterns provided by the axioms of probability calculus and the subject's own 
cn*ten*a,, the subjective theory incurs the sin of arbitrariness (see Swinbume 2001 a: 70). 
Even if we refuse Swinburne's idea that the axioms of probability calculus should be 
adopted because they capture our ordinary a priori criteria of what is evidence for what (see 
Swinburne 2001 a: 119), it is difficult to deny the importance of a priori considerations in this 
matter. In spite of the problems with Swinburne's principle of simplicity, he really appears to 
have a point when he affirins that the assignment of prior probabilities requires the 
postulation of a priori grounds. This is so because resorting to contingent evidence has to 
stop when all empirical information has already been included, and yet it may be the case that 
we still have many rival hypotheses to choose from. In this kind of situation, the different 
hypotheses '[ ... ] can be determined only on a priori grounds (by considerations of simplicity 
and scope). There must be intrinsic probabilities if there are to be any prior probabilities, and 
only if there are prior probabilities can there be posterior probabilities of initial conditions' 
win ume 2001 a: 115). 
As I will claim in the final section of this chapter, the fact that we accept the need for 
additional constraints to the axioms of probability for the ascription of priors does not mean 
we have to embrace a theory of probability of the sort postulated by Swinburne. In particular, 
we may adopt the idea that science is a rational enterprise without postulating any criteria 
whose character and applicability are universal and independent of the values and concepts 
shared by a given scientific community. The additional criteria for correct evaluations of 
what makes what probable may have their roots in the inter-subjective agreement of the 
researchers' community instead of being universally applicable standards known to a 
logically omniscient being. 
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However, before developing the notion of inter- subjective probability, let us discuss 
another criticism of the subjective theory, whose consequences will be relevant to my 
proposal for using Bayes's theorem in the epistemology of theism. 
3.2 The limits of convergence theorems 
As we saw in section 2, the main subjectivist reply to the charge of it being untrue to 
scientific objectivity was the idea that prior probabilities do not really matter, for they are 
washed out by likelihood calculations after we take account of the evidence. As a result, 
initially divergent priors become more and more convergent, leading to an eventual 
consensus on the posterior probabilities of the rival hypotheses. Consequently, the 
subjectivists claim, we need not worry about any a priori criteria for adjusting prior 
probabilities, since the implausible ones will be necessarily discharged as we learn from 
evidence. Taking Swinburne's illustration, for example (see Swinbume 2001 a: 64), those 
who ascribe a high prior to the hypothesis that cyanide will nourish tomorrow given past 
records and very awkward and idiosyncratic inductive criteria would see their prior reduced 
to zero very quickly (and possibly with some unpleasant consequences) after taking into 
consideration new pieces of evidence relevant to the subject. 
Yet, for the convergence theorems to work, they must be governed by objective and 
stringent criteria. And there are real doubts about whether such criteria are available to the 
subjective theorist. Initially, as Swinbume notices, the traditional Dutch book arguments by 
which subjectivism justifies the only constraint on the assignment of priors - the probability 
axioms - do not justify the use of the rule of conditionalisation that is crucial for the 
operation of convergence theorems. In his words: 
The Dutch-book style arguments that justify subjective Bayesianism, however, require 
only that my allocation of probabilities at a given time should conform to the calculus; they 
do not prohibit my changing my allocations entirely at some subsequent time in accord 
Nvith a rule not deternimed in advance. So why should I not refuse to learn from 
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experience ... so 
long as my allocations of probability at the later time conjointly conform 
to the calculus? (Swinburne 2001 a: 247). 
In fact, subjectivists like Howson & Urbach recognise that there is no unconditional 
justification for the Bayesian condi I111111 principle, that is, there is nothing in the 
subjective theory that obliges me to take new evidence into consideration if I do not want to 
do so. Once I submit my previous belief to change through new evidence, I have to update 
my prior probability otherwise I will be victim of a Dutch book (see Howson & Urbach 1993: 
103-4). Yet, one could argue that not only is the disposition of learning from new evidence 
part of the scientific ethos, which is something subjectivism fails to take into account, but 
also that without this objective obligation the conditionalisation rule could not play its role in 
the convergence theorems. In other words, there will be no convergence to certainty if there 
in light of additional is nothing that makes the contenders re-evaluate their previous positions IIII 
evidence. 
Still, the problems posed by convergence theorems to subjectivism are not restricted 
to its failure to justify the willingness to learn from experience. According to Mary Hesse, 
they can only lead to a total consensus under very specific conditions. Firstly, all hypotheses 
to be confirmed must have a finite initial probability, since extreme values (I and 0) will not 
give the expected convergence results (see Hesse 1975: 74). Yet, one of the contenders may 
well assign one of these values if they are constrained only by their individual degrees of 
belief In addition, the application of results from chance games like coin-tossing and dice- 
throwing does not always apply in scientific contexts, since the analogy between betting 
situations and theory assessment in science is very weak (see Hesse 1975: 58). In fact, the 
application of convergence theorems to scientific theory choice requires two statistical 
conditions that do not make much sense in normal scientific contexts. First, convergence 
theorems make what is called the randomness assumption, according to which, 'given a 
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particular hypothesis hs, the probability of making the test which yields ei is independent of 
the particular order in which it and other evidence is observed' (Hesse 1975: 77). However, 
what distinguishes most scientific activity from statistics is that the former requires structured 
experiments, deliberately designed to test a hypothesis in a precise order. As a result, the 
randomness assumption demanded for convergence theorems to work can only be applied to 
scientific inferences about matters that involve random sampling - as we have in social 
sciences surveys for example - which rules out much of interesting scientific theory choice. 
Second, convergence theorems require that the pieces of evidence involved be independent, 
that is, the outcome of evidence ej should not interfere in the probability of evidence e2, or in 
symbolic tenns P(ej. e21h) = P(ellh) x P(e2lh) 7. However, this assumption is not always valid 
in scientific contexts either. As Hesse asserts, 'rather than conducting a large number of 
independent tests of the same hypothesis, scientific hypotheses are often themselves modified 
in the light of evidence, and new tests devised for the new hypothesis, with the new results of 
previous evidence assumed' (Hesse 1975: 78). Thus, the convergence theorems, which are 
plainly applicable to chance games contexts, seem quite restricted as devices for conferring 
objectivity to probabilities previously assigned in subjective tenns only. 
John Ean-nan is even more of a sceptic than Hesse with regard to the power of 
convergence theorems to account for the objectivity of theoretical activity in science. His 
scepticism is largely due to the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence. 
Broadly speaking this problem states that evidence is ultimately impotent to guide the choice 
between rival hypotheses since the same set of data can be explained by different and 
incompatible theories, for, as has been argued since Hume, no finite number of evidential 
statements can demonstrate a universal statement. In other words, the same body of evidence 
See a sinular point in Gillies (2000: 77). 
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can be said to confirm totally different and incompatible hypotheses. This problem is not 
new to this thesis since I mentioned it when I presented Swinburne's discussion of the curve- 
fitting problem (see Chapter 3, p-63). Once many rival irreconcilable theories, that make for 
totally different curves can all account for the same data represented as points in a graph, the 
choice among these theories cannot be settled on a posteriori terms only, that is, in terms of 
evidence. The solution suggested by Swinburne is that we need impersonal, a priori, and 
universal criteria for assessing the hypotheses one against the other so that the choice can be 
rationally oriented. Earman, however, despairs of Swinburne-type solutions since they are 
not workable, and if they were, they would not be sufficient to explain scientific objectivity 
given their controversial and artificial character (see Earman 1992: 139-40). In addition, 
Earman sees the underdetermination problem as destroYing the hopes of subjective 
Bayesianism along with those of convergence theorems. 
The problem of underdetermination requires that convergence theorems presuppose 
some form of consensus in the scientific community in order for them to account for 
scientific objectivity. For example, it requires an agreement among all individuals involved 
concerning the model that serves to establish the form of the likelihood calculations and their 
relative weighting functions (see Ean-nan 1992: 148). In other words, in order to achieve the 
results expected by subjective Bayesians, the scientists assessing a set of rival hypotheses 
have to agree about the parameters that will guide the degree by which evidence e is made 
probable by a certain hypothesis h in P(elh). Given this substantive assumption, the theorems 
postulate that in the long run the different priors will converge to certainty. The problem, 
however 
, is that the assumptions cannot 
be granted unless we abandon a strict subjectivist 
framework. Further, we may never have enough time to reach convergence of opinion, or as 
Keynes said in another context, 'in the long run we are all dead' (see Earman. 1992: 148). 
Worse than that, however, is the fact that 'scientists often agree that a particular theory is 
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better supported by one experimental finding than another ( ... ). What happens in the Iong or 
the short run when additional pieces of evidence are added is irrelevant to the explanation of 
shared judgements about the evidential value of present evidence' (Earman 1992: 149). In 
other words, given the dynamism and speed of scientific research, the convergence theorem 
results in confirmation theory produce a very imprecise account of what happens in theory 
choice in science. 
In addition, as John Vickers well observes , if subjectivism wants to be a respectable 
account of scientific reasoning, then it needs to account for the relationship between 
probability and truth (see Vickers 1989: 398). Vickers mentions two main options for 
Bayesianism at this point. First, we can reduce the subject of believing to an idealised figure, 
like Swinburne's logically omniscient being, in which the relationship between truth and 
probability is given by a priori, impersonal and universal inductive laws and by the 
knowledge of all logical relations involved in a probability proposition. Second, there is the 
alternative of conceiving probability not as an ideal individual's degree of belief but as the 
degree of belief of a selected group, for example, the scientific community, which would be 
taken as the source of the criteria for any probability assignment to be considered 'correct'. 
For Vickers, therefore, the notion of probability as the subjective opinion assumed by an 
individual is unacceptable as it stands and needs a reformulation on one of the above lines. 
In other words, convergence theorems are not very helpful to subjectivism as an 
account of scientific inference, unless it is submitted to a reformulation regarding the way 
probability is related to truth. 
3.3 Deborah Mayo and the rejection of Bayeslanism 
Deborah Mayo is another author who rejects the idea that a purely subjective estimate 
Of prior probability has any bearing upon scientific reasoning. In contrast with Vickers, 
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however, she does not see any prospect of granting prior probabilities an important place in 
the account of scientific theoretical activity. According to Mayo, Bayesianism is not an 
adequate account of scientific reasoning since it is at odds with real practice. One of the main 
reasons for this is that the Bayesian statistical methods of analysis are very little used in real 
experimental science. Moreover, scientists keep on using experimental methods and 
statistical tools that the Bayesians are very keen to criticise (see Mayo 1996: 71). In addition 
to that empirical issue, Mayo holds that the Bayesian approach fails to provide the ampliative 
rules needed to understand the inductive process in scientific contexts. Bayesians also find it 
hard to comply with the objectivity expected fTom scientific reasoning. Once again, the need 
for prior probability assignments is at the root of this failure to account for scientific 
objectivity. 
As I observed earlier, given the purposes of this thesis, I do not intend to stand in the 
crossfire between Bayesians and anti-Bayesians. So, Mayo's criticisms will serve me as long 
as they permit me to reveal the problems of both the logical and the subjective theones of 
Bayesian probability so that I can formulate an alternative to them in the last section of this 
chapter. Bearing this proviso in mind, what we have, according to Mayo, is that the problem 
with the logical Bayesian project is that it could not deliver what it promised. In other words, 
it failed to show that the degree of confinnation that evidence e affords to a hypothesis h is a 
fonnal, impersonal, a priori matter. Particularly referring to Camap's attempt to assign 
priors by deducing them from the logical structure of a particular first order language, Mayo 
observes three main failures in that account. Firstly, the formal languages proposed by 
Camap were too restricted to account for scientific inferences. Secondly, given the restrictive 
and purely a priori character of his chosen syntactical system, the assigned prior probabilities 
were hardly logically relevant to any empirical hypothesis. Thirdly, in order to justify the 
option for the axioms and postulates to be used in his logically dnven assignment of priors, 
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Carnap had to resort to a claim for the intuitive character of the constitutive elements of his 
system (see Mayo 1996: 73). 
The reasons for Carnap's failure in assigning prior probabilities in purely logical 
terins can apply to some extent to Swinburne's attempt as well. A crucial difference is that 
Swinbume does not propose a formal semantic and logical system from which to define 
principles and theorems of inductive logic which are purely analytic (see Camap 1950: v). In 
fact, as we saw in Chapter 3, Swinburne gives to his principle of simplicity, his main criterion 
for assigning prior probabilities, a synthetic a priori and even an ontological character, 
assuming that the principle expresses a structural fact about the world, namely that it is 
fundamentally simple (see, for example, Swinburne 2001a: 96). This difference, however, 
does not seem to count in favour of Swinburne, since Carnap's intention in constructing his 
probability system in analytic terms was to keep the confirmation relationship between 
hypothesis and evidence strictly in the logical field. In appealing to synthetic a priori 
principles, Swinbume leaves himself more exposed to the charge of being unfaithful to the 
ideal of a logical theory of probability at all. In addition, his claim that the principle of 
simplicity is intuitive and accepted by all rational persons (see Swinburne 2001 a: 155) suffers 
from the same dubious efficacy as Carnap's justification. 
Given all these problems in the logical theory, Mayo quickly dismisses its attempt to 
justify prior probability assignments in objective tenns and concentrates her criticisms on the 
subjective approach 8. As we saw, the subjective Bayesians relinquish any hope of assigning 
prior probabilities in a neutral logical way, estimating their values by reference to personal 
degrees of belief while respecting the condition of coherence stated by the probability 
axioms. It does not matter whether these prior opinions vary from person to person or from 
8 For a comparison between the types of probability involved In Carnap's and de Flnetti's progranunes, see 
Constantini (1989). 
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moment to moment, but only that they cohere with the individual's beliefs posterior to the 
data according to Bayes's theorem (either through conditionalisation or by changing the prior 
assigriment). 
However, Mayo holds, there are good reasons to question whether scientists' prior 
beliefs in the hypotheses they are investigating should figure so centrally in the philosophical 
account of scientific learning from data. Against the subjective account there is the common 
view that 'in science, it seems, we want to know what the data are saYing quite apart from the 
opinions we start out with' (Mayo 1996: 76). Except for the cases where prior probabilities 
are assigned in a frequentist way, and as long as logical probabilities will not do, we need to 
ascribe the priors in a subjectivist manner. However, Mayo claims, 'knowledge of the world, 
many think, is best promoted by excluding so far as possible personal opinions, preferences 
and biases' (Mayo 1996: 82). As a result, for her, Bayesianism does not provide a good 
account of scientific reasoning. Not only is it at odds with real scientific practice, but it also 
depends on the problematic notion of prior probability. In sum, if subjective Bayesianism, 
which is at least coherent, fails, logical Bayesianism fares even worse. 
Now, as I said, I do not intend to defend Bayesianism as the correct description of 
scientific practice, since that claim is not important to my proposal. However, there are good 
reasons to take Bayesianism as an illuminating formal account of inductive reasoning that can 
help us in the problem of the justification of theism. 
3.4 Bayesianism as an account of induction 
As we saw previously, there are two main components in a Bayesian inference: 
likelihood calculations, which are the objective part of the process since it Is where evidence 
comes in; and prior probabilities. Some of the most important criticisms of Bayesianism in 
general and in particular of its subjective version refer to the role and assignment of prior 
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probabilities. Priors are the starting point of the inductive process and are defined by an 
individual's degree of belief - in the subjective view - or by some strict logical relations, 
like Swinburne. In fact, most authors today refer to the Bayesian according to logi I 
approach as containing a subjective account of prior probabilities, given the enonnous K- 
difficulties in establishing priors on logical tenns only 9. 
According to Bruno de Finetti, the assigmnent of prior probabilities is a prerequisite 
for any inductive inference carried out in a rational way. In other words, if, following Hume, 
we take induction as a type of reasoning from past experiences to expectations about the 
ftiture, then one of the main assumptions of this process is that the future will resemble the 
past in a regular way. All this then involves dealing with beliefs in the fon-n of expectations, 
assumptions and hypotheses. Clearly our expectations may prove false, that is, the future 
event may not bear out the assumption that the future will be like the past. So for an account 
of this process to adequately express the character of scientific reasoning, it should not only 
reflect the main components involved in scientific inference, but it should also furnish 
instruments for correcting the initial expectations and assumptions that guided our 
observations. 
The Bayesian approach takes induction as the confinnation of a hypothesis by 
evidence under the terms of Bayes's theorem. This means, de Finetti claims, that 'all the 
assumptions are expressed, in a sense, as an assignment of initial probabilities, to be changed 
into the final probabilities after the observations are taken into account... ' (de Finetti 1969: 
3). In other words, the Bayesian approach is capable of describing induction as a dynamic 
doxastic process, respecting the central part beliefs play in it, and providing a way of 
correcting our beliefs according to the observations we make. On these grounds, the concept 
9 Another reason for treating only the subjective version under the heading of Bayeslamsm is that It is 
commonly viewed as by far the most accepted approach in this particular theory of probability (see, for 
example, Vickers 1989: 397). 
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of prior probabilities is an inevitable part of a rational account of inductive inference, since it 
describes our starting point in this process of theonsing about the future based on past 
experiences. 
According to Irving J. Good, the inevitability of considering prior probabilities in the 
interpretation of inductive inference means that we had better take them into consideration 
explicitly, because otherwise they will just be swept under the carpet. Good advances a very 
common response to the critics of subjective elements in Bayesian epistemology, namely that 
the subjective elements they suppress by eliminating prior probabilities return in other points 
of their account. As we saw in section 2, subjectivists argue that personal judgement in 
assessing probabilities and evaluating theories is part of the inductive process whether we 
like it or not. So. for example, while every event in real life is totally unique, in order to deal 
with events in induction we categonse them in terms of properties that charactense samples. 
Now, the sample under which a frequency groups the individual occurrences involves moves 
based on personal judgement. Even in the likelihood calculations, the least disputable part of 
a probabilistic inference, we have the influence of subjective elements, for, as Good says, 
There is no dispute about the numerical values of likelihoods if your basic parametric 
model is accepted. Of course you usually have to use subjective judgement in laying down 
your parametric model. Now the hidebound objectivist tends to hide that fact... the bad 
subjectivists are the people with bad or dishonest judgement and also the people who do 
not make their assumptions clear when communicating with other people. But, on the 
other hand, there are no good 100% (hidebound) objectivists; they are all bad (laughter) 
because they sweep their judgements UTC [under the carpet] (Good 1976: 143). 
The problem with the critics of personal estimates of prior probabilities then is that they 
speak as if we could eliminate any trace of judgement in inductive inference. According to 
Good, Bayesianism has the virtue of respecting the judging element that inevitably occurs in 
the assessment of all theory while also providing a means of checking and correcting personal 
judgement, in order to increase its objectivity and coherence. So Bayes's theorem represents 
this tool for perfecting and updating our assumptions and initial beliefs in view of observation 
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and arguments, and prior probabilities reflect the unavoidable role that personal judgement 
has in inductive inferences. 
A critic of subjective Bayesianism could well concede the point about the importance 
of stating prior probabilities in an adequate account of rational induction, but he could still 
question why this should be left to the arbitrariness of the individual's decision. What 
Swinburne proposes with his criteria for theory choice is precisely to eliminate any element 
of subjectivity from the assignment of priors by reducing this operation to a logical process. 
If my arguments above are correct, however, he does not succeed in some important respects. 
Yet, this does not mean there is no way of preserving the notion of prior probabilities or of 
increasing its objectivity save by resorting to Swinburne's option. Before we discuss an 
alternative proposal for solving the problem of prior probabilities estimates, however, let us 
elaborate on another problem put by external critics of Bayesianism. 
The Bayesian interpretation of induction pen-nits us to see induction not only as a 
means of predicting the future, but also of explaining the past, that is, of giving a correct 
account of evidence already known, a form of induction called 'inference to the best 
explanation'. This property of the Bayesian epistemology, however, is seen by some as the 
Achilles' heel of this account, since it makes Bayesianism vulnerable to the problem of old 
evidence. 
3.5 The old evidence problem 
The problem of old evidence refers to the temporal position of a piece of evidence vis- 
A-vis the hypothesis under assessment. Our common intuition is that a piece of recalcitrant 
evidence, which is already known, and which has not yet been provided with a satisfactory 
explanation, gives a high degree of confirmation to the theory that finally accounts for it. The 
problem for Bayesianism comes up when we assume that the degree of confirmation of a 
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hypothesis h given evidence e is measured by the difference between the probability of h in 
viewof eand of h in itself Symbolically we have: S(h, e)=P(hle) - P(h), where S(h, e) stands 
for the support given by e to h. Now, in a situation when an occurrence is an accepted fact 
for the scientific community, the probability of e is 1. Consequently, in Bayes's theorem, 
P(h1e) will be equal or less than P(h) (provided that P(elh):! 5; 1), and the degree of support of 
an old evidence e for h (S(h, e)) will then be 0 or negative. This result runs counter to the 
prevalent intuition in the scientific community and in common sense which sees the account 
of recalcitrant old evidence as sometimes more crucial than the explanation of a new one. An 
example of this is the confirmation for Einstein's theory of general relativity provided by the 
explanation of the anomalous advance of the perihelion of Mercury, a phenomenon that had 
been studied for a long time and was perfectly known to astronomers (see Earman 1992: 
119). 
Referring to Swinburne's use of the Bayesian approach as a model for scientific 
reasoning to be used in the justification of theism, Adolf GrUnbaurn puts the problem the 
following way: 
Yet M the case of old evidence as defined, i. e. facts already known, how can Swinburne 
avoid conceding that the expectedness in the denominator is equal to 1, and argue 
effectively that it is less than 1? The circumvention of an expectedness equal to I is 
crucial, if there is to be incremental confirmation of h. As noted in Section 5.2, the 
condition for such confinnation is that the likelihood in the numerator exceeds the 
expectedness in the denominator. But since no probability value or product of such values 
can exceed the value 1, this condition for incremental confirmation cannot be met if the 
expectedness equals I (see GrUnbaurn 2000: 37). 
To analyse this problem, let us recall Bayes's theorem once again, using the version 
most frequently employed by Swinburne: 
P(h / e. k) - 
P(e / h. k) x P(h / k) 
P(e / k) 
What GrUnbaurn claims is that, since e is already known, P(elk), that is, the 
expectedness of e (the probability of its occurrence anyway) will be 1. If so, P(elh. k) cannot 
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be higher than P(elk), since the latter has already the maximum value allowed by the 
probability calculus. In this case, since the consideration of evidence can only add to the 
value of prior probability if P(elh. k)>P(elk), then all the pieces of evidence considered by 
Swinbume, which are all classifiable as old evidence, cannot increase the probability of 
theism one iota, which is a terrible result for a Bayesian programme in the epistemology of 
theistic belief 
However, as both logicists like Swinbume and subjectivists like Colin Howson and 
Peter Urbach agree in accepting, we should not attribute value I to P(elk) in a Bayesian 
calculation, even if e is actually already known. Instead, e should be estimated on the 
counter-factual supposition that one does not yet know it so that we can measure the 
difference it makes to the probability of our belief, given the rest of our background 
knowledge k (whose value is indeed 1). According to Howson & Urbach, assigning value I 
to P(elk) reveals a misapplication of Bayes's theorem. The probability should be relativised 
to current knowledge minus e. 'The reason for the restriction', they argue, 'is, of course, that 
your current assessment of the support of h by e measures the extent to which, in your 
opinion, the addition of e to your current stock of knowledge would cause a change in your 
degree of belief in h' (Howson & Urbach 1993: 403). In other words, since e is under 
question, that is, since we are aiming to explain it, its prior probability P(elk), which is the 
measure of its happening without any explanation other than background knowledge, has to 
be taken to be less than 1. It is because the theories we already know are not sufficient to 
explain e that the evidence will have a low prior probability in view of it. Consequently, if e 
is a puzzling fact that demands explanation, its value in a confirmatory context should not be 
since it has not yet been satisfactonly accounted for. 
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Even if this argument does not settle the matter entirely '0, these considerations are 
important in highlighting a property of the Bayesian account of the confirmatory relationship 
between evidence and hypothesis. The value of P(elk), i. e. the degree of expectedness of e is 
given not by how known or old evidence e is, but by how puzzling or uncertain e is given that 
which has been proposed as explanation of e so far. In this sense, the refonnulation of a 
hypothesis, or a new way of relating hypothesis and evidence, through highlighting an aspect 
of either h or e not put forward yet, may make a difference in the likelihood calculation. 
The theory of probability I will discuss in the last section of the present chapter is 
designed to preserve the advantages of Bayesianism as an account of induction insofar as it is 
free from the problems faced by both the logical and the subjective theories. In this 'third 
way' the notion of a common background knowledge that guides prior probability 
assignments and directs the convergence of opinions through the evaluation of evidence will 
play a crucial role. Indeed it is an undeniable fact that in modem natural sciences there is a 
considerable consensus not only concerning a stock of theories about the world but also about 
what are good ampliative inferences from that stock to new hypotheses regarding new or old 
pieces of evidence (see Eannan 1992: 159). It is on the basis of that stock and according to 
rules of inductive inference, which are not always clearly captured in symbolic forms, that the 
scientific community judges when a theory receives an adequate prior probability, what 
theories deserve to be taken into account, and to what extent a piece of evidence favours one 
hypothesis in place of another. 
I will now examine a theory of probability that gives the notion of background 
knowledge a special role so that, in the final chapter of this thesis, I can use religious 
10 Is any relevant debate in philosophy settled? See Mayo (1996: 334-5) for a reply to Howson & Urbach, for 
example. 
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experience and Bayes's theorem in the justification of theism in a way different from that 
proposed by Swinbume. 
4. The Intersubjective Theory of Probability 
As an alternative to the logical and the subjective theories of probability we discussed 
au above Donald Gillies has proposed what he believes to be a middle way between them both, 
which he calls the intersubjective theory of probability (see Gillies 1991: 521). As we saw in 
section 3, the main criticism directed against the subjective interpretation of probability was 
that degree of belief in a confirmation context is not an entirely subjective matter. As Wesley 
Salmon once said: 
The frightening thing about pure unadulterated personalism is that nothing prevents prior 
probabilities (and other probabilities as well) from being determined by all sorts of 
idiosyncratic and objectively irrelevant considerations. A given hypothesis might get an 
extremely low prior probability because the scientist considering it has a hangover, has had 
a recent fight with his or her lover, is in passionate disagreement with the politics of the 
scientist who first advanced the hypothesis, harbors deep prejudices against the ethnic 
group to which the originator of the hypothesis belongs, etc (Salmon 1998: 559-60). 
Against this full subjectivism in probability, Swinbume, for example, argues that most people 
draw basically the same conclusions from common evidence such as the fact that we all agree 
that bread nourishes and that cyanide is a poison. 
Yet, it does not follow from the considerable convergence of opinion about what may 
be inferred from some facts that there is only one correct way of going inductively from 
evidence to hypothesis. Whether we like it or not, no matter of fact can demonstrate a 
universal statement. According to an intersubjective view of probability, we tend to draw the 
same conclusions from the same data because we share a common background knowledge 
that prevents us from taking wild theories to be confirmed by evidence. It is on the basis of 
their training and experience that scientists acquire a common base of relevant information to 
guide their plausibility judgements, Salmon claims (see Salmon 1998: 558). However, even 
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after this preventative filtering, plenty of competing explanations are still open, and people do 
not act irrationally in making one choice or another within the limits of this set of options. 
For a while, competing hypotheses may have to live together before disagreement is settled 
by argument, empirical evidence or anything that trained specialists in the area can bring to 
bear. 
Swinburne is right in postulating that there must be correct inductive criteria for 
judging the plausibility of a hypothesis and whether it is confirmed by evidence. Still, this 
does not mean we know clearly what these criteria are, how they work or why they are able 
to increase the probability of our theories. Even if we cannot re*ect the idea of correct j 
inductive criteria, it does not necessarily commit us to any explicit attempt to spell them out 
as in Swinburne's principle of simplicity. The requirement that theory choice should be 
governed by principles seems better satisfied if such principles are associated with the 
background knowledge that is shared by a group dedicated to fon-nulating theories about 
certain matters. Even so, such principles must also allow considerable room for 
disagreement, given that there is always some degree of underdeten-nination in inductive 
matters. In other words, the admission in principle for the need for criteria to assess inductive 
inferences does not necessarily commit us to any of the available candidates for the post, and 
does not imply that inductive issues can be conclusively settled. 
It is on the basis of the notion of a common background knowledge that Gillies 
proposes the concept of intersubjective probability, which is postulated as an extension of the 
notion of subjective probability. The same approach of measuring degree of belief by betting 
quotients is then applied to social groups so that we can find out to what extent the group as a 
whole believes a certain proposition P. The Dutch book argument is also applied to groups 
and as a result we have the following informal definition of the concept of intersubjective 
probability: 
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Let 0 be some social group. Then it is in the interest of 0 as a whole if its members agree, 
perhaps as a result of rational discussion, on a common betting quotient rather than each 
member of the group choosing his or her own betting quotient. If a group does in fact 
agree on a common betting quotient, we shall call that betting quotient the intersubjective 
or consensus probability of the social group. This type of probability can then be 
contrasted with the subjective or personal probability of a particular individual (Gillies 
1991: 517). 
As with subjective probability, the intersubjective concept is based on a view of probability 
that comes from the Dutch book argument. This type of argument, as we saw above, requires 
that the degree of belief revealed by betting behaviour be coherent, following the guidelines 
of the probability calculus. In addition, the ascription of an intersubjective probability 
requires that the individuals belonging to the group share a common purpose resulting from 
the members having an interest in acting together and holding the same ideas. Consequently, 
if the group is not coherent in its common beliefs, that is, if its members do not keep up the 
common betting quotient they agreed upon initially, the group will inevitably lose money in a 
betting expenment. 
Apart from the existence of a common interest, Gillies suggests that the existence of a 
flow of information among the members of the group is another important condition for an 
intersubjective probability (Gillies 1991: 518). This flow of inforniation can be organised in 
different ways, according to such factors as the size of and power relations within the group. 
The crucial element is that once there is a group with a common purpose, its members need to 
share some information that will flow among them so that they can form through discussion 
and mutual agreement a common degree of belief about the matters related to their shared 
purpose. This is important because, according to Gillies, the intersubjective probability of the 
propositions agreed by the group must be connected with the group's common purpose, 
otherwise the Dutch book argument falls. 
Given this theory of probability, Gillies claims that we can account for the 
probabilities involved in confinnation theory, that is, we can provide rules governing the 
Chapter 7- Swinbume and the Intersubjective Theory of Probability 245 
degree of support evidence gives to a hypothesis. The intersubjective theory of probability is 
ý'k able to account for the fact that the probabilities ascribed to hypotheses in scientific contexts 
are neither a matter of individual taste nor of a single rational degree of belief on which all 
rational human beings should agree. Instead, the high degree of consensus in the scientific 
community should be interpreted as the expression of intersubjective probabilities, that is, 
common beliefs shared by a group with the common purpose of putting forward true theories 
au I about matters of fact and relations of concepts. It is on the basis of their shared background 
knowledge that scientists agree as to whether a given hypothesis is confin-ned or not by a 
certain piece of evidence. 
Certainly an individual scientist may disagree with some aspects of the established 
background knowledge. Indeed, according to Gillies, in the application of intersubjective 
probability to confim-iation theory there is room for individual contributions. However, in 
order to become accepted by the collective and become itself part of the background 
knowledge, an individual's proposal must be discussed and processed by the group. On the 
other hand, as a member contributes to the improvement of the set of hypotheses believed by 
the group and the refinement of their degree of belief in the theories already accepted, the 
individual will always owe a great deal to the other members' contributions. In fact, the set 
of propositions accepted by the scientific community at a certain time will always be more 
extensive than the knowledge possessed by an individual scientist, and will constitute the 
basis on which each member proposes a contribution. It is that basis which will furnish the 
inductive criteria for evaluating a new theory, for detennining the relevant theories to take 
into account in a theory choice problem and for choosing the pertinent pieces of evidence to 
take into consideration. 
The intersubjective theory of probability can account not only for the occurrence of 
dissidents inside the scientific community, but also for the existence of concurrent schools of 
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thought in this community. These two factors that can break the group consensus are 
described in different ways by Gillies' theory of probability. 'As for the scientific rebels or 
dissidents', he says, 'the appropriate interpretation of probability II is clearly the subjective one' 
(Gillies 1991: 529). Given that the intersubjective theory is Just an extension of the 
subjective theory, and since it does not contradict the latter , it may well account for that 
phenomenon without much difficulty. In fact, rebels and dissidents are important to scientific 
communities since they may contribute innovations to background knowledge and they may 
help to reduce dogmatism through their questioning. 
As to schools of thought within a single, overarching community, the intersubjective 
theory of probability interprets inter-subgroup disagreement in tenns of Bayes's theorem. 
While likelihood (P(elh. k)) and expectedness ((P(elk)) can be given a value based on the 
common background shared by the whole scientific community, the same cannot be said of 
prior probabilities ((P(hlk)). For Gillies, different schools of thought are likely to judge the 
plausibility of a theory on background knowledge differently (see Gillies 1991: 530). 
Consequently, Gillies is sceptical as regards the employment of prior probabilities in 
confirmation theory, for, as he says: 
We want, as far as possible, to ensure that our confirmation ftinction is based on 
intersubjective probabilities which are consensus probabilities of the whole relevant 
scientific thought collective. In this way we can achieve general agreement in judgement 
as to how the competing research programmes are progressing. But this means that we 
should try to confine ourselves to the probabilities like P(e, h&k) and P(e, k), and try to 
avoid the prior probabilities of the Bayesians (Gillies 1991: 530). 
In other words, the consensus prevailing in natural science is not well accounted for If we 
take prior probabilities into consideration because they are the locus of disagreement among 
schools of thought - or 'research programmesi in Lakatos' tenninology 
(see Lakatos 1970) - 
in terms of Bayes "s theorem. 
Wesley Salmon shares Gillies' concerns about the consequences of including personal 
prior probabilities in the confin-nation of theories in natural science. However, instead of 
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suggesting the abandonment of prior probabilities in this kind of account, Salmon holds that 
the prior probabilities in natural science are ultimately objective probabilities such as 
frequencies or propensities. However, leaving aside this frequentist position, Salmon 
maintains that the existence of background knowledge common to the whole community of 
researchers is capable of putting considerable constraints in the assignments of priors (see 
Salmon 1998: 578). 
According to Salmon, three types of criteria flow from the agreed background 
knowledge in science for the kind of plausibility judgement involved in the estimation of 
prior probability values. First, there are pragmatic criteria, which have to do with the 
circumstances in which a hypothesis is proposed. An example of a pragmatic criterion is the 
degree of specialisation of the hypothesis proponent, that is, the less specialised or less 
familiar with the field the scientist is the lower the prior probability of his theory will be, 
according to this criterion. Second, there are forinal criteria which have to do both with the 
internal consistency of the new hypothesis and the logical relations it has with previously 
accepted laws and theories. Third, Salmon claims that there are material criteria for guiding 
the ascription of prior probability values, which refer to the structure and content of the 
theory being proposed. Among these material criteria, Salmon includes simplicity, which, for 
him, is not a universal and totally impersonal criterion as Swinburne holds. 'The most 
reasonable way to look at simplicity, I think', Salmon claims, 'is to regard it as a highly 
relevant characteristic,, but one whose applicability varies from one scientific context to 
another' (Salmon 1998: 563), a conception that largely coincides with that defended in 
Chapter 3 above. 
In fact, the a priori character of simplicity is not problematic if this means that it is a 
criterion to be applied before any consideration of empirical evidence, as Salmon also seems 
to agree, since he classifies it as a plausibility judgement criterion. The crucial point in my 
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disagreement with Swinburne is the universal and impersonal character of simplicity as he 
understands this principle. In sum, the judgement about prior probability is made on the basis 
of a common background knowledge intersubjectively agreed in the scientific community. 
This is far from being a purely personal matter, but is not totally impersonal either, but shared 
and learnt intersubjectively. As Salmon claims, 'the kind of judgement to which I refer is not 
spooky; it is the kind of judgement that arises on the basis of training and experience' 
(Salmon 1998: 563). 
So, instead of bein the content of what a logically omniscient being knows, the 
criteria for constrainin the assessment of priors aay be thought of as pgll qf the information 
shared by a certain community pf inquirers and required of anyon who wants to join this 
communi1y. Considered in tenns of intersubjective probability, the criteria for theory choice 
proposed by Swinburne can be included in the background knowledge part of Bayes's 
theorem, generally symbolised by k. In this way we not only represent more successfully this 
important criterion in the body of the theorem, but we also avoid the difficult problem of how 
we get to know the correct inductive criteria that are accessible to a hypothetical logically 
oniniscient being. In addition, in postulating those patterns as entertained by a certain 
community of believers, we are not saying that they are strictly speaking the correct ones, but 
only that they are considered by that group to be the best expression of the right ways for 
assessing probabilities. 
The intersubjective account I am proposing can only work if we consider background 
knowledge in a way that differs from Swinburne's. As was claimed in Chapter 3.3 (pp. 82f), 
instead of putting in k only tautologies and empirical knowledge, there is no reason not to 
include in the concept of background knowledge other elements of rational inquiry and 
scientific activity such as inductive pi-inciples, mathematical knowledge and inductive values. 
All of them are part of what a member of the scientific community is supposed to know in 
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order to be considered as such. Such things are neither tautologies nor empirical data, but can 
clearly be thought of as part of the body of infonnation that defines a certain area or a whole 
theoretical activity as scientific. An important example in favour of my position is the very 
introduction of inductive principles used in experimental science, e. g. randomised trials, 
which have developed historically along with these sciences". This being the case, I can 
then say that Swinburne does not give the criterion of background knowledge the role I am 
postulating for it due to his too restrictive understanding of this concept. 
Swinburne rejects the idea of considering simplicity as part of the background 
knowledge in a criticism he makes of a proposal by Richard Boyd (see Swinburne 
2001a: 96n). However, the main claim of Boyd that is denied by Swinbume - that evaluative 
criteria and principles of inference are established from empirical data - is not part of the 
proposal presented here. I also maintain that there should be a priori elements in inductive 
reasoning, which are not reducible either to tautologies or to empirical inforn-iation. Yet, 
their a priori character does not preclude them from being part of a body of background 
knowledge that governs, depending on the context, a particular area of research or the rational 
theoretical activity in general. I see no reason in principle not to do so. Indeed, among other 
things, in this way it is possible to account for these elements in Bayes's theorem more 
explicitly, as part of the background knowledge k. 
If we take background knowledge so defined as means of providing additional 
constraints to the estimate of prior probability, some of the conditions for the convergence of 
prior opinions can be met to a considerable extent. Indeed, the common k not only serves to 
limit the range of prior probability values which can be assigned to a certain hypothesis but 
also guides the pre-selection of theories worthy of consideration. In this way, two important 
III am grateful to Donald Gillies, who suggested this example to me. 
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requirements for the convergence of priors - that the values of initial probabilities are neither 
extreme nor too disparate, and that there is an agreement on which theories to consider - are 
met in principle. A similar point could be made concerning the underdetermination problem 
of hypotheses by evidence. Once there is a common background that is large enough to base 
the judgement on the extent to which a certain piece of evidence confirms a particular 
hypothesis, then this difficulty also loses much of its force. 
In addition, if the background knowledge intersubjectively recognised by the 
inquiring community also embodies heuristic values as mentioned above, then there is a way 
out of the objection posed by Swinburne against Dutch book arguments. In my exposition 
above, I agreed that Swinburne had a strong argument against the full subjectivists when he 
observed that they could not use the conditionalisation rule as a basis for updating prior belief 
on evidence leading to a convergence of opinions because the individual could simply refuse 
to consider more pieces of evidence. However, the search for more and more facts about the 
world is a very strong value in scientific circles. Indeed, this is a fundamental element of 
scientific ethos, i. e. it is something that a true member of this community is supposed to 
believe in. As a result, the need to apply the conditionalisation. rule is justified by an 
evaluative belief that is an important part of the scientific background knowledge. So, 
although the subjective theory has some difficulty in justifying the use of a rule that is 
essential for the process of prior opinion convergence to happen, the same need not to apply 
to the intersubjective theory of probability. 
As to the objection that Dutch book arguments fail to give a proper account of 
scientific reasoning, since nature is not a cunning bettor trying to win money off the 
scientists, Gillies seems to have a good reply. He acknowledges that intersubjective 
probabilities cannot be introduced by taking the scientific community to be playing a game 
against nature. His proposal is to take betting quotients just as one particular way of 
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rendering degrees of belief measurable because betting is one particular observable effect of 
believing. For this purpose, the Dutch book approach can be maintained if we introduce the 
concept of a hypothetical experiment in which a group of scientists would bet against an 
experimenter on their degree of belief in a certain hypothesis h based on a certain common 
background knowledge which they all adhered to after rational discussion (see Gillies 1991: 
532). 
In any case, the use I am going to make of the idea of convergence of opinions in my 
application of Bayesianism to the epistemology of theistic belief need not comply with all the 
niceties of this concept as required by confinnati case ion theory in natural sciences. In the 
that matters to this thesis, convergence need not necessarily lead to total consensus, since, 
following Swinburne's account, a posterior probability which is simply higher than 0.5 is all 
that is required for justified belief, rather than one close to 1. In addition, in my proposal, 
convergence will serve as a regulative horizon to guide debate, as a way of maintaining the 
hope that initial disagreement can be settled through rational argument. So, Bayesianism 
may be an insufficient account for confinnation theory in natural sciences, where broad 
consensus on empirical infon-nation and research methods prevail to a point that even the 
convergence theorems are not enough. Still, if the intersubjective theory of probability can 
give a good interpretation of hypothesis assessment in contexts that deal with degree of belief 
instead of the objective probabilities as required by natural sciences, it may be worth trying It 
in the epistemology of theistic belief It is on the application of Bayes's theorem to the 
epistemology of the belief in God's existence in the light of the intersubjective theory of 
probability that I will elaborate in the next and concluding chapter of this thesis. 
Chapter 8- Intersubjective Probability and the 
Epistemology of Theistic Belief 
Having analysed and criticised Swinburne's appeal to Bayes's theorem and religious 
experience in the epistemology of theistic belief in chapters I to 5, and having looked 
at alternative approaches to religious experience and probability theory in chapters 6 
and 7, this final chapter will consist of three parts. I will start by applying the 
intersubjective theory of probability and Alston's approach to religious experience in 
the construction of a positive proposal to the use of Bayes's theorem and religious 
experience in the epistemology of belief in God. The next step will be to compare my 
proposal with Swinbume's in order to clarify further the approach developed here. 
Thirdly, I will discuss the sense in which the intersubjective Bayesian account 
represents a contribution to the epistemology of theism. 
1. Intersubjective Probability and Theism 
As we saw in Chapter 7.4 (pp. 243ff. ), the intersubjective theory of probability 
requires the delimitation of the group involved in the betting behaviour experiment so 
that the prior probability of a hypothesis may be assigned according to their shared 
degree of belief in it. This initial degree of belief will be measured by the rate the 
group is prepared to bet on the hypothesis at issue, given both a common purpose that 
unites the members and a shared set of background information that constrains their 
probability assignment. 
In my application of the intersubjective theory to the justification of theism, I 
will need then to single out the groups that will represent at least the main parties 
involved in this discussion. Unfortunately, any delimitation of these groups will 
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involve a certain degree of infort-nal judgement that may prove controversial at some 
point, a situation analogous to the one involved in determining the characteristics of a 
sample in statistical research. However, in contrast with the logical theory and the 
objectivist approach, the intersubjective theory of probability permits us to consider in 
probabilistic estimation both non-statistical information and judgements that are not 
based on universal and totally impersonal criteria. As we saw above, the main reason 
for this acceptance is that for intersubjectivists some degree of informal judgement is 
inevitable in matters of probability, and even logicists, despite their intentions, use 
informal judgement at every turn. For the intersubjective approach, as an extension of 
the subjective theory, the best way to diminish the degree of arbitrariness involved in 
this procedure is, on the one hand, to assume this non-objective element explicitly, 
and on the other, to submit any personal judgement to plausibility evaluations 
according to what is known about the subject within a particular group of researchers. 
Although it acknowledges the need for a starting point that cannot be entirely 
justified, this procedure obviously does not eliminate the risks involved in stipulation. 
Nevertheless it at least puts a considerable constraint on any exclusively personal 
opinion, namely the background knowledge assumed in the area to direct the 
plausibility assessments. 
Given the proviso above, the characterisation of the groups involved in the 
philosophical debate about the justification of theistic belief needs to take into account 
some information commonly accepted in the philosophy of religion researchers' 
community. In order to do so, we may consider more particularly what it is that 
leading representatives of this community assume about the issue. This may still not 
solve our problem for, given that these leading representatives may disagree among 
themselves, we are still faced with the decision of choosing one of the positions in 
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dispute. In the case of the present thesis, however, the fact that it is dedicated to the 
particular approach to the problem of justification of theism developed by Richard 
Swinburne, who is undoubtedly one of the leading figures in the area today, should 
provide a good starting point. Let us then attempt to stipulate the groups to which the 
betting quotients regarding the hypothesis of theism may be assigned. I will have in 
view the approach to this problem advanced by Swinburne to see if, from his position 
I can draw conclusions that can be extended to the whole area of analytic 
epistemology of religion. 
As we saw in Chapter 1.1 (pp. 14f), Swinbume addresses his efforts in 
justifying theism to the compatibility between believing in God and sharing in the 
intellectual values, general methods of reasoning and information prevalent in modem 
academic and scientific circles. I believe his choice of interlocutor is particularly 
fortunate because this is the medium where the question of justifying the belief that 
there is a God in intellectual terins is more pressing. In fact, this type of question 
specifies degrees of relevance detennined by an interest in theoretical questions and 
the existence of an alternative world view with which theism can be contrasted in 
different contexts. So. it is reasonable to assume that in a more homogeneously 
theistic environment, in which questions of intellectual justification are not 
particularly important, the intellectual respectability of the belief that there is a God is 
very little challenged'. This is certainly not the case with modem academic and 
scientific circles, not only because questions about truth and the probability of a 
1 Consider, for example, East Timor during the Indonesian occupation, when Christianity, particularly 
Roman Catholicism, was universally adopted, becornIng not only part of the Timorese identity but also 
of their resistance against oppression (see Kohen 1999). In the terms of the present discussion, 
Timorese society would not constitute a good sample for determining the prior probability of theism 
regarding the philosophical discussion of its justification because there was no questioning of the belief 
in God in that context and because this problem simply had no relevance for them at that moment, 
because they had far more pressing issues to deal with. 
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hypothesis are central to their concern, but also given the prevalence of a naturalistic 
and materialistic world view in such circles. 
Given the considerations above, we could define one of the groups involved in 
ascribing a prior probability to theism from an intersubjective point of view as 
consisting of those religious believers interested in reconciling the belief in God to the 
tenets of philosophic and scientific reason. For this group, the philosophical 
discussion about the justification of the belief in God is clearly relevant, for not only 
do they participate in both a religious community and an intellectually sophisticated 
environment that challenges that belief, but they also take this conflict as a theoretical 
problem that deserves consideration. In the terms of the intersubjective theory of 
probability, the common purpose that defines that group is of giving a solution to 
justifying belief in God that is acceptable both to religious and scientific and 
academic circles. 
The fact that I concentrate on believers that belong to both religious and 
secular intellectually sophisticated circles in order to define the relevant group does 
not mean that the theoretical justification of theism is relevant only to this group. 
Indeed, given that there is a propositional content in theistic belief, the discussion 
about its rationality and degree of probability has int insic relevance to theism. As a au IIInI 
result, since those who both profess a religious belief and belong to academic and 
scientific circles are the most exposed to the epistemological challenges to theism, a 
successful answer to the questions that this special group of believers face will be also 
highly significant to the justification of theism as such. 
If the academic and scientific context is where the epistemological 
justification of theism is most required, Swinburrie's strategy of searching for a 
dialogue with non-believers in those circles really seems the most appropriate. The 
Chapter 8- Intersubjective Probability and the Epistemology of Theistic Belief 256 
retreat to fideism or to attempts at justification exclusively in ternis of the internal 
features of religion cuts no ice, since they can only have resonance in contexts where 
religious belief is not challenged, and then where the justification problem is not 
really posed. In other words, the most that strategies of justification which appeal 
only to internal criteria of religion can manage to show is that religious beliefs are 
justified in a religious context. If the theoretical justification problem anses from 
questions posed by non-religious individuals, then the challenge is simply not met by 
purely contextual or fideistic positions. In sum, I think Swinbume is right in claiming 
that this kind of approach does not give a proper answer to the scientific and academic 
questioning of theism, being in fact a sort of surrender to the claim that theism is not 
intellectually respectable given the background knowledge shared in this 
environiment2. 
However, while I may agree with Swinburne that one needs to take into 
careful consideration the background knowledge of members of scientific and 
academic circles in a proper justification of theistic belief, I do not accept that this 
implies there is only one rational way of ascribing a prior probability value to theism. 
As we saw, according to Swinburne, the prior probability of theism should be 
evaluated fundamentally according to the universal and a priori criterion of 
simplicity, which any rational person should follow, no matter whether theist or 
atheist. Yet, if my cnticisms of this criterion and of its application to theism are 
correct, its impersonal and universally applicable character becomes doubtful. 
21 realise this remark may be controversial in view of what is held by the movement of 'Christian 
philosophers', of which Alvin Plantinga is one of the leading figures. However, because of his new 
externalist approach I do not include Plantinga among those who disregard the dialogue with the 
scientific community and who appeal only to elements internal to religion in this debate. I will spell 
out these points in section 3. 
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In using a Bayesian approach to the problem of justification of theism based 
on the intersubjective theory of probability, I do not aim to ascribe a prior to this 
hypothesis that is universally acceptable. Instead, the prior probability of theism is 
estimated differently according to the different groups involved in this debate. We 
have, on one side,, religious believers that both accept theism and participate in 
scientific/academic circles, and on the other side, the atheists. Among the atheists, 
however, many different groups can be distinguished, since the hypothesis of theism 
as enunciated by Swinburne can be denied in various ways. Yet, since my proposal is 
focusing on modem, secular, intellectually sophisticated groups, it can reasonably 
limit its attention to ontological naturalists - understood as those who postulate that 
there is nothing apart from the objects of the natural world. So although there are 
infinite ways of denying theism, the only one really relevant to the debate in question 
is that world view which has been strongly established in the academic sphere since 
Laplace declared there was no need for the hypothesis of God in his physics. 
Swinbume ends up limiting his analysis to the naturalists as well, but in clear 
contravention of his theory of probability. Despite his attempt to reduce the number 
of rival explanations using objective a priori criteria, he leaves aside many other 
possibilities that are also incompatible with theism, such as pantheism or absolute 
idealism. From the point of view of the intersubjective theory of probability, these 
options are not considered simply because they are not relevant to the justification of 
theism - given what we know about modem academic and scientific circles. 
For the intersubjective approach, in addition to the common purpose that 
unifies the group, it is required that the members be informed about the degrees of 
belief shared by the group and correct their individual priors accordingly. In order to 
apply this requirement we need to clanfy what is the particular background 
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knowledge that identifies each of the two parties involved in the debate about the 
justification of theism. In general terins, theists and atheists may be said to have in 
common a set of values and information that are acknowledged in modem scientific 
and academic circles, but in addition to that, each group also has beliefs that are 
incompatible with each other, namely the belief that there is a God and the belief in 
ontological naturalism respectively. What we have then is a large group defined by 
the background knowledge commonly accepted by all those who belong to the 
scientific and academic environment and two subgroups that are distinguished from 
each other because of a theistic background or lack of it. 
At this point we might use Alston's concept of doxastic practice to understand 
a little better what is at issue. As presented above, theists and atheists involved in the 
discussion about the justification of theistic belief both participate in a doxastic 
practice that is defined by the academic and scientific culture of the late 20th -early 21" 
century Western world. We have here all central elements of a doxastic practice such 
as: being acquired and engaged in before being criticised, having an overrider system, 
being interconnected, being socially transmitted and shared; and having a distinctive 
set of presuppositions that can change (see Alston 1991: 187-8). It is not easy to 
define what precisely the set of values and inforination shared by theists and atheists 
is in this context, but it seems uncontroversial that to be part of this culture we must 
accept the necessity of forming beliefs in a coherent and consistent way, searching for 
information in order to improve and increase our present stock of knowledge, and 
correcting our previous beliefs on receipt of evidence provided by established 
scientific results. In the academic and scientific doxastic practice, broadly defined by 
the obedience to formal constraints of logic and probability laws, the heuristic value 
of searching for evidence to improve our knowledge, and the content provided by 
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established scientific research will be the common ground on which the debate 
between theists and atheists will be able to take place in a productive manner. 
However, the members of the groups involved in the debate on the 
justification of theistic belief also participates in other doxastic practices, particularly, 
they belong to practices that are incompatible and provide rival understandings of the 
same set of data. We have the atheists who take ontological naturalism as the best 
theory to account for the phenomena Swinbume considers in his analysis, such as the 
existence of the universe, the order in natural happenings, the providential character 
of the world we live in, the occurrence of conscious beings, of extraordinary 
happenings in the world like purported miracles, and the fine tuning of the universe. 
For the atheist, there is no reality apart from the physical world and the theoretical 
concepts with which we attempt to explain it. Nevertheless let us assume that the 
atheist involved in this debate accepts that the concept of God is meaningful and 
coherent, but believes its plausibility is very low, since it is dispensable to any 
scientific account of nature and corresponds to a reality that does not belong to the 
natural world. 
I postulate that the theist involved in this kind of debate will share the values 
and background knowledge of the academic and scientific culture, to whose 
questioning of his religious beliefs he wants to respond. What differentiates him from 
the naturalist is that the theist adds to the secular experience of the world a religious 
experience to which he either has had access directly or through testimony. Religious 
expenence will be in this context not a piece of evidence to be explained by the nval 
accounts of theism and atheism, but grounds for initial belief particular to the theistic 
side. As in Alston's approach, the theist will find himself believing that there is a 
God well before he has been able to contrast that belief with any alternative. His 
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adherence will probably have occurred at an early age, but this does not mean he does 
not have grounds to believe that there is a God, since he participates in a socially 
established group who share a particular set of background concepts which enables 
them to perceive certain phenomena as God's handiwork or God's presence or God's 
deed. In addition, the same set of background concepts provides them not only with a 
system of checking and test standards to evaluate the outputs of the particular 
religious doxastic practice they belong to, but also a degree of self-support related to 
the aim and structure of this practice (see Alston 1991: 250). In sum, the theist's 
belonging to a given religious doxastic practice that includes the belief that there is a 
God - and in the present discussion it does not matter if it is Christian, Islamic or 
Jewish doxastic practice - will gTound him in ascribing to the theistic belief a higher 
degree of initial plausibility (or in the tenns of the intersubjective theory of 
probability, a higher betting quotient) than the atheist. 
Yet, once he is engaged in this debate, the theist will have a different 
assessment of the initial probability of theism from that ascribed by the theists who 
are not in the same context. Because he is exposed to a constant challenge to his 
religious beliefs and shares the values and information of academic and scientific 
culture, the theist I am considering in my account will have a lower degree of belief 
that there is a God than those who are not in the same context. As mentioned at the 
end of Chapter 6.3.3 (pp. 199f. ), his awareness of naturalistic interpretations of 
mystical perception, the recognition of religious pluralism as an instance of the 
religious ambiguity of the world, and the fact that theism has increasingly lost 
credence in the scientific world view, will make this theist decrease his degree of 
belief in the hypothesis of theism in the context of the discussion of its justification. 
In sum, the theist's side in my account will have a higher degree of belief in the 
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existence of God than the atheist, grounded on the religious experience and 
background concepts he has acquired from his particular religious doxastic practice. 
On the other hand, although his initial degree of belief in theism given his religious 
background can be estimated as higher than 0.5, due to the sharing of information and 
other elements that are present in the scientific environment , it should not be too close 
to 1. 
My account of this debate using a Bayesian intersubjective theory of 
probability gives us two different estimates of prior probability to start with, one for 
the atheist and another for the theist. These estimates are based on background 
knowledge that is common in all that concerns information, logical and probabilistic 
rules and heuristic values that are distinctive of scientific and academic circles, but 
that is divergent as regards religious experience and its conceptual framework. The 
likelihood inference, which is the most objective part of a Bayesian reasoning process, 
will be made in this model on the basis of the common ground shared by the two 
groups. In other words, the discussion of the probability of the theistic hypothesis 
will be based not only on their initially divergent prior degrees of belief, but also on 
evidence, inductive patterns and evaluative standards of explanatory power that are 
commonly accepted in academic and scientific circles. Assuming that the prior 
estimates are not too divergent for the reasons given in the previous paragraph, the 
model is able to account for a possible convergence of opinion insofar as public 
evidence is evaluated according to the same evaluative standards, a process that is 
fonnally descnbed by the Bayesian rule of conditionalisation. In pnnciple, even if 
theists and atheists start from different degrees of belief in the existence of God due to 
partially different backgrounds, their assessment of this hypothesis given commonly 
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acknowledged evidence and evaluative pattems can eventually wash out that 
divergence towards an agreement about the final probabIlIty of theism. 
Let us then summarise the main features of this outline of a Bayesian 
intersubjective account of the philosophical discussion of the justification of theism. I 
have assumed this discussion is carried out between those who believe in God and 
those who do not in the particular context of the academic and scientific environment. 
In other words, this approach postulates that people have a starting point in this 
debate, which in Bayesian terms means that the groups involved have prior degrees of 
belief as to whether there is a God stemming from their adoption of a particular 
doxastic practice. Both parties will be judged in tenns of the coherence of their 
degrees of belief, according to the probability calculus, which is the first sense of 
rationality in Bayesian tenns. This discrepant initial Prior probability will entail, to 
begin with, a divergent posterior probability, that is high for the theist and low for the 
atheist. Before the discussion is settled, they will both be rational in view of their 
respective starting points, since the high prior probability assigned by the theist will 
take the belief that there is a God to a high posterior, while the opposite will be the 
case for the atheist. 
As the pieces of evidence are taken into account, that is, as long as the debate 
carries on, the initially divergent priors may tend to a convergence through 
conditionalisation, if the common part of the rival group's background knowledge is 
sufficient to settle the likelihood inferences. In other words, the parties may show that 
certain phenomena are better explained by theism or by ontological naturalism so that 
the priors are updated accordingly in a cumulative case either in favour of theism or 
of its rival in the dispute. The crucial requirement for this increasing agreement to 
occur will be a shared background knowledge that is large enough for the theist and 
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atheist to move within. in following the rule of conditionalisation, the rival groups in 
this debate will be complying with the second condition for rationality in a Bayesian 
sense, that is, the updating of priors through argument in light of evidence. 
The intersubjective approach to the epistemology of theism can also provide 
an account of the third sense of a Bayesian type of rationality. Beliefs are rational in 
this sense if our acceptance of them is proportionate to their degree of probability 
after considering the evidence available. The model points to a regulative horizon in 
which initially divergent prior degrees of belief converge to the point of consensus in 
those cases where the background knowledge shared by the parties is sufficient to 
detennine the likelihood inferences. Further, during the period that the debate is not 
resolved by means of discussion, both parties could be considered as epistemically 
entitled to their respective degrees of belief in a proposition that it is at least more 
likely than its alternatives. Before the debate on the basis of commonly accepted 
evidence, logical rules and inductive standards is able to bring about an agreement, 
the posterior probability of theism will be largely determined by their respective prior 
degrees of belief. Once their respective priors entail a posterior higher than the rivals 
to each group, they could be declared to be rational according to this meaning of 
Bayesian rationality as well, although only temporarily, that is, until one of them is 
shown to be wrong through argument. 
So much for this outline of the methodological proposal based on Bayesianism 
and religious experience in an intersubjective way. In the next two sections, in which 
I compare my proposal with Swinbume's, and discuss the place of my approach in the 
contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, I hope to clarify and expand on this 
account. 
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2. The Intersubjective Approach and Swinburne 
From what was said in the previous section, it can be seen that the approach to 
the epistemology of theistic belief postulated in this thesis agrees in several places 
with the proposal developed by Richard Swinbume. Firstly, I accept his contention 
that the debate on the justification of theism should be specially directed to academic 
and scientific circles of a certain kind, and that if this discussion is to be resolved 
through argument, the parties involved need to have a great deal of background 
knowledge in common. In other words, if the theist accepts that his belief that there is 
a God needs to be justified in theoretical terms, he should address his intellectual 
effort towards the environment where the theoretical questioning of theism is 
currently undertaken at its sharpest, that is, in academic and scientific circles. This 
means that, if the theist aims to make his belief intellectually respectable in this 
environment, he needs to take seriously the established elements (both formal and 
material) of modem scientific background knowledge, and engage in a fruitful 
dialogue with secular subscribers thereto. 
A second point in which I agree with Swinbume concerns the type of 
argument to be used in the context of this debate. Although I do not disdain 
initiatives that attempt to reinstate the ontological argument, I take natural theology as 
fundamentally an inductive enterprise, that is, its conclusions will not follow from the 
premises in a logically necessary way, but will be based on inferences to the best 
explanation. Related to this point is my partial agreement with Swinburne as regards 
the place of Bayes's theorem in the justification of theism since, like him, I take 
Bayesianism as an illuminating formal account of inductive reasoning. However, in 
contrast with Swinburne, I do not assume that it is the best representation of the 
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process involved in the confirmation of hypotheses in natural sciences, which is why 
my agreement in this matter is only partial. 
As a consequence of our congruence concerning the ftindamentally inductive 
character of natural theology and the possibility of interpreting induction using 
Bayes's theorem, I also agree with Swinburne that we can employ the notion of 
probability to refer to hypotheses and beliefs. If believing is a matter of degree, it can 
prove useful to measure it in tenns of probability values, so that we can check both 
the coherence of our initial degrees of belief and how far the inductive process 
changes those prior degrees of belief in light of evidence. The notion of probability 
can then be helpful in spelling out a theory of rationality that takes as its basis the 
sheer coherence among the ideas. The second level in a Bayesian concept of 
rationality is the updating of prior degrees of belief in view of evidence. As to the 
third level, one is rational as long as one believes a proposition that is more probable 
than any of its alternatives. 
Although this is another issue to be elaborated on in future, the concept of 
rationality that stems from the Bayesian. intersubjective approach has some 
advantages over that defended by Swinbume, as seen in Chapter 1.4 (pp. 36f. ). 
Firstly, I do not consider investigation as playing any crucial part in this matter. The 
search for new evidence is highly valued in the scientific environment for example, 
but it is difficult to see why someone who was not stnving to test his beliefs in all 
contexts would thereby be acting irrationally. However, as long as evidence is 
considered, and we are in the academic or scientific context, our corresponding degree 
of belief should be updated accordingly, as a requirement of rationality. 
A second important difference is that my conception takes the highest level of 
rationality suggested by Swinburne ('we should believc in propositions that are 
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probable in view of correct inferential standards and true infonnation') as 
fundamentally a regulative horizon, that is, an ideal we aim for in our beliefs, but not 
reached by any of our actual beliefs so far. In principle, our actual beliefs can always 
be corrected and updated in view of that horizon. In fact, Swinbume also refers to 
correct inductive criteria and rightly basic beliefs as elements of an epistemological 
ideal only manifested by a logically omniscient being (see Swinbume 2001 a: 153). 1 
agree that given the regulative character of the highest level of rationality, the 
inductive standards we use - such as the principle of simplicity - may be a priori in 
the sense of not being empirical propositions and of being conditions of rationality. 
However, while I accept the a priori character of simplicity in these senses, I also 
maintain that it is part of a given background knowledge shared by a research 
community, and that it is in relation to that background knowledge that simplicity 
acquires a concrete meaning and can operate as an inductive criterion. In other words, 
instead of postulating the idea of a logically omniscient being, I adopt 
intersubjectively shared background knowledge as the concrete stance in view of 
which true inforination is obtained and inductive standards are acquired and, if need 
be, corrected. 
A third difference between this thesis and Swinburne's approach, regarding 
rationality refers to the role played by considerations external to the believer in the 
justification of a belief. As we saw, Swinburne opts for a strictly internalist approach 
to justification (see SwInbume 2001a: 163), according to which the grounds for a 
belief should be accessible to the believer through introspection. Although this is still 
a point to be further elaborated in the ftiture, the approach developed in this thesis 
allows for a mixed approach to justification. It considers the believer as justified in 
his posterior probability of h providing this is higher than its altematives, vvhen this is 
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the outcome of the relationship between hypothetical and evidential beliefs. The 
initial probability, however, can be grounded in the fact that the believer belongs to a 
certain doxastic practice that has shaped his conceptual framework. In this respect, 
what justifies his initial beliefs includes elements extemal to his mental state, that is, 
the features of that specific doxastic practice and the relationship among them, of 
which the subject is not necessarily aware. In this adoption of a mixture of intemalist 
and extemalist views of justification, my approach is closer to Alston's than to that 
developed by Swinburne (see Alston 1995: 40). 
Indeed my position also contains other important differences from 
Swinburne's Bayesian interpretation of the epistemology of theism. A major 
disagreement involves the kind of probability theory used to guide the estimate of 
prior probability, and the selection of the competing hypotheses that are alternatives 
to theism. Swinburne assumes a version of the logical theory of probability according 
to which our prior probability estimations should follow universal and objective 
criteria of theory choice in addition to the axioms of probability calculus, among 
which he particularly favours simplicity in his application of Bayesianism to the 
justification of the belief in God. 
Swinbume's intention in proposing a universally acceptable criterion for 
estimating prior probabilities like simplicity was to provide a way to settle this 
difficult question in Bayesian epistemology in a fon-nal objective way. However, my 
discussion of the limits of his principle of simplicity attempted to show that the 
application of this criterion involves a great deal of inforinal judgement, and that Its 
definition is much clearer in the context of a specific debate in a particular research 
community. In other words, given all the setbacks in Swinburne's attempt to deal 
with priors in the terrns of the logical theory of probability, I havc chosen another 
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Bayesian way to deal with the epistemology of theism, namely by means of the 
intersubjective theory, whose approach to theism was spelt out in section I of the 
present chapter 
3. 
Another major difference between my proposal and Swinburne's is the role 
played by religious experience in my Bayesian account. As we saw in Chapter 4, 
Swinburne aims to use that phenomenon as a public piece of evidence in a universally 
acceptable inductive argument. Yet, if the considerations advanced in Chapter 5 are 
correct, religious experience does not provide the type of evidence Swinburne aims 
for, since its evidential value depends on a conceptual framework that is not 
universally shared. In addition, in my view, the analogy between religious experience 
and sense perception is not sufficiently strong to allow scepticism about one to be 
equivalent to scepticism about the other. 
I adopted an approach to religious experience that does not take it as a premise 
for a universally acceptable argument, but as the direct ground for a initial degree of 
belief in theism that depends on the participation in a particular religious doxastic 
practice. I aimed to provide a more realistic approach to what is at issue in the debate 
about the justification of theism and to escape from the criticisms directed to 
Swinburne's position on this matter. Instead of people starting from neutral and 
is universally deten-nined a priori principles, it is more appropriate to picture thi 
discussion as involving groups with different starting points of view regarding the 
issue. The theist engages in this debate from a perspective biased by the religious 
background in which he was brought up while the naturalist starts with another bias. 
3 The stress on the principle of simplicity as the sole determinant of the prior probabIlIty of theism is 
also the main argument in his reply to Mackie's objections to his argument from consciousness (see 
Swinbume 1983: 387). However, in view of the requirement regarding the conditionalisation rule, 
Swinburrie's reply is mistaken, since there are empirical data considered in the background knowledge 
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A totally neutral unbiased starting point is not what we generally have in this kind of 
philosophical debate (or, for that matter, in any). Religious experience contributes to 
the reinforcement of the theist's degree of belief in theism and helps to justify it via 
the corresponding doxastic practice. However, when it comes to discussing the 
justification of this belief with people who do not participate in the same religious 
doxastic practice, then religious experience will be able to provide only an initial 
probability with which the theist will start off his debate with the naturalist, as is 
suggested by Alston's approach (see Alston 1991: 286). 
As a result, my position regarding religious experience will require a theory of 
probability that allows for more than one rational estimate of the prior probability of 
theism,, which Swinburne's approach does not. In the intersubjective view that I 
adopt, this estimate will depend on the acceptance of the particular religious 
conceptual framework that both informs and is grounded in religious experience. In 
other words , in my proposal for using Bayes's theorem in the discussion of the 
epistemology of theism, I recognise that the two main parties involved attribute 
different priors to the belief that there is a God. 
Recognising that there are different starting points in this debate does not 
entail that the intersubjective approach is relativist. The way in which I suggest using 
Bayesianism and religious experience in the justification of theistic belief does not 
mean giving up the project of resolving this question through argument even though 
we abandon a neutral, universal way of establishing prior probabilities. In fact, given 
the effects of the conditionalisation rule on cumulative arguments, the only precaution 
that need be taken regarding prior probabilities is that the rival estimates are not 
as regards the argument from consciousness in addition to simplicity. Yet, if my arguments are correct, 
this does not mean the theist should assume exactly the same background knowledge as Mackie. 
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extremely disparate. This proviso is satisfied in my proposal by the claim that the 
justification of theism will only be resolved through argument in the case where there 
is a broad background knowledge in common between the contending parties. In the 
model formulated in the previous section, this condition was met by the suggestion 
that this question is primarily of philosophical interest, and by considering the 
problem as the attempt to show that belief in God is intellectually respectable given 
the inferential patterns and the body of infori-nation already established in certain 
academic and scientific circles. 
If the prior probabilities are not extremely disparate, and given a common 
background knowledge on which the contenders can move together in their 
discussion, the basic conditions for a convergence of opinion In principle are in place. 
The fact that they came from different starting points does not really matter given that 
there is the possibility that they will be washed out by means of the likelihood 
inferences. As we saw in Chapter 7.2(pp. 224f), this is a common reply of subjective 
Bayesianism to the charge of not being able to account for the objectivity and 
consensus observed in theory choice in science. In fact, this feature is recognised by 
all those who accept the principles of Bayesian epistemology, as this statement by 
Swinbume illustrates 
However it does not seem possible to lay down any more precise rules for 
determining P(hd. Nor it is necessary where there is a substantial amount of 
evidence of a kind which makes theories hi differ from each other markedly in 
their accuracy, for example where our sole evidence is that many a's have been 
observed and a certain proportion of them found to be Q. For it is easy to see that 
in that case P(hl-e) are affected much less by P(hd than by P(elhd, the other factor 
which determines the relative values of P(hl-e) (Swinburne 1973: 132). 
In other words, the fact that we may lack precise rules for deten-nining the prior 
probability of a hypothesis is not really problematic as long as there Is sufficient 
evidence to make one hypothesis more likely than another. 
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Still, one could object that it is very controversial in itself to claim that there is 
evidence capable of making theism or naturalism more likely than its rival to the point 
of washing out the divergent priors assigned by theists and atheists. The amount of 
evidence handled in this discussion is generally very limited, that is, what we have is 
little more than the phenomena discussed by Swinburne in The Existence of God. 
Moreover, we can hardly see any convergence in the opinions of the two contending 
parties that result from the arguments of natural theology. In fact, the critic of my 
proposal could claim that we can hardly observe any agreement between theists and 
ontological naturalists on the existence of God at all. 
Although the space dedicated to a positive proposal in this thesis has ended up 
being very limited, at least a provisional response to these two serious objections can 
be given. 
First, the amount of evidence dealt with in traditional natural theology may be 
limited, but we cannot discard the possibility of new arguments being brought to the 
discussion in future. In fact, we can see in Swinburne himself this thesis that the 
arguments involved in this debate are not so limited in number as the influential 
Kantian threefold classification may make one suppose (see Swinburne 1991: 12)4. 
However, even if there is a clear delimited set of evidence involved in this question,, 
this does not mean the discussion cannot go forward. As it was suggested in Chapter 
7.3.5 (p. 241) when dealing with the problem of old evidence in the Bayesian theory of 
confirmation, re-elaboration on previous explanations of evidence e by hypothesis h 
may change the result of likelihood inferences. The point regarding the confirmation 
of hypotheses in view of phenomena previously known is that the values of P(elh. k) 
4 Another author that does not subscribe to the thesis of limited amount of public evidence in the 
theistic debate is Alvin Plantinga (see PlantInga 1998: 91f), despite his position regarding natural 
theology not being so optimistic as Swinburne's. 
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and P(elk) do not depend on how known or old evidence e is, but on how puzzling or 
uncertain e is given background knowledge. The discussion involving the likelihood 
of a hypothesis may then evolve through improving the understanding of the 
hypothesis, or through relating hypothesis and evidence in a different way, or through 
highlighting an aspect of either h or e not put forward yet, so that e may become better 
explained. In other words, the debate on the justification of theism can in principle go 
ahead towards increasing agreement even given a limited set of evidence. 
Second, the difficulty in reaching agreement through argument regarding the 
justification of theism does not seem to be a problem confined to this philosophical 
issue. Indeed, it is a recurrent (and unfortunate) feature of philosophy that opposite 
parties rarely reach an actual consensus through argument. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean philosophical debate is all in vain. Arguments may not be 
conclusive, but can be evaluated regarding their logical consistency, their 
consequences for other areas and the plausibility of their assumptions. Surely all 
these pattems of evaluation can in tum be subject to discussion, but this only 
highlights the proviso within my proposal. It is possible that there is no way to go 
forward in this debate because the background knowledge in common between theists 
and atheists is actually too thin or non-existent. This can be the case, but it can also 
be the reverse, and this possibility is sufficient to allow that my proposal is not 
necessarily relativist. I do not abandon the possibility of establishing a solution to this 
question through rational means using objective evidence, even if this end cannot be 
achieved at present. 
A final difference between my proposal and Swinburne's which I would like 
to emphasise concerns the evaluation of Bayesianism as a theory for the confirmation 
of natural science hypotheses. As we saw, Swinburne relies on the Bayesian account 
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of inductive inference in his rhetorical strategy directed to the scientific community. 
As part of this strategy there is the Idea that if Bayes's theorem expresses the form by 
which scientific reasoning proceeds then a case in favour of theism that uses the same 
type of inferential pattern should be recognised by scientists as displaying the same 
rigour and intellectual respectability as those offered for scientific theories. In other 
words, we can interpret Swinburne's project as including an analogy between theistic 
belief and scientific hypotheses and their respective modes of justification in his 
attempt to respond to the challenges posed by the modem academic environment to 
religious beliefs. 
However, unlike Aquinas in the 13 th century, in whom Swinbume finds 
inspiration for his programme, Swinburne has to resort to something different from 
the scientific concepts and methods of research of his time in his defence of theism. 
As we briefly saw in Deborah Mayo's criticism in Chapter 7.3.3 (p. 233), Bayesian 
statistics are very rarely used in actual natural science research. In addition, not only 
is scientific inquiry incomparably more diversified and complex today than it was in 
Aquinas' time, but its procedures are also less akin to logical and philosophical debate 
than Aristotelian science used to be. What it turns out Swinbume is doing is adopting 
a certain inteEpretation of scientific reasoning in order to liken the justification of 
science to the justification of the belief in God. In other words, he uses a theory from 
the philosophy of science, rather than science itself, to ground a position in the 
philosophy of religion. 
However. ) there is a 
fierce controversy going on in today's philosophy of 
science about the accuracy of Bayesianism as a theory for the confirmation of 
scientific hypotheses. Despite its relative success in accounting for certain problems 
in scientific methodology, and despite the fact that it is considered by many to be an 
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improvement over hypothetico-deductive models of scientific inference (see, for 
example, Earman 1995: 63-86 and Horwich 1992: 205-214), there are considerable 
cnticisms of both logicist and subjectivist attempts to defend Bayesianism as an 
accurate interpretation of scientific reasoning. Given the complexity and extension of 
this discussion I am not able to make a position on this topic and, in any case, it is not 
strictly required by my approach. 
In contrast with Swinbume, this thesis adopts a more minimalist view about 
Bayesian epistemology. Bayes's theorem is merely a possible account of inductive 
inference which can be helpful in describing in formal terms the steps involved in an 
inference to the best explanation. An inference to the best explanation captures the 
essence of natural theology. For me the real interest of the Bayesian approach is not 
in its expressing the inferential method in natural sciences specifically, but in the 
particular way it permits us to consider the arguments for the existence of God, by 
revealing their non-demonstrative character and by describing how they can make up 
a cumulative case. In this sense, Bayesianism is taken as an interesting attempt to 
express inductive reasoning in formal terms, so that our degrees of belief can be 
controlled by constraints such as coherence, updating of initial beliefs in view of 
evidence and other elements of Bayesian epistemology. Consequently, I need not 
hold that Bayesianism is the best account of scientific inference to use it in an 
approach aimed at meeting the challenges to theism presented by the scientific and 
academic environment. If Bayes's theorem gives us a good possible way to interpret 
inductive reasoning in general, then its use permits us to discuss the matter in an 
argumentative manner recognisable to those who question religious beliefs in that 
environment. 
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My interpretation of Bayesianism is very cautious as regards its description of 
scientific reasoning. The analogy I establish between theism and scientific theories is 
much weaker than that which Swinburne seems to suggest. As a result, the 
difficulties involving Bayesianism as a confirmation theory of scientific hypotheses 
and the many discrepancies between scientific and metaphysical theories are not as 
harmful to my account as they could be to Swinburne's. 
3. The Intersubjective Approach and the Epistemology of Theistic Belief 
From what has been said in the two previous sections, we may describe the 
intersubjective approach to the Bayesian epistemology of theism as a means of 
accounting for the interaction between the use of arguments in natural theology and 
the non-inferential grounds provided by religious experience in the justification of the 
belief in God. Understood in this way, the position developed in this thesis may be 
entitled to claim a particular place in the diversified spectrum of the contemporary 
analytic epistemology of religion. This is the subject I will develop in this last section 
of the present chapter. 
A useful way of classifying the many approaches to the epistemology of 
theistic belief is offered by William Abraham in his An Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Religion. Although any attempt to categonse the different positions in this area 
runs the risk of oversimplification and reductionism, Abraham provides an interesting 
way of clarifying the alternatives. Abraham 5s classification of the contemporary 
approaches to the epistemology of religion falls into four categories. If we discard 
'theological fideism' because of its purely theological character, and because it sees 
philosophy and faith as incompatible (see Abraham 1985: 77), we have then three 
main accounts of this matter. At one extreme there is what he calls 'hard rationalism', 
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that is, the attempt to deal with the question of the justification of belief in God from a 
purely rational point of view, following the tradition of natural theology. The other 
end of the spectrum is occupied by philosophical fideism, which stresses the 
importance of doing justice to the internal content of the Christian faith and to the 
intensity of feeling involved in religious experience (see Abraham 1985: 99). The 
middle position, which attempts to pursue both the quest for rational justification of 
theistic belief and respect for the internal aspects of revealed faith and its ground in 
religious experience, is described by Abraham as 'soft rationalism'. 
'Philosophical fideism' is represented in Abraham's classification by Alvin 
Plantinga's approach. Since Abraham published his book, however, Plantinga has 
changed his position. Yet, given that Plantinga is a leading epistemologist of religion, 
it is important to say at least a few words about his approach in relation to that which I 
am defending here. In his Warranted Christian Belief (2000), Plantinga has two main 
purposes. First, he wants to show the general public that there are no de jure 
questions regarding the justification of Christian belief that are independent of de 
facto objections to it (see Plantinga 2000: 19 1). If we take justification in the sense of 
fulfilling an episternic responsibility in fonning beliefs, then the accusation that 
Christian believers are not justified in their beliefs is not plausible. This is the case 
because if, after reading and discussing carefully all important critics of Christianity, 
the believer still takes these criticisms as far weaker than the overwhelming force she 
attaches to her religious beliefs, she is clearly not flouting any epistemic duty (see 
Plantinga 2001: 101). For Plantinga, a person who accepts the Christian beliefs in this 
basic way - that is, not because of arguments, but 
because of a inner certitude she 
thinks is a grace of God - is not irrational or unjustified in doing so, provided she 
carefull considers the objections against her belief In fact, she can be mistaken, her 
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beliefs can be de facto false. Yet, this means that the real issue in this case is not 
whether Christian believers are rational in their beliefs, but whether Christian beliefs 
are true or not. 
The second purpose of Plantinga's project is addressed to the Christian 
community only. He constructs a model to show how theistic beliefs taken in the 
basic ýMM could have warrant (see Plantinga 2001: 220). 'Warrant' in Plantinga's 
epistemology is the quality that a justified belief needs to be considered knowledge 
(see Plantinga 1993: 19). Given his extemalist approach, warrant is mainly a matter 
of beliefs being produced by proper functioning and being fornied with reliable 
mechanisms. As a result, Plantinga suggests a model for belief formation based on 
Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin's idea that we all have a faculty created by God that 
is innate to humans and which permits them to know their Creator (see Plantinga 
2001: 245-6). As a result, Plantinga maintains, if there is a God like that of traditional 
theism, then it is very likely that humans really have that faculty, and then that they 
have warrant for their beliefs. Plantinga, is not concerned with theistic belief only. 
His effort is also addressed to the epistemological justification of the Christian system 
of beliefs which he calls 'the great things of the gospel', following Jonathan Edwards 
(see Plantinga 2000: 80). To show how Christian beliefs could have warrant, 
Plantinga suggests an extension of his model based on a special warrant-producing 
mechanism that he calls 'intemal instigation of the Holy Spint' (see Plantinga 
2000: 201). 
In a reply to a review by Swinburne (2001b: 203-214), Plantinga argues that 
being justified with respect to public evidence - Swinburne's concept of justification 
- is neither sufficient nor necessary for warranted Christian 
belief The probability of 
Christian beliefs based on public evidence is very small given the 'problem of 
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dwindling probabilities', that is, the probabilities of each piece of evidence in favour 
of Christian beliefs must be multiplied, resulting in a value that is smaller the more 
pieces of evidence we consider (see Plantinga 2000: 280). Being so small, this 
probability value is not sufficient to hold the belief in the great things of the gospel 
with the force with which it is held by many believers (see Plantinga 2001: 217). On 
the other hand, says Plantinga, a belief can have warrant without being probable with 
respect to public evidence. In fact, the evidential base of the critics of Christian 
beliefs can be totally different from the Christian evidential base. In other words, 
there is no guarantee that there is an evidential basis common to both parties and 
neutral between them. As a result, what counts as a defeater for one may not count as 
a defeater for the other (see Plantinga 2001: 22 1 ). 
Plantinga's problem of dwindling probabilities is related to Swinbume's 
approach to the probability of the components of the Christian creed, which is not the 
concem of this thesis. Perhaps Swinbume's piecemeal approach that Plantinga 
cnticises could be rephrased in terms of a Bayesian cumulative case, and then the 
problem of dwindling probability would simply vanish 5. However, because this is 
such a complex issue, I will not develop this thought here. It remains as another 
interesting point for future elaboration. 
Let us then return to the discussion of the justification of theism. In a 
Bayesian approach, the posterior probability of thelsm is based on public evidence, as 
Swinburne holds. This type of evidence is considered in the likelihood calculations 
[P(e1h. k)1P(e1k)]. However, the final degree with which theism is justifiably believed 
5 Plantinga is mistaken when he asserts that if I accept the probabIlIty that it will rain tomorrow is 0.9,1 
am not believing that it will rain tomorrow, but only that it is ý'ery likely that it will (see Plantinga 
2001: 220-1). He makes here a confusion between belief and strength of belief, which Swinburne 
correctly distinguishes. In the case mentioned, I obviously believe it will rain tomorrov, '. The figure 
associated with my belief (0.9) is just a measure of its strength. 
____J=; ý, 
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according to that approach also depends on a prior probability. At this point, the 
intersubjective Bayesian approach I am developing here is more on the side of 
Plantinga than of Swinburne. As I said above, instead of a universally and 
impersonally deten-nined starting point, my account allows fI nor or different p 
probabilities being ascribed by different groups involved in a debate. In other words, 
once my approach accepts externalist elements in the Justification of prior probability 
assignments, Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin model could in principle be used at this 
point, instead of religious experience. As a result, the Christian and the naturalist can 
start with different degrees of belief in theism. However, since the approach aims to 
offer a way of justifying theism theoretically (in Swinburne's sense, but also 
considering priors estimated as above 6) by rational discussion, it requires a scenario 
where theists and atheists share a common background knowledge and an evidential 
base. 
Indeed there is a deeper issue behind some of Plantinga's remarks on the 
justification of theism and Christianity which bears upon the question as to whether 
there can be a shared background knowledge k between theists and atheists. Plantinga 
defends the idea that this neutral common ground is available in areas such as 
mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry and large parts of biology. Still, this 
neutral field between naturalists and theists disappears when it comes to areas such as 
evolutionary biology and human sciences, where metaphysical elements play a very 
important role (see Plantinga 1996: 210-11). This intermediate position is based on a 
distinction between empirical evidence on the one hand, and theoretical hypotheses 
and background assumptions on the other, a distinction that is clearly granted in the 
6A belief is justified in the sense in which I am defending here if. 1) it Is coherent, 
2) the prior degree 
of belief is updated in view of public evidence, 3) its overall or final probability is more probable than 
that of its altematives. 
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Bayesian approach. The theist need not adopt all metaphysical assumptions assumed 
by the naturalist, otherwise there would be no disagreement between them 7. In my 
approach as in Plantinga's, the theist need not start from the same metaphysical 
positions as the naturalist. However, I do not see why this would necessarily lead to 
the idea of 'Christian science', as some maintain. In my view, the acceptance that 
theists and naturalists adopt different initial standpoints does not necessarily mean 
that there is no way of settling their differences through discussion, and that each of 
them has to resort to a particular type of science on the basis of a 'rejection of 
neutralism'. This can be seen in authors like John Stek (1990) and Roy Clouser 
(1991) , in whose writings the position according to which scientific activity and 
religious commitment are deeply connected is particularly strong. 
According to such authors, there are no neutral intellectual disciplines. Thus, 
there is 'Christian science' as opposed to other types. Plantinga himself raises this 
possibility: 
For example, many Reformed Christians follow Abraham Kuyper in holding that 
intellectual endeavor in general and natural science In particular are not 
independent of religious commitment. Perhaps the credit for this idea should go 
not to Augustine, but to Tertullian. Tertullian has suffered from a bad press; one 
of his major emphases, however, is that scholarship - intellectual endeavor - is 
not religiously neutral (Plantinga 1996: 214, note 1). 
However, one of the aims of the intersubjective approach is to suggest a way of 
resolving the issue of God's existence through rational discussion. Given that this 
aim can only be achieved by admitting a common neutral background between the 
parties involved, the idea of a religiously biased science is incompatible with my 
suggestion. The consequence of its admission in my proposal would be an 
7 Plantinga's criticisms of ontological naturalism (see PlantInga 2000: 229ff) are not a criticism to 
science itself (see Plantinga 2000: 406n). Rather, they reject a certain metaphysical inteEpretation of 
scientific data, and do so, in my view, based on public evidence and solid inferential standards. This is 
why I do not agree that his position is fideistic. See also Plantinga 1996: 2 10-1. 
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irremediable relativism, since there would be no way, even in princi ing "ple, of washi 
out the initial divergence of probability estimations. 
Abraham classifies Swinburne's programme as hard rationalist (see Abraham 
1985: 115ff). It is characterised by the attempt to reinstate the arguments of natural 
theology in the form of a cumulative case that is quantified and laid out according to 
the probability calculus. The appeal to public evidence and logic - especially 
inductive logic and its main component in Swinburne's approach, Bayes's theorem - 
as the sole tools to be used in the justification of religious belief is what give this 
stance the character of hard rationalism (see Abraham 1985: 118). In addition, 
Swinburne reduces this discussion to the debate about God's existence, not allowing 
much room for the specific beliefs of a particular faith to interfere in the analysis. 
Abraham finds many problems in the hard rationalist approach. Firstly, the 
reduction of the theistic tradition to a minimum core given by natural theology puts 
ordinary believers on the sidelines until the question of the epistemic justification of 
theism is sorted out by the philosophers (see Abraham 1985: 100). Secondly, the 
mystery and complexity of God are eliminated by being completely reduced and 
rephrased according to concepts accessible to secular believers. Thirdly, hard 
rationalism fails to account for the fact that the 'believer's assurance does not rise and 
fall with evidence' (Abraham 1985: 102), that is, the tenacity of belief which we 
observe among religious believers does not depend so directly on probability 
assessments. In fact, Abraham claims, 'many ordinary believers and most saints do 
not treat their religious beliefs as simply more probable than not. They claim a 
certainty which is much deeper than this' (Abraham 1985: 121). Fourthly, hard 
rationalism does not take religious experience properly into account in its approach to 
the justification of religious beliefs, considering this is not merely a piece of evidence 
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in an inductive argument, but an inward and subjective factor that is crucial to 
religious conversion. In other words, hard rationalism, in its attempt to talk in terms 
understandable to the secular believer, ends up to misrepresenting rellglous actIvItY, 
which means it does not work as an epistemology of religious belief (see Abraham 
1985: 129). 
As we saw in Chapter 2.1.2 (p. 45), Robert Prevost points to a problem with 
Swinburne's approach in addition to that suggested above by Abraham. According to 
Prevost, Bayes's theorem cannot account for the details of a crucial discussion in 
natural theology such as the problem of evil (see Prevost 1990: 21 and 26). Indeed, 
John Hick joins Prevost in claiming that Swinbume's probabilistic approach is not 
adequate to discuss the degree of disconfirmation the existence of evil means to the 
belief that there is a God. In contrast with Prevost, Hick claims that the problem with 
the Bayesian discussion of evil is not that it cannot account for the details involved,, 
but that Bayes's theorem as a probability tool requires exact quantitative proportions 
to operate, and Swinburne does not provide any numerical values in his arguments. In 
fact, claims Hick, Swinbume has, nghtly, not even attempted to establish such 
precise relative values. He is fully aware of the impossibility of doing any such thing' 
(Hick 1989: 108). In other words, the probabilistic argument Swinburne provides is 
simply a qualitative judgement informed by a fon-nula that is fundamentally 
quantitative, but the question of God's existence does not allow for numerical 
estimates of probability. As a result, Swinburne"s approach is not able to deten-nine 
the probability of theism as he intended, or in Hick's words, '[ ... ] the argument, 
fascinating though it is does not succeed. The universe does not penrilt probability 
logic to dispel its religious ambiguity' (Hick 1989: 108). 
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Hick is right when he says that probability basically involves numerical values 
and that Swinburne's approach does not take this fact seriously. However, Hick does 
not say why it would be impossible to estimate these values in the case of theism. 
There may be no way of justifying such an ascription using the logical theory of 
probability, that is, if we demand universally justifiable and neutral criteria for 
assigning those figures. Nevertheless, there is no such impossibility if we take 
probability as degree of belief that could be measured by the betting quotient in a 
psychological experiment. In other words, there is no problem in prmciple with 
attributing quantitative values as a measure of the degree of belief in a hypothesis in 
view of evidence using the intersubjective approach to Bayesian probability. Thus 
Hick's critique of Swinburne can be subverted. 
All figures we can obtain will be disputable, but a figure may still be worth 
using since this procedure can be helpful, just as it is sometimes helpful to quantify a 
student's perforniance through a numerical mark even if this is not an exact 
quantitative matter 8. Take the example of the problem of evil: if it does not make 
theism logically impossible then it does not reduce this hypothesis to zero probability. 
In this case, the degree of belief in theism in view of the occurrence of evil will be in 
a range defined by the extent to which the existence of God explains this piece of 
evidence in comparison with incompatible alternative explanations. Swinbume's 
defence and theodicy, however schematic they might be in The Existence of God. ) 
aims to provide the elements for making theism at least as compatible with evil as 
ontological naturalism. If successful, the result of that enterprise would really be that 
the argument of evil is neutral regarding theism and the main rival of theism, i. e. that 
8 For an interesting discussion of the problem of numerical estimations of qualltatIve Issues see GIlles 
(2000: 202) and Bartholomew (1996: 36-7). 
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P(e1h-k)=P(e1-h. k), which means in this context that the likelihood of theism in view 
of evil would be 0.5. 
In other words, 'we lack the quantitative data needed to put the fonnula to 
work' as Hick claims if we think only from a frequentist or logical standpoint in 
probability theory, which prevent any personal or intersubjective judgement in 
probability estimation. However, in the approach outh IIIn ion ined in this thesis the asc ipti 
of values will be a matter of quantifying our degree of belief in a certain propositional 
relationship. Proceeding in this way, we may develop a clearer evaluation of the 
coherence of our degrees of belief and a better account of how the likelihood of 
theism in view of a certain piece of evidence interacts with the likelihood it acquires 
in view of other phenomena, by means of the updating of prior degrees of belief in the 
hypothesis. 
Still, even if the Bayesian approach can help us to check the coherence of our 
beliefs and control the process of updating belief in view of evidence, Hick seems to 
have a point when he claims that 'the universe does not pen-nit probability logic to 
dispel its religious ambiguity' (Hick 1989: 108). Certainly, Bayesian inductive logic 
is not able to dispel the religious ambiguity of the universe. But that is not its 
function, and in fact Swinburne has never held that it is. The forinalisation of 
inductive inference provided by the Bayesian approach cannot by itself settle the 
problem of justification of theism for the same reason deductive logic cannot all alone 
take us to truth, namely because this is not their function. What we can expect from 
them is to find some guidance as to how to deal with the content of our beliefs so that 
we can draw conclusions about their validity or probability in a more coherent way. 
Hick's contention is analogous to Prevost's criticism to the effect that Bayes's 
theorem cannot prevent different interlocutors from drawing different conclusions if 
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they use different criteria (see Prevost 1990: 32). In fact, it would be surprising if it 
could. Bayes's theorem is an algorithm that gives you results depending on how you 
feed the formula, that is, if it has different inputs the outputs will obviously be 
different. To dismiss the Bayesian approach on the charge that it falls short of our 
expectations because of this point is analogous to say that deductive logic is of no 
avail because people who start with different premises will necessarily draw different 
conclusions in a valid inference. Prevost notices quite clearly the crucial divergence 
between Swinburne and Mackie regarding the prior probability of theism (see Prevost 
1990: 39), but thinks this is a problem for the Bayesian account as a whole, and a 
reason for its outright dismissal. However, according to the view developed in this 
thesis,, the problem raised by Prevost is not a failure of Bayesianism as such, but of 
the logical theory's account of it, which I criticised and to which I suggested the 
intersubjective approach as an altemative. 
In fact, there are reasons to hold that the intersubjective approach to the 
Bayesian epistemology of theism may be an improvement on Basil Mitchell's 
cumulative case method for the justification of the belief in God, which Prevost takes 
as a better altemative to Swinbume's (see Prevost 1990: 94). 
Mitchell's project is to find a method for discussing the justification of theistic 
belief in an argumentative way so that the question is not taken as either a matter of 
deductive proof or of 'strict probability'. This refusal to use deductive and inductive 
forms of reasoning in the attempt to justify theism argumentatively entitles him to be 
considered a good representative of 'soft rationalism' (see Abraham 1985: 106). 
According to Mitchell, 
Among the reasons, both philosophical and theological, for denying that there can 
be a rational case for Christianity the most influential has been the assumption 
that any argument, to be rational, must conform to the requirements of proof or 
strict probability. The contention of the present chapter , vill be that the 
assumption in question is false. In it I shall endeavour to show that In fields other 
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than theology we commonly, and justifiably, make use of arguments other than 
those of proof or strict probability; and that, typically, theological arguments are 
of this kind (Mitchell 1973: 39). 
The notion of 'strict probability' is clarified in an endnote, in which Mitchell says that 
'the sense of "probable" involved here is that in which the probability of an event is 
determined by its relation to a class or classes of similar events' (Mitchell 1973: 158, 
Chapter 2, endnote I). As we saw, Swinburne also believes that the justification of 
theism does not involve deductive proofs. Moreover, Swinburne certainly agrees with 
Mitchell that natural theology does not act in the probabilistic argument in the way 
presented by Mitchell. As we saw in Chapter 7.1 (p. 205), Swinbume classifies what 
Mitchell calls 'strict probability' as 'statistical probability', which Swinburne does not 
consider adequate to deal with the confinnatory relationship between evidence and 
hypothesis (see Swinburne 1973: 12). The extent to which the evidence of evil or of 
the occurrence of order in the physical world increases or decreases the probability of 
theism, for example, is a matter of what Swinbume names 'inductive probability', 
which Mitchell simply does not consider in his proposal. In other words, in ruling out 
the importance of deductive arguments and of statistical probability, Mitchell is not 
saying anything Swinburne denies. 
However, the dismissal of deductive and statistical arguments is only the first 
stage in Mitchell's description of a method he believes to be more adequate for 
dealing with the justification of theism. In his words, 
What has been taken to be a series of failures when treated as attempts at purely 
deductive or inductive argument could well be better understood as contributions 
to a cumulative case. On this view the theist is urging that traditional Christian 
theism makes better sense of all the evidence available than does any alternative 
on offer, and the atheist is contesting the claim (Mitchell 1973: 39-40) 
Mitchell contrasts deductive and statistical approaches with one in which the 
arguments are not treated in isolation but instead reinforce one another. Yet this is 
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another coincidence between Mitchell and Swinburne's proposals, since Swinburne 
also alms to build a cumulative case with the aid of Bayes's fon-nula. However, while 
Swinburne puts the cumulative case for theism in terms of the Bayesian 
conditionalisation rule (despite not having been very faithful to it in drawing up his 
final conclusion), Mitchell suggests that mutual argumentative reinforcement should 
be achieved in an infori-nal way, by means of personal judgement (see Abraham 1985: 
117). 
The reason Mitchell gives for his stated preference is that theism and atheism 
are world-views, whose interaction is similar to that between alternative scientific 
paradigms, as described by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
In this kind of debate, the parties involved cannot resort to any precise rule to decide 
which world-view gives a better account of evidence. The most they can do is to use 
criteria such as consistency, coherence, simplicity, and explanatory power, which do 
not belong to any particular world-view in particular. As a result, adherents of 
divergent standpoints can resolve their disagreements through rational means using 
this kind of inter-paradigm criteria and what Mitchell calls 'trained personal 
judgement' (see Mitchell 1973: 95). 
Now the use of criteria, like those mentioned above, to discern the 
comparative plausibility of world views such as theism and ontological naturalism is 
not what distinguishes between Mitchell's and the Bayesian approach. In fact, as 
Salmon argues in 'Rationality and Objectivity in Science or Tom Kuhn meets Tom 
Bayes', Bayes's theorem and the axioms of probability calculus also capture in a 
formal manner the criteria Kuhn suggested for adjudicating among theories (see 
Salmon 1998: 577). In this way, those criteria can be more precisely forinulated and 
can more usefully guide our perception regarding the coherence of our degrees of 
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belief and the relative explanatory power of two rival hypotheses vis-a-vis the same 
set of phenomena. Even the 'trained judgement' needed to make possible the inter- 
paradigmatic discussion can be accounted for in Bayes's theorem as a resort to a 
common background knowledge k in view of which the rival theories are assessed. In 
other words, if Salmon's arguments are correct, not only can the recourse to tralned 
judgement and Kuhnian theory choice criteria be fon-nulated in Bayesian ten-ns,, but 
they can also become clearer and more functional in that form. 
In fact, Swinburne also proposes the use of criteria of the type mentioned by 
Mitchell in the debate between theists and naturalists. The difference is that 
Swinburne thinks those criteria are universal and impersonal grounds for deciding in a 
purely a priori way the initial probability of the rival positions at issue. For Mitchell, 
guided by the analogy provided by critical exegesis and historical interpretation, the 
search for an agreed starting-point is not the way to proceed in the debate about the 
justification of theism. Instead of looking for a universally agreed initial position, the 
debate can more successfully progress if the contenders discuss which of the rival 
accounts 'makes better sense' of the available evidence (see Mitchell 1973: 53). Note 
that this is basically the position I defend regarding prior probabilities (the starting 
points in Bayesian inductive reasoning), that is, we can allow for the contending 
parties to start from different degrees of belief, since in the long run the consideration 
of public evidence and shared criteria may wash out the initial disagreement. Even 
the main condition for this kind of discussion to proceed successfully, postulated by 
Mitchell (i. e. that the contenders do not take extreme positions (see Mitchell 1973: 
109)), can be accounted for in Bayesian terms. As we saw above, we can only hope 
for a solution of such debates through rational means if the parties share a 
considerable amount of background knowledge and do not have too disparate Initial 
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degrees of belief. So, given those conditions, what will deten-nine the possibility of 
resolving the discussion through argument will be the likelihood inferences, that is, 
the extent to which the evidence e becomes probable in view of the hypotheses at play 
(i. e. whether P(e1hi. k)<P(e1h2. k)) and in relation to its own degree of expectedness 
(that is, whether P(elk) <P(elh i. k) and if P(elk) <P(el'h2l)). In other words, in tenns of 
the approach defended in this thesis, Mitchell is right in denying the importance of 
discussing the contenders' initial positions, but with this denial does not go the whole 
idea of applying the Bayesian approach to the justification of theism. Instead the 
Bayesian account can give a clearer description of the ideas involved in 'defining 
initial positions in the debate' and 'making sense of evidence', which remain very 
vague in Mitc e I's proposal. 
Abraham, however, seems to block the move to interpret soft rationalism in 
Bayesian tenns when he affinus that 'what is vital to realize is that there is no fonnal 
calculus into which all the evidence can be fitted and assessed. There is an irreducible 
element of personal judgement, which weighs up the evidence taken as a whole' 
(Abraham 1985: 106). In fact, we cannot combine the role of personal judgement 
with the Bayesian approach if the latter is interpreted in Swinbume's way, since 
Swinburrie intends to deal with probability in a purely objective manner, according to 
the canons of the logical theory. However, there is no reason to reject the 
combination of formal inductive reasoning and personal insights in the proposal I am 
outlining in this chapter. Mitchell's personal judgement is carefully described as 
being a trained one, that is, one does not deal with the matter in a purely idiosyncratic 
way, and we can account for that through the intersubjective approach defended here. 
According to Abraham, soft rationalism has, like any philosophical position, 
both virtues and vices as a method of accounting for the justification of religious 
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belief Among the virtues he enumerates: 1) it reveals the pattern which this kind of 
dispute generally makes; 2) it makes more explicit the self-involving nature of 
religious belief by stressing the crucial place of religious experience as a ground for 
religious belief-, 3) it does justice to the subjective elements that are so important to 
religious believers, and 4) it makes sense of both the tenacity of religious belief and 
the certainty that often accompanies it (see Abraham 1985: 109-10). 
These positive elements of soft rationalism are also present in the proposal 
defended in this thesis. First, by acknowledging that the parties involved in the debate 
"out theism start from different backgrounds with regard to religious matters I aim au I 
to give a more realistic picture of what is involved in the debate between theists and 
atheists. In fact , it is the relevance of religious experience in my proposal - the 
second point raised by Abraham - that will magnify the difference between the ways 
that theists and atheists assess the initial probability of theism. In other words, my 
proposal uses religious experience as an element that influences the prior opinion of 
the theists engaged in the debate because that is something they partake in even before 
engaging in debate with non-believers. Third, my approach also allows for subjective 
elements to enter in the discussion by adopting a theory of probability that is an 
extension of the subjective theory. In other words, even in the context of rational 
debate, the approach takes seriously the particular elements of religious faith that an 
individual shares with his community. Fourth, the intersubjective approach assumes 
that the assessment of the probability of theism is relative to a particular context of 
debate. The tenacity and certainty of religious belief is recognised by the approach as 
legitimate in a context where religious believers are not preoccupied with building 
bridges between themselves and a non-believing environment. On the other hand, 
even when it is dealing with 'people who neither know that God exists nor 
know that 
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God does not exist' - to use Mitchell's expression (see Mitchell 1973: 109) -, the 
approach permits us to account for the high degree of belief in God assumed by the 
theist involved in the debate, since until evidence is able to settle the matter, the 
specific prior assigned by the theist will have a strong influence upon his posterior 
degree of belief in theism. 
Further, the intersubjective approach seems able to give satisfactory answers 
to the three main deficiencies of soft rationalism pointed out by Abraham. According 
to Abraham,, a first problem with Mitchell's proposal is the vagueness of the notion of 
a world-view. A second difficulty is the danger of subjectivism in an account where 
personal judgement plays such an important role. The third weak point of soft 
rationalism is the possibility that the training of personal judgement, which is the soft 
rationalist reply to the second difficulty, is nothing but training in a particular 
tradition,, which will not help with the aim of resolving religious issues through 
discussion (see Abraham 1985: 11 Off). 
As regards the first point, the intersubjective approach assumes that belief in 
'the theist hypothesis' is part of a whole in the sense that it acknowledges its 
communal character and the crucial place religious experience has in grounding the 
belief Moreover, it is able to distinguish a certain element from this whole for 
analysis, specifically the belief that God exists. In fact the debate between theists and 
atheists is also the main preconception of Mitchell's approach (see Mitchell 1973: 
59ff). Yet, while in Mitchell it is not clear how the whole picture is related to the 
point about theism, and there is no indication about how the cumulative case works, in 
my approach these problems are better managed. First, Bayesian intersubjectivism 
accounts for the relationship between the justification of theism and the whole set of 
religious beliefs by stating that in this particular philosophical debate the prior 
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probability of theism is determined by the religious background of the theist. Second, 
the different grounds for the theist's belief, which make for a cumulative case, are 
combined with each other through the rule of conditionalisation. In this way, my 
approach both deals with a much more specific and manageable element than a world 
view and is able to relate this specific discussion to that broad standpoint in a clearer 
way than in Mitchell's proposal. 
As to the second and third difficulties in soft rationalism, the intersubjective 
position also seems to give a better answer than Mitchell's proposal. The accusation 
of subjectivism is met not only by the charactensation of the debate in tenns of 
intersubjective probability, but also by the idea that the subsequent discussion can be 
carried out in terms of common terrain between theists and atheists. As a result, and 
this is related to the third problem of soft rationalism, the crucial point regarding the 
possibility of resolving the question through personal judgement turns on the extent to 
which theists and ontological naturalists share a common background knowledge. 
The larger this intersection the easier it is to obtain an argumentative solution to the 
question at issue. In my proposal an attempt to enable this condition is made by 
characterising the group of theists involved in the discussion as those interested in 
making belief in God intellectually respectable in academic and scientific circles, 
which in fact excludes those who Abraham classifies as 'fidelsts'9. 
In sum, my proposal intends to stand between Swinburne's and Mitchell's 
approaches, aiming to be an improvement on both which benefits from their good 
points but avoids their specific problems. The intersubjective Bayesian approach 
assumes Bayesianism as a good interpretation of the arguments of natural theology as 
inferences to the best explanation. In this way, it is able to benefit from the rigour and 
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precision which a forn-lal approach is able to provide. Yet it gives an important place 
to religious experience, giving to the internal elements of reli ious practice a more g 
important and realistic place than in Swi I proposal. In doing so, the 
intersubjective approach claims not to fall into subjectivism, since the particularity of 
the initial degree of belief in theism is supplemented by the objective elements of 
public evidence, formal reasoning and (to a certain extent) common background 
knowledge. 
Certainly the proposal offered is also open to many criticisms. Perhaps the 
main one is that it is still too green and schematic. In fact all I could hope to achieve 
in this chapter, as I repeatedly observed in many occasions, was simply to outline a 
programme. Many challenges open up on the horizon, since the task of building up a 
positive account is much more difficult than the task of criticising other accounts. I 
will be content if I was at least able to show that my account is promising. 
Recall that I do not agree that Plantinga's position is fidelstic. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to present a way of using Bayes's theorem and religious 
experience in the justification of theism that were an alternative to that proposed by 
Richard Swinburne. In order to attain this goal, I described and analysed Swinburne's 
approach, criticised the flaws found in it and advanced a different means of dealing 
with these two main elements of his epistemology of the belief in God. These tasks 
were accomplished in eight chapters, and in what follows I will summarise the main 
points that I believe are the thesis' contributions to the critical interpretation of 
Swinbume's philosophy and to the epistemology of theistic belief 
Despite being largely a description of Swinburne's approach, Chapter I is 
important because it establishes the link between the Bayesian methodology adopted 
by him and the target-public he aims at, a consideration that is particularly relevant to 
the proposal that will be forinulated in the end. In addition, that initial account also 
emphasises the crucial role played by religious experience in Swinbume's 
epistemology of theism. Moreover, I adopted William Abraham's classification of 
Swinburne's methodology - called 'hard rationalism' - in order to better understand 
Swinburne's proposal and prepare for the eventual formulation of my alternative. 
Chapter 2 consists of a review of the critics of Swinburne's methodology. In 
this review, I briefly advanced the main idea defended in this thesis, i. e. that the 
rejection of Swinburrie's Bayesian approach to the epistemology of theism does not 
mean denying any place to this methodology in the justification of theistic belief as 
such. I argued that the existing reasons for a complete rejection of the Bayesian 
approach in the area were flawed, and that even a criticism of Swinburne's way of 
dealing with it would only be successful after a thorough analysis of his principle of 
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simplicity, which is the distinctive element in his Bayesian discussion of the 
rationality of theism. 
Chapter 3 was then devoted to the critical discussion of Swinbume's 
simplicity principle. After reviewing important authors on this matter, such as Mano 
Bunge, Rom Harre and Mary Hesse, I presented Swinbume's defence of the 
epistemological importance of simplicity in light of his new developments in the area, 
put forward in Simplicity as Evidence of Truth (1997) and Epistemic Justification 
(2001). In these two works, Swinburne considerably improves his theory by making 
the concept of simplicity more precise, by clarifying its application in scientific 
reasoning, and by presenting new arguments for the idea that simplicity is an a priori 
indication of the truth of a theory. 
Although the improvements regarding earlier developments were significant, I 
held that there were still too many problems with the principle of simplicity to permit 
it to have the prominent role it enjoys in Swinbume's epistemology of theism. As to 
the definition of simplicity, even after the exclusion of notions like 'naturalness', and 
cneatness', and the concentration on the quantitative aspects of simplicity, the concept 
still remains with too many meanings, which is a potential source of confusion. In 
addition, the stnpped-down notion of simplicity in Swinbume (1997) and (2001) 
excludes elements relied on in The Existence of God to give theism high intrinsic 
probability. 
As to the application of simplicity to the task of selecting theories, I pointed to 
two problems in Swinburne's proposal. First, being a multifaceted concept, the 
employment of this criterion to select the most probable theory will produce 
conflicting results, for different theories are said to be simple according to different 
facets. This possibility diminishes considerably the room for the ascnption of priors 
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to be made in strictly universal and impersonal terms. Indeed, Swinbume recognises 
the problem, but claims that potential clashes are solved on the basis of the consensus 
existing in the scientific community (see Swinburne 1997: 30). However, this 
indicates that the members of the scientific community have in their background 
knowledge more than tautologies and empirical data, in contrast to what is implied by 
Swinbume's account (see Swinbume 1991: 53 and 2001a: 93). According to 
Swinburne, scientists should know a priori the criteria for distinguishing which Is the 
most relevant concept of simplicity in a given concrete situation of theory choice. 
This point allowed me to argue for an expanded notion of background knowledge, 
which also includes inference rules, mathematical concepts, heuristic values and 
inductive criteria, which are neither tautologies nor empirical claims. As a result, far 
from being universally applicable and totally impersonal, the principle of simplicity 
would only make sense as a criterion for theory choice in a particular context and 
relative to a definite community of researchers, which have in common a certain 
background knowledge that includes elements such as the principle of simplicity 
itself Second, the application of the simplicity principle was neither as direct nor 
totally impersonal as Swinburne intended. In fact, simplicity is a matter of degree, 
and it only represents a quality in a theory if it is present in it at the right level. Again, 
the definition of what is the nght level depends on the context and on the consensus of 
a particular community of researchers. In other words, the highest degree of 
simplicity (assuming we can define it unambiguously) does not mean the highest a 
pri . ori . prior probability. A theory can be excessively simple, and if it is simplistic, its 
prior should be correspondingly low according to this criterion, even before we 
consider any empirical evidence. 
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Lastly, I argued that the justification provided by Swinbume for the 
epistemological value of simplicity was also highly disputable. According to 
Swinburne, one of the reasons why simplicity is an indication of the truth of a 
hypothesis is that, among the criteria for hypothesis selection, simplicity would be the 
most important for defining the prior probability of large-scale theon I Swinbume 
postulates three such criteria: scope, fitness with background knowledge and 
simplicity. As to the first, he says we should prefer simplicity because this generally 
outweighs scope in determining prior probability (see Swinburne 1991: 106). In fact, 
this priority of simplicity over scope is rather doubtful as a claim about the history of 
science, but even if Swinbume is nght on this point, what will settle the conflict 
between the evaluations on these two critena does not seem to be any a priori 
principle, but the background knowledge shared by the relevant research community. 
In other words,, the decision to invest in a hypothesis despite its broad scope and 
because it is simpler than its competitors will be based on a trained judgement, that is,, 
one that conforms more closely to the relevant background knowledge. 
Swinburne's dismissal of the criterion of fitness with background knowledge 
in view of simplicity is also controversial. On the one hand, he argues that it does not 
apply to large-scale theories like theism, because background knowledge includes 
only empirical information (see Swinburne 2001a: 91 and 1991: 53), and the theistic 
hypothesis is intended to explain all empirical phenomena. However, as I held above, 
there is no reason to exclude from background knowledge non-empirical information 
such as inductive standards, logical rules, mathematical laws and heuristic values. On 
the other hand, Swinburne claims that the criterion of background knowledge bolls 
down to the criteria of yielding the data and of simplicity since when we say a theory 
is plausible because it fits with what we know we mean it does so in the simplest way 
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(see Swinbume 1997: 41). Yet, even if we may include the notion of simplicity to 
spell out the operation of the criterion of background knowledge, this is not the only 
concept involved, and not even the most central one. Simplicity may express the iýýay 
a hypothesis h relates to a body of established information so that we evaluate h as 
plausible, but it does not say anything about the nature of the criterion of fitness with 
background knowledge. In other words, the criterion of fitness cannot be reduced to 
that of simplicity because its definition does not give central place to the idea of being 
simple, but rather to a theory's being logically consistent with an accepted body of 
information. 
As I held in Chapter 3.3 (pp. 83f) there is reason to believe that it is the 
criterion of simplicity that can be reduced to that of fitness with background 
knowledge. On the one hand, the notion of simplicity can only be understood in 
relation to a context. In other words, nothing is simple in itself, but only in view of a 
given property or facet that can only be evident in the context of a particular 
discussion. On the other hand, the application of the criterion of simplicity requires 
the notion of background knowledge as well. 
Moreover, the very rationale used by Swinburne to justify the simplicity 
principle is doubtful in view of the probability calculus. For Swinburne, we need the 
simplicity principle to select the most plausible theories from a potentially infinite set 
of competing alternatives (see Swinburne 1991: 55). However, as we saw in Chapter 
3.4 (pp. 94f), when considering an infinite number of hypotheses, we can only ascribe 
prior probability zero according to the probability calculus. Even if we allow a non- 
standard mathematical analysis of the problem, which deals with the question in terms 
in concrete processes of infinitesimal numbers, a serious difficulty remains because, i 
of theory choice, one does not consider an infinite number of exclusive alternatives, 
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but only those actually believed relevant by the research community concerned. In 
other words, Swinburrie's fundamental reason for postulating the principle of 
simplicity is based on too artificial and implausible a scenario for the way theory 
choice happens in scientific contexts. 
Moreover, Swinburne is not clear about the way simplicity factors into 
Bayes's theorem. He admits the principle of simplicity is not analytic, but synthetic a 
priori (Swinbume 1997: 50-1). Further, he asserts at various points that in the 
estimate of the prior probability of theism we should leave all empirical data to the 
evidence and consider in background knowledge k only tautologies (see, for example, 
Swinbume 1991: 65,68,90,107,129). This means that in Swinbume's account there 
is no place to factor simplicity into Bayes's theorem at all, since it is neither a 
tautology nor an empirical truth. 
After dealing with a crucial point of Swinbume's application of Bayes's 
theorem to the justification of theistic belief, I devoted the three following chapters to 
religious experience, the other main subject of his enterprise. Chapter 4 was, in 
essence, a description of Swinburne's approach to religious experience and an 
analysis of the role it has in the overall argument in favour of the belief that there is a 
God. My claim there was that the fact that Swinburne does not use the Bayesian 
analysis as he does in the other arguments does not mean an abandonment of that 
method, as many of his interpreters view it. Instead, religious experience was taken 
as another inductive argument, but its character and the place reserved for it by 
Swinbume required some groundwork to make it function as such. The principles of 
credulity and testimony were necessary to make the hypothesis of theism the best 
explanation for religious experience, making it able in fact to tip the balance of 
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probability in favour of theism, as Swinburne holds in the final pages of The 
Existence of God. 
However, it is also possible to detect considerable problems in Swinbume's 
handling of religious experience. As I expounded at the end of Chapter 4 (pp. 129f. ), 
if we follow his own calculations,, the cumulative evidence provided by the other 
arguments in favour of theism already seemed sufficiently strong to raise the posterior 
probability of theism well above 50%, making the religious experience argument 
completely redundant. Moreover, there were important difficulties with religious 
experience as a compelling inductive argument, the very thing Swinbume intended it 
to be. The arguments for not considering religious experience as a basis for a 
universally acceptable inductive argument were presented in Chapter 5. The main 
contention was that the most Swinburne was able to achieve was a defensive position, 
according to which one could take religious experience at face value given some 
inductive principles. However, once we saw that perceptions require a conceptual 
background to be identified and explained, and once the background assumed in 
religious perception is seen to be not as universal as that which is required for sense 
perception, I concluded that, contra Swinburne, scepticism regarding religious 
experience is not as irrational as scepticism about sense perception. 
In Chapter 6,1 discussed William Alston's alternative use of the phenomenon 
of religious experience in the justification of theistic belief, and compared it with 
Swinburne's attempt, which is something not very well explored in the literature. 
Instead of employing it in an inductive argument, Alston postulated that religious 
experience provides an immediate basic belief that there is a God. However, 
interpreted Alston's approach as confirming a prima facie belief in God only in those 
participants who use socially established means of forming bellefs In a particular 
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religion. Consequently, while Alston's approach to religious experience looks 
broadly immune to most cri. 111 iticisms addressed against Swinburne's attempt, the result 
is, in fact, a much weaker and particular justification for believing that there is a God. 
Taking Alston's position, that religious experience should be viewed as providing 
initial grounds for theism I held that we could re-use his ideas in a Bayesian 
methodology of religious epistemology, providing it is combined with other means of 
justifýing theistic belief In order to do so, however, I needed a theory of probability 
different to that defended by Swinburne. 
Chapter 7 was then dedicated to discussing in great depth Swinburne's theory 
of probability. His concept of probability Is pluralistic and allows the attribution of 
probability values to a hypothesis in view of evidence, norinally called 'epistemic 
7 
probability . Given the aims of this thesis, I concentrated on the 
discussion of the 
status of epistemic probability, which Swinburne prefers to name 'Inductive'. 
Swinburne adopts the logical theory of probability as a means of assigning a prior 
probability value to a theory in Bayes's theorem. In his version of this theory of 
probability, the initial degree of belief with which a proposition is to be held should 
be determined by a priori and impersonal criteria, known to a logically omniscient 
being, and of which we have a limited comprehension. The principle of simplicity, 
extensively discussed in Chapter 3, plays a major role in this theory, since it is the 
main criterion for attributing a probability value to a hypothesis before the 
consideration of evidence. In addition to the criticisms I formulated In Chapter 3, new 
III in to considerations stemming from the subjective theory of probability were brought i 
argue that the logical theory fails because it cannot live up to its promises. In other 
words, as de Finetti, Collin Howson and other representatives of subjective 
Bayesianism assert, logicists deny any place to infon-nal and personal judgement in 
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probability estimation, only to resort to them at every turn. However, I did find 
problems in the subjective theory: its difficulty in establishing a relationship between 
probability and truth, and its exclusively individualistic account of probability 
estimation. I therefore defended the intersubjective theory of probability which, 
although an extension of the subjective theory, incorporates the missing elements 
pointed to by the critics of subjectivism. 
In the intersubjective approach to epistemic probability, the degree of belief is 
detennined by the background knowledge shared by a group of individuals who share 
not only a common set of concepts but also a common objective. In this way, their 
prior probability attribution, for example, is not a matter of the idiosyncratic views of 
an individual, but of a consensus shared by a select group, such as the scientific 
community or the religious believers who are interested in justifying their belief that 
God exists. Following the suggestion of Gillies, the measure of this degree of belief 
is given by the amount of money the group agrees to bet on the hypothesis in a 
psychological experiment. This approach also allows for the possibility that more 
than one prior probability assignment may be made, given different groups with 
different backgrounds. 
In the last chapter, I outlined an alternative proposal for applYing Bayes's 
theorem and religious experience to the justification of theism on the intersubjective 
approach. The idea is that religious experience should be a factor in the background 
knowledge of one of the main parties involved in the question of justification of 
theistic belief Since the approach permits more than one estimate of prior probability 
to the hypothesis of theism, it allows us to take senously the fact that theists and 
naturalists adopt different starting points in the debate or, In Alston's terrns, that they 
belong to different doxastic practices. If we take the justification of theism as a 
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philosophical question and define the group of theists as those who share the objective 
of showing that theism is intellectually respectable to scientific and academic circles, 
then we have the outcome that the two main parties involved will share a significant 
amount of background knowledge. It is the sharing of this common ground that 
permits us to think that, despite their initially divergent prior probabilities, they can 
move to a rational resolution of the point at issue. In other words, it is because, and to 
the extent that, they agree about a set of evidence and inferential rules that the theist 
and the atheist can overcome their initial disagreement. 
Put this way, the intersubjective Bayesian approach could be placed in an 
intermediate position between Swinburne's 'hard rationalism' and Mitchell's 'soft 
rationalism', to use Abraham's terminology. It agrees with Swinbume that the 
probability calculus can help to make the arguments more ngorous and coherent, and 
to clarify notions like 'making better sense' and 'cumulative case', which are very 
vague in Mitchell's account. On the other hand, it allows for different starting points 
to theists and naturalists, recognising the crucial role religious experience has for the 
theistic side, and accepts that this discussion involves both a priori critena and 
(inter)personal judgement. In addition, the intersubjective approach is able to provide 
a concept of rationality for evaluating the positions involved. In Bayesian tenns they 
will be considered rational if they are coherent in their probability estimations, if they 
update their prior probabilities in view of evidence according to the rule of 
conditional i sation and if their final degree of belief is proportionate with the posterior 
probability obtained in the course of the debate. 
I do recognise that the intersubjective Bayesian approach to the epistemology 
of theism outlined above is still very programmatic, and that it contains many points 
deserving clarification. At least, I hope to have shown that it is an alternative that 
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overcomes most of the problems that appear in Swinburne's position, and thus that it 
deserves further development as a methodology in religious epistemology. In other 
words , if we are to use 
Bayes's theorem in this discussion, then the suggestions I have 
made here should be added to the significant contribution Richard Swinburne has 
made to the area. 
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